An Economic Analysis of Governmental Exchange. by Lange, Ralph William
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1974
An Economic Analysis of Governmental Exchange.
Ralph William Lange
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lange, Ralph William, "An Economic Analysis of Governmental Exchange." (1974). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 2616.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/2616
INFORMATION TO USERS
This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While 
the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original 
submitted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.
1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent 
pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it 
is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have 
moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a 
good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being 
photographed the photographer followed a definite method in 
"sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper 
left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to 
right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is 
continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until 
complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, 
however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from 
"photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver 
prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing 
the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and 
specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as 
received.
Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
5 1;l
74-24,785
LANGE, Ralph William, 1942- 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENTAL EXCHANGE.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Ph.D., 1974 Economics, general
University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OP GOVERNMENTAL EXCHANGE
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Economics
byRalph William Lange 
B.A., Southeastern Louisiana University, 1964 
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1966
May, 1974
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author wishes to express his sincere apprecia­
tion to Dr. R. A. Flammang for his guidance and constructive 
criticism. Also the writer is indebted to Dr. T. R. Beard 
and Dr. William Campbell who read the original manuscript 
and offered many helpful suggestions. Grateful acknowl­
edgment is expressed to Patricia Lange, the author's wife, 
for her encouragement throughout the study.
To Mrs. Katheryn McWaters goes my appreciation for 




ACKNOWLEDGMENT .....................................  ii
LIST OP TABLES.....................................  v
LIST OP F I G U R E S ...................................  vi
ABSTRACT......................... viii
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION ...............................  1
Statement of the Problem 
Purpose and Nature of Study
II. PAST AND PRESENT STATE TRADING.............. 8
The Early Period 
The Mercantile Period 
The Classical Period 
The Twentieth Century
Recent State Trading Activities 
State Trading in Retrospect
III. GOALS AND CONSEQUENCES OP STATE TRADING . . 31
General Objectives 
The Economic Consequences of State 
Trading (Static)
Economic Consequences of State 
Trading (Dynamic)
IV. THE COMPARATIVE COST DOCTRINE AS A
THEORY OP STATE TRADING ................... 70
The Comparative Cost Doctrine 
Comparative Costs as Applied to 
State Trading 




V. GAME THEORY AS APPLIED TO STATE
T R A D I N G ...................................  92
Assumptions of Game Theory
The Zero Sum Game (Two State Traders)
A Simple Game Theory Model 
Probability and Power
The Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi Solution 
for Bilateral Power Positions 
The Values Within the Payoff Matrix
VI. STATE TRADING IN W H E A T .....................  130
The Wheat and Food Aid Treaty
The Soviet-American Wheat Deal
The Cost and Benefits of the Deal
State Trading and Game Theory Applications
VII. STATE TRADING IN OIL— THE OPEC CASE . . . .  160
The OPEC— Its Origin and Development 
Recent OPEC Activities
The OPEC Lesson
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION..................... 185
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................  205




1. U. S. Agricultural Exports and Government
Financed Programs, Calendar Years of
195^-69  ...............................  24
2. U. S. Agricultural Exports and Government
Financed Programs, Calendar Years of
1954-69 (Total Agricultural Exports) . . . .  25
3. Title III, Public Law 480— Value of Barter
Contracts Entered Into and Strategic 
Materials Delivered or Reimbursement 
Received Through Dec. 31» 1969   27
4. U. S. Export Subsidy Rates and Prices for
Hard Red Winter Wheat for the Period of
July 1 to Sept. 25, 1972  136
5. Worldwide 'Published Proved1 Oil Reserves . . . 172
6. Estimates of Middle East Oil Production and




1. State Trader: Acting as an Exporter Above
Previous Export Prices .....................  36
2. State Trader: Acting as an Importer Below
Previous Import Prices .....................
3. State Trader: Acting as an Exporter Below
Previous Export Prices .....................  M
4. State Trader: Acting as an Importer Above
Previous Import Prices .....................  ^8
5. State Trading: Undertrading Internal Effects
Within State Trading Country ............... 51
6. State Trading: Undertrading Internal Effects
Within the Exporting Country ............... 53
7. No Price Discrimination: Aggregated Demand
Curves Inequality of Marginal Revenue . . . .  56
8. Price Discrimination: Two Markets Equating
Marginal Revenue Curves .....................  58
9. Price Discrimination: Buyer Equating Marginal
Cost in Two Markets.........................  60
10. Bilateral Monopoly: Indeterminate Solution . . 62
11. Offer Curves: Two State Traders (Economic
Considerations Only) .......................  85
1 2 . Offer Curves: Two State Traders (Economic
and Political Considerations) ............... 88
13. Offer Curves: Bargaining Zone ............... 90




15. Payoff Matrix: Zero Sum Game V/ithout Saddle
P o i n t .......................................... 103
16. Zeuthen-Nash Utility Plane .................... 118
vii
ABSTRACT
The study was designed to analyze state trading in 
an attempt to determine its economic and non-economic 
nature and content; to examine those instances in which the 
comparative cost doctrine lacked the necessary ingredients 
to explain exchange; and to explore the applicability of 
game theory to the possible indeterminant regions of 
bilateral monopoly.
In accomplishing these tasks, the background and 
types of state trading were first explored. The periods 
examined ranged from the early Middle Ages to today's 
present epoch. At this point the general objectives and 
consequences of state trading were examined. Included were 
such objectives as domestic protection, disposal of surplus 
commodities, and price discrimination. The consequences, 
however, were limited to production and/or consumption 
effects and factor movements.
Next, the study explored the applicability of 
international trade theory to the cited situations. Theo­
rists for decades have modified and added to the original 
forms of comparative advantage or cost doctrine hoping to 
find the "one11 theory to explain exchange among nations. 
However in their search, various hypotheses were developed
viii
to justify trade under different situations. Hence,, it was 
necessary to identify that "interpretation" which best 
described the various cases of state trading.
As a consequence of the above "interpretation," it 
became apparent that in many situations state trading could 
not be rationalized by the comparative cost doctrine.
Rather, through the use of "offer curves," a zone of inde­
terminacy was revealed wherein bargaining strengths and 
tactics determined the outcome. To explain exchange under 
such conditions, game theory was used.
As a result of the inquiry, several seldom-stressed 
matters with regard to state trading were revealed. First, 
the investigation suggested that government exchange is 
subject to somewhat of a frustrating pattern. Secondly, 
the theory of comparative cost was found to be insufficient 
when applied to many state trading cases. Thirdly, it was 
shown to be analytically possible (as seen in two analyzed 
cases— wheat and oil) to apply various game theory models 





Statement of the Problem
The passage of the Trade Expansion Act in 1962 
represented a bold American initiative looking 
toward a new era of expanding trade and economic 
cohesiveness among the nations of the free world.
Today the exuberant hope for building a Grand 
Design of unity has been chilled by a gradual 
resurgence of economic and political nationalism.
The free world community now stands at a cross­
road. It may move forward to a more open inter­
national economy— with all free nations enjoying 
the fruits of closer economic ties— or it could 
move backward to a world marked by narrow and 
destructive economic nationalism.1
Prom the above passage by the joint Economic Com­
mittee, one may conclude that in the mid sixties the world 
was indeed at a crossroad. Since that time, the inter­
national economy has see-sawed toward greater freedom in
some respects, and toward more restraints in others. It is
possible, for example, to argue that the rise of state 
trading has operated to divide the world during the 1960's 
and 1970's while simultaneously the movement toward economic
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 
Off Dead Center; Some Proposals to Strengthen Free World 
Economic Cooperation. Report of the Joint Economic Com­
mittee, 89th Congress, 1st Session, December, 1965, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. 1.
1
2
integration has been further advanced. This study is aimed 
primarily at the first phenomenon— state trading.
Loosely speaking, state trading occurs when govern­
ments or their representatives engage in international
2trade on government account. It may be found in many forms 
such as commodity agreements, offshore procurements, or in 
the activities of government corporations or other government 
middleman agencies. In many instances the ultimate motivat­
ing force for exchange of commodities may not even be
3strictly economic. When this is so, the traditional tools 
of economic analysis (emphasizing comparative costs as the 
basis for exchange) tend to break down into the indeterminate 
world of bilateral monopoly. As so aptly stated by Jacob 
Viner:
When governments are also conductors of economic 
enterprise in the international field, what results 
is a pattern or intergovernmental relationship in 
which economic, political, and military bilateral- 
monopoly plus duopoly are all wrapped up in one 
package of international dynamite.^
PAs will be presented later, a more detailed 
explanation will indicate that state trading exists when 
national governments or their agents take part in inter­
national commerce for varied objectives and under varied 
conditions and forms to secure imports or sell exports 
the title which lies with the government or is secured by 
the government.
■̂ For example, it may be military or political.
^Jacob Viner, "International Relations Between 
State-Controlled National Economics," American Economic 
Review. XXXIV (March, 1 9 W , 317.
3
Of course, many government or state trading 
activities are not covered entirely by the Viner descrip­
tion. There are numerous cases in which governments do 
conform to the motivating forces (basically profit subject 
to various constraints) found within private international 
trade. However, there are enough exceptions to warrant 
investigation into those cases not fully explained by 
traditional theory.
Purpose and Nature of Study 
It is the purpose of this study to analyze state 
trading in an attempt to determine its economic (and 
non-economic) nature and content, to examine those 
instances in which the comparative costs doctrine lacks the 
necessary ingredients to explain exchange, and to explore 
the applicability of game theory to the state trading 
situation. It is a study that needs to be made, for state 
trading appears to be growing in relative importance, 
leaving less and less to be explained by the "traditional" 
theory of comparative costs, which is most applicable to 
international exchange through free markets. To date, very 
little has been done to really get at the nature of the 
process (it is both economic and political). There have 
been few systematic attempts to apply traditional economic 
theory to the state trading case, and no one has apparently 
attempted to employ game theory (or game-theory-based
bargaining models) to state trading as yet. This last in 
particular appears to be a rather peculiar oversight, for 
game theory was developed precisely in order to sharpen the 
decision-making process under conflict conditions.
To begin to accomplish these tasks, the background 
and types of state trading are first explored. For pur­
poses of comparison, a brief historical sketch is presented 
in which "contemporary" governmental trading methods are 
contrasted with older forms of state trading. Rather than 
examine minute details, this section will be limited to a 
broad view in order to emphasize certain fluctuating 
patterns found within government commerce. Also included 
in this section is an analysis of the development of the 
non-market system which has become of critical importance 
today.
The general objectives and consequences of state 
trading are examined next. Obviously, state trading can 
have some far-reaching effects (both political and economic) 
resulting from government attempts to secure certain state 
trading goals. Such goals may include: domestic protec­
tion, disposal of surplus commodities, securing of strategic 
materials, political assistance or warfare, and possible 
price discrimination. Quite obviously, not all of the 
possible direct and indirect economic impacts can be 
explored, so this section centers on the most visible or
5
apparent production and/or consumption effects and factor 
movements.
Naturally, the impact of state trading depends very 
much on the particular type of state trading that is being 
practiced, and this is considered next. At one point in 
time a government may be an exporter of goods and at another 
an importer. In each situation the state trader may attempt 
(depending on its objectives) to sell or buy commodities at 
the market price, above the market price, or below the 
market price. Hence, depending on market conditions (and 
other factors), the government trader may practice price 
discrimination.
At this point the study explores the applicability 
of international trade theory to the presented cases. 
Theorists for decades have modified and added to the 
original forms of comparative advantage or costs doctrine 
hoping to find the "one" theory to explain exchange among 
nations. However, in their search, various hypotheses were 
developed to justify trade under different assumptions and 
in different situations. Hence, it is necessary to find 
that (if any) interpretation which best describes the 
various cases of state trading. Moreover, the actual 
question of the applicability of comparative costs is 
investigated in some depth.
As a result of the above, it becomes apparent that 
in some cases the doctrine of comparative costs does not
apply to state trading. Instead, the use of "offer curves" 
indicates that there exists an indeterminate region of 
trade— *a zone where bargaining strength and tactics 
determine the outcome.
Hence, game theory, an approach uniquely suited to 
bargaining, is explored as a possible device for explain­
ing state trading actions— especially those of a bilateral 
monopoly nature. At first a matrix is developed and then 
modified to show the need for power relationships. At this 
point, that "power" model (basically Zeuthen, Nash, and 
others), which is felt to be most capable of application to 
state trading, is modified and applied to the presented 
data.
As a final task, two real world state trading cases 
are examined in some detail. First the controversial 
American-Soviet wheat deal is analyzed in terms of the 
reasons for its origination and from the position of its 
costs and benefits. In addition, the presented game theory 
is used to reveal (from a rather unique view) the actions 
of the participants. Secondly, the OPEC (Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) is examined; and as with the 
wheat deal, game theory is used to more fully disclose the 
activities of the "players."
As to the question of a theory to explain state 
trading, this paper makes several implicit hypotheses. 
First, in many instances state trading does not conform to
7
the comparative cost doctrine. Secondly, state traders do 
not necessarily exchange goods and services for profit 
only. Thirdly, there does not exist "a" theory of state 
trading. Game theory, although used extensively is not in 
itself a theory of government exchange. Rather it is a 
device or tool heretofore not used in the examination of 
state trading. Prom its use, particular insights are 
possible— insights not readily found when "attempting” to 
use traditional theory to explain the trading process.
In conclusion, this dissertation attempts to explore 
certain economic and non-economic aspects of state trading; 
it analyzes the lack of applicability of comparative cost 
doctrine to governmental trade; and as an alternative view 
examines the possibility of using game theory as a means 
of explaining or rationalizing prices, directions, and 
patterns of exchange. This study is viewed as very timely 
and significant as a result of the recent thaws in U. S. 
relations with Red China and the Soviet Union— and because 
of the oil shortage "crisis" in the United States (and the 
world) much of which finds in origin in the power tactics 
of the OPEC nations.
CHAPTER II
PAST AND PRESENT STATE TRADING
In order to fully comprehend the nature and prob­
lems of state trading, a general knowledge of its evolution 
and current forms is necessary. This chapter presents a 
brief historical perspective of state trading from its 
Middle Ages origin to its present day status. Rather than 
examine minute details, certain cyclical patterns found 
within the history of government commerce will be presented. 
Five chronological time periods are utilized: (1) the early
gestation period of the late Middle Ages, (2) the Mercantile 
period, (3) the Classical era, (4) the early twentieth 
century, and (5) the modern present-day epoch. The chapter 
concludes with analysis (post hoc) of state trading.1
The Earlv Period
From the earliest records of international commerce, 
government involvement in the exchange of goods and services 
has ranged from sporadic and piecemeal to complete domina­
tion of trade. State trading appears to have been only one
■*-As may be pointed out, not all historians agree to 
the exact starting point of state trading. Quite obviously, 
limited forms existed before the Middle Ages. Additionally, 
events in history (economic) are examined along with various 
views on the history of economic thought.
9
facet in the spectrum of control, but a significant one
2whose origin dates back to the Middle Ages. During this 
period, "international" trade was common simply because 
there were so many "national" borders that had to be crossed 
in shipping goods even short distances. "State trading" 
occurred (depending on how liberal an interpretation is 
given to the term), naturally, as the lords of the many 
independent manors took part in buying and selling com­
modities to other similar lords and their entities.^ The 
city-states of Italy were the most notable cases in point. 
However, since economic self-sufficiency was the rule 
rather than the exception, this crude form of state trading 
was necessarily quite limited.
As time passed, state trading began to take on new 
dimensions. Gradually, the economic and political organ­
izations that characterized near self-sufficiency weakened 
with the beginnings of new town urbanization, religious 
"liberation," and the colonization of newly discovered 
lands. The "new" states taxed, designated regions of trade, 
and eventually established trading monopolies. It was 
during this era of the emergence of the national state that
^John N. Hazard, "State Trading in History and 
Theory," Law and Contemporary Problems. XXVI (Summer, 1959),
2^3 -4 5.
■̂ By state trading, the author is implying that the 




most economic historians felt the gestation period for state
trading was completed. In essence, those elements needed
for government commerce (or any form of trade) had been
established. Population density had increased; town
urbanization had occurred; population quality had begun a
slow upward grading with the assistance of the printing
press; and beginnings of technological change were present.
These elements combined with growing power within many
national governments allowed for the firm establishment of
5exchange between nations on government account.
The Mercantile Period
Prom the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, 
state trading appeared in form and structure similar to 
that of the twentieth century. That is, national economic 
and political power was the keynote of this era of 
Mercantilism— a fact of supreme importance to government 
trading activities.
Mercantilism varied from nation to nation and from 
time to time, but its common theme was the importance of 
the state in political and economic affairs. Most 
Mercantilists stressed regulation of activities to further 
the goals of increased wealth and power. In many instances
^Por an interesting sociological approach emphasiz­
ing these ingredients see: Werner J. Cahnman, "Toennies
and Social Change," Social Forces. XL (December, 1968), 136-1̂ .
11
precious metals were valued and used as measuring rods to 
gauge the "successfulness" of nations— with state trading, 
through a strong central government, becoming a significant 
weapon in the struggle for a favorable balance of trade and 
the resulting inflow of bullion. The Mercantilist writer 
Thomas Mun, commenting on the value of trade, put it this 
way:
Although a kingdom may be enriched by gifts 
received, or by purchase taken from some other 
nation, yet these things are uncertain and of 
small consideration when they happen. The ordinary 
means therefore to increase our wealth and treasure 
is by Foreign Trade, wherein we must ever observe 
this rule; to sell more to strangers yearly than we 
consume of theirs in value.6
As an instrument used to secure such ends, state
trading took several forms. For example, trading monopolies
were created by special grants from the Crown, companies
like the Hudson Bay and East India Companies being cases in
point. These organizations were actually "agents" of their
respective governments whose task was to explore the new
world for the benefit of their mother countries. Although
not the government monopoly buyers and sellers of later
periods, they were granted exclusive licenses as merchants
of the Crown and thus constituted one of the first "true"
7forms of state trading.'
6Philip C. Newman, Arthur D. Gayer, and Milton 
Spencer, eds., Source Readings in Economic Thought (New 
York: Norton and Company, 195*0, PP. 22-25.
?There may be some disagreement as to whether these
12
Similarly (but usually overlooked by economic 
historians), the securing of bullion was itself an expres­
sion of state trading. Noted earlier, it was a goal of 
many nations to secure gold through a favorable balance of 
trade. In order to achieve this objective, government 
intervention took place in an attempt to create those con­
ditions necessary for the inflow of bullion. Hence gold, 
not usually viewed as a commodity in international exchange, 
became a significant "good" exchanged between European 
governments.®
In the years that followed, significant changes 
occurred. Scholars began to argue that international trade 
could be of mutual advantage to nations engaged in exchange. 
Bullionist doctrines lost some of their appeal in light of 
new "liberal1 thinking. In many instances, economic and 
political power was still viewed as a legitimate objective 
for governments, but even at its height, the influence of 
Mercantilism was not universal. For example, Pre-Classical 
writers such as Sir Dudley North and David Hume viewed 
wealth in a context void of the desirability of gold per 
se.^ Moreover, if the automatic specie-flow mechanism were
companies were "state trading." However, as they were agents 
of their respective governments involved in some degree of 
international trade, it can be argued that they were indeed 
practicing a form of government commerce.
®Edward Ames, "State Operations in Gold and Foreign 
Exchange," Law and Contemporary Problems. XXVI (Summer,
1959), 329-332.
^Newman, Gayer, and Spencer, op. cit.. p. 53.
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permitted to function, it was not necessary for nations to 
place the weight of their policy decisions to securing gold. 
As a result, the limited forms of state trading began to 
diminish under the rising tide of economic liberalism 
sweeping the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
The Classical Period
In many respects the liberal doctrines of what later 
came to be known as the Classical period are the direct 
anti-thesis of Mercantilists thought and practice. For 
example, among the new ideas characterizing the period was 
the notion that governments were to '’encourage" the self- 
interest of individuals. A "hands off" policy of limited 
regulation and control was deemed more desirable than 
allowing governments to manipulate international intercourse 
for its own benefit.'*’® The Benthamite philosophy of little 
conflict between public good and self-interest reduced the 
"need" for government intervention and helped create a 
climate in which state trading all but stagnated and dis­
appeared .
The tenor of the Classical period is best captured 
by Adam Smith:
What is the species of domestic industry which 
his capital can employ, and of which the produce is 
likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, 
it is evident, can, in his local situation, judge
10Ibid.. p. 117.
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much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do 
for him . . . .
To give the monopoly of the home market to 
the produce of domestic industry, in any particular 
art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct 
private people in what manner they ought to employ 
their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be 
either a useless or a hurtful regulation. If the 
produce of domestic can be brought there as cheap 
as that of foreign industry, the regulation is 
evidently useless. If it cannot, it must generally 
be hurtful.11
Ironically, along with creating (or interpreting) 
the environment for the demise of state trading, the 
Classical school indirectly laid the foundation for its 
later rebirth. The laissez-faire orientation of these 
scholars (and the economic systems themselves) certainly 
hastened the passing of the Industrial Revolution and the 
development of many nations. With the Revolution, however, 
there appeared a myriad of abuses and social ills. These 
abuses, in turn, produced their own responses— one of which 
was that of Karl Marx, with his vision of a state-directed 
economy.
Socialism was from its very beginning a reaction 
against social and economic discord and inequity. The 
Classical doctrines, as the Mercantilist philosophies before 
them, were not universally accepted, even in their own time. 
Criticism was especially evident against the possible
11Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations (New York: Random House, 1937),
pp. 423-424.
15
by-products of industrialization— business crises, child
labor, long hours, and unemployment. Socialists both in
England and on the Continent expressed through their
writings a desire for a new social order in which mankind
could solve his problems void of the competitive evils they
12envisioned in the present system. As products of the 
Enlightraent, many distrusted authority yet built and 
described systems in which authority was a requirement. An 
enlarged role for the state, including state trading, thus 
became eminently more possible under the new models than 
within the classical system.
The Twentieth Century
Of the periods in which state trading occurred, the 
twentieth century has provided the most fertile climate for 
its growth. However, as with earlier epochs, an "up again, 
down again" character has again appeared. Governments con­
tinued to use state trading as a tool to achieve certain 
policy objectives which varied with economic and political 
conditions. World War I amply demonstrated the usefulness 
of government trade as a means of securing strategic control 
over various segments of an economy. As pointed out by J. 
Hazard, former adviser on state trading to the Department 
of State:
12Newman, Gayer, and Spencer, o p . cit.. pp. 23^-35.
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Purchasing missions on government account 
appeared in the great markets of the world.
The Czar of Russia bought munitions in the 
West, the firm of Morgan financed the French 
Government in its commercial operations in the 
United States. The retreat from private 
enterprise was not limited to the continent.
The United States thought it necessary to 
requisition the railways and to form a 
commercial fleet to be managed by the War 
Shipping Board. Yet, governments still relied 
upon the price system to obtain the goods 
they required. The War Shipping Board 
waived its right to claim sovereign immunity 
in the courts. "Business as usual" is said 
to have expressed not only one's patriotic 
duty, but also abounding faith in the 
transitory character of the whole episode.
Similarly, the Russian Revolution of 1917 laid the
foundation for a vast system of economic planning in which
state trading became a tool of utmost importance. Lenin,
not content with traditional methods of exchange and/or
protection, turned to state monopolies of foreign trade.
In a decree of 1918 he declared:
All foreign trade is nationalized. Contracts 
for the purchase or sale of all kinds of products 
(the products of mines, of industry, of agriculture 
and others) with foreign governments or individual 
enterprises abroad will be carried out in the name 
of the Russian Republic by specially empowered 
organs. Apart from these organs every contract for 
trade, for purchase or sale abroad is forbidden.14
In later statements Stalin followed Lenin's position but
was apparently unaware of effects other than immediate
protection for Soviet industries.
^Hazard, op. cit., p. 2^.
l4Ibld.. p. 2^6.
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Not until the depression of the thirties and the 
resulting difficulties in trading did it appear to other 
nations that government trade could again help to secure 
advantages in world markets. Bulk buying and barter deals 
then became contagious as international currencies became 
scarce and trade restrictions grew.1-* Though intended as 
only a temporary expedient until the depression ended, such 
procurement methods allowed nations the opportunity to 
"bargain" for strategic commodities— goods which could not 
be easily obtained through traditional channels with the 
limited amount of foreign exchange available.
Unfortunately, as economic conditions improved, 
crises appeared anew with the growing possibility of armed 
conflict. Nazi Germany began to rearm in the middle 1930's, 
and much of its war program depended on international trade. 
Reminiscent of past Mercantile practices, state trading 
developed new dimensions under a powerful and dominant 
German central government.
The Allies were also busy in their attempts to 
determine the usefulness of government trade. Even before 
the war, Russia had been negotiating with the United States 
for the establishment of a trading mission to be located in 
New York. The Amtorg Trading Corporation, as it was 
eventually entitled, originally attempted to isolate itself
15Ibid.
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from United States law and control. However, unsuccessful 
in its task, the agency was of little significance until 
the war increased in severity. At this point the American 
government eased its former restrictions stimulating a 
rapid increase in trade between the two nations.1^
Other allied nations also began to create similar 
state trading entities. Nor was trade one way in nature, 
for the United States set up many of its own governmental 
departments for the "securing*' or importation of strategic 
materials from foreign countries. The United States Com­
mercial Corporation was a prime example of such a procure­
ment agency.17
As these forms of state trading multiplied and 
proliferated throughout the world, opposition appeared from 
various interest groups. Free trade was still a desired 
objective (from the world point of view and by many private 
traders) with many supporters in most nations. In face of 
this opposition, state trading slowly began to diminish 
after the war without the protection or guise of a 
"temporary expedient in difficult times."
Recent State Trading Activities 
After war and depression memories had faded, most 
countries attempted to reconstruct their trading relations
l6Ibid.. pp. 2/17-50. 17Ibld.
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using more acceptable peacetime methods. With its commit­
ment to the private enterprise market system, the United
States pressed for the readoption of private channels of 
18exchange. Favoring "free" trade rather than "controlled," 
governments of most Western nations agreed to speed up and 
facilitate the return of the private market system. How­
ever, several major representatives of the allied powers, 
notably Britain and France, continued and in some cases 
expanded the use of state trading. Britain, a nation 
dependent upon imports for her survival, negotiated several 
long term contracts to ensure supplies of essential agri­
cultural commodities. Some of these lasted until 1955. 
France formed similar state trading entities in its agri­
cultural sector, in raw materials importation, manufactured 
goods, and military hardware. Between 19^8 and 1953, 
imports on government account increased to approximately 
35 per cent of French intra-European imports. Moreover, 
even as Great Britain began to phase out governmental
exchange, France continued and became the primary exponent
19of state trading in Western Europe. 7
The Soviet Union also continued to expand its form 
of government trade. By extending its influence into the
^ O f  course, such private channels were subject to 
regulation through tariffs, quotas, and other trading 
restrictions.
■^Marc Quinn, "State Trading in Western Europe,"
Law and Contemporary Problems. XXVI (Summer, 1959), ^05.
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bordering nations of Eastern Europe, Russia created a 
Soviet trading bloc with the •’adoption" of satellite 
countries. Each newly acquired neighbor eventually changed 
its trading practices until nearly all exchange came under 
the control of their respective central governments.
Similar in structure to the Russian model of trading 
corporations, these state trading nations offered and con­
tinue to offer a growing and unified core against the 
private traders of the West.
Other less developed nations, seeing the success of 
the British, French, and Soviet Bloc examples, began to 
experiment with versions of state trading. In many cases 
these nations, lacking foreign exchange, viewed government 
trade as a desirable means of obtaining needed foreign 
currencies. If they were especially subject to persistently 
declining or unstable prices for their exports, they tended 
to set up governmental agencies to negotiate bilateral trade 
agreements. Additionally, their search for new markets and 
more stable trading relationships led many nations to in­
creased trade with China, Russia, and other Sino-:Soviet 
Bloc members.
An example of the undeveloped nations' efforts in 
this direction may prove instructive. Between 195^ and 1955 
Burma negotiated bilateral trade and payments arrangements 
with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Communist China, Hungary,
21
20Poland, Rumania, East Germany, and the Soviet Union.
These agreements were made during a period in which Burma's
main export (rice) was experiencing severe price declines
in world markets. Aggravated by production surpluses and
falling foreign exchange earnings, Burma felt that state
trading was the solution to its dilemma. However, it did
not prove to be successful:
(1) The quality of imports from the Sino-Soviet 
bloc were poor, and the deliveries slow and ir­
regular; (2) Burma became an involuntary creditor 
under some of the agreements when she expected to 
receive credits; and (3) the world rice market 
improved, making sales in the free market more 
attractive than deliveries under contracts to the 
Sino-Soviet bloc countries.21
Ironically, during this same period the United 
States reversed Its policy and laid the foundation for the 
resurgent development of its own special brand of state 
trading. In 195^ the Agricultural Trade and Development 
and Assistance Act (referred to as Public Law 480) was 
enacted. The Act, known as the Pood for Peace program 
today, was originally established for the disposal of 
agricultural surpluses but has since served broadly as a 
tool for (1) the encouragement of economic development in 
poor countries, (2) the expansion of American markets, and
20J. N. Behrman, "State Trading By Undeveloped 
Countries," Law and Contemporary Problems. XXVI (Summer,
1959), 454-55.
21Ibld.. p. 457.
22(3) as a vehicle of U. S. foreign policy. Basically the 
Act is divided into three sections or titles. Title I 
exports are sold abroad for foreign currencies or on credit 
for U. S. dollars. Title II exports are strictly unilateral 
gifts to those nations requiring assistance because of 
disasters, poor food supplies, or to promote economic 
development. Title III allows the Commodity Credit 
Corporation to sell or "barter" government owned agricul­
tural surpluses for strategic materials and supplies and 
services required for the overseas operation of U. S. 
agencies and the Defense Department. Under this program,
U. S. firms make arrangements with the CCC to ship agricul­
tural commodities to predetermined destinations and to 
finance purchase of, or deliver, an equal bundle of com­
modities that are being purchased by aid recipient nations 
or by military establishments. Such primary shipments are 
restricted to areas that will potentially increase com­
mercial sales for the U. S. The receipts (to the 
government) from these transactions are used to purchase 
foreign commodities that are not required to be produced 
domestically according to balance of payment requirements. 
The contractor receives payment in agricultural goods for
22Baymond J. Doll, Glen H. Miller, Jr., and Richard 
D. Rees, International Trade and American Agriculture. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (September, 19?0),
pp. 20-21.
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providing such services. Specifically, such payment may be 
large as per cent of the value of the purchased items.
In recent years, 1967-69, total shipments worth 1.3 billion 
dollars, 1.2 billion dollars, and 1 billion dollars
23respectively have been made under the total program. J 
Tables 1 and 2 present a break down of U. S. agricultural 
exports under such government sponsored activities.
Under a similar program (but for stockpiling pur­
poses), the Property Management and Disposal Service of the 
General Service Administration procures and disposes of 
materials from U. S. stockpile sources. For purchasing, 
sealed bids are received by this agency and are awarded 
according to established criteria which is not always "the 
lowest bid." In other cases the government "barters" sur­
plus stockpiled commodities for those materials in short 
supply. For example, titanium may be exchanged for copper, 
a more desired commodity. Also, stockpiled items may be
obtained from sources other than the free world if their
2bspecifications require it.
23of course such procurements and sales are subject 
to the general regulations concerning overseas buying and 
selling. Furthermore, general approval by Congress is 
required for the disposition of stockpiled items.
2^The above information was secured from the Office 
of Emergency Procurement. No written confirmation could be 
obtained as the author was informed that the agencies in 
question are only under broad guidelines and do not have 
written instructions as to the specific details of their 
operations. However, general regulations may be obtained 
from: Stockpile Report to the Congress. Office of Emergency
Preparedness: (January-June, 1970).
TABLE 1
U. S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND GOVERNMENT FINANCED PROGRAMS 




























195^+ _ _ 28 20 22 70
1955 263 - - 56 186 262 767
1956 638 — 65 187 372 1,262
1957 760 - - 39 175 21+1+ 1,218
1958 752 — **3 159 65 1,019
1959 731 - - 32 111 175 1,01+9I960 1,01U — 1+9 121+ 117 1,301+
1961 878 1 93 151 181 1,301+
1962 1,007 U2 81 178 137 1,1+1+5
1963 1,162 52 99 160 38 1,511
196U 1,232 97 62 186 35 1,612
1965 899 152 73 180 5 1,309
1966 815 239 79 132 1+1 1,306
1967 736 201 108 179 13 1,237
1968 539 381+ 101 150 3 1,177
1969 329 1+09 10l+ 152 — 99^
+July-December
SOURCE: Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, U. S. Department of Agriculture
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TABLE 2
U. S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND GOVERNMENT-FINANCED PROGRAMS






Year Programs Programs* All
1954 + 281 1,304 1,5851955 1,118 2,081 3,199
1956 1,711 2,459 4,170
1957 1,536 2,970 4,506
1958 1,233 2,622 3,855
1959 1,207 2,748 3,9551960 1,461 3,371 4,832
1961 1,483 3,541 5,0241962 1,480 3,554 5,034
1963 1,522 4,062 5,584
1964 1,635 4,713 6,384
1965 1,335 4,894 6,2291966 1,353 5,528 6,881
1967 1,270 5,110 6,380
1968 1,188 5,046 6,234
1969 1,002 4,934 5,936
•"Total agricultural exports outside speoified Government 
programs"'includes (1)! barter shipments for overseas pro­
curement for U.S. agencies; (2) extension of credit and 
oredit guarantees for relatively short periods; (5) sales 
of government-owned commodities at less than domestic 
market prices; and (4).export payments in cash or in kind.
+July-Deoember
Souroe: Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States.
U.S. Deparimeni of Agriculture
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Since 1967, stockpiling purchases have been small, 
and emphasis has been toward the disposition of excess 
materials for currency. Usually a fixed price is estab­
lished (f. o. b.) for surplus items near or equal to current 
world market prices of the commodity in question. Table 3 
gives a detailed breakdown of strategic materials bought and 
sold under stockpile directives.
As a last possibility the U. S. has purchased goods 
and services under its "offshore procurement" programs. 
Basically, such buying practices are for military aid or 
assistance. Under the program the selling nation can 
receive assistance in the development of its overall 
military capability though higher income or productive capa­
bilities.
Clearly, (as demonstrated by the presented cases) 
the United States has also become a major participant in 
state trading.
State Trading in Retrospect
Historically, then, state trading has occurred in 
many forms and with many variations. At present, the 
practice is still so diverse that evaluation is an elusive 
task at best.
Perhaps the most difficult task is to construct a 
concise explanation of state trading which can encompass all 
the cases mentioned earlier. Governmental trade has taken
TABLE 3
TITLE III, PUBLIC LAW 1*80— VALUE OF BARTER CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO AND STRATEGIC MATERIALS 
DELIVERED OR REIMBURSEMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH DEC. 31, 1969*
(in millions of dollars)
Type












Strategic materials for stockpile:
Strategic stockpile 151.5 151.5 151.5 151.5Supplemental stockpile 1,1+20.0 1,1+26.7 1,1+20.0 1,1+26.8
Total 1,571.5 1,573.2 1,571.5 1,578.3
Procurements for other Government 
agencies:
AID 33.5 33.3 33.5 33.3AEC b.5 3.2 U.5 3.2DOD 68.5 67.5 68.5 67.5
Total 106.5 k/ltik.O 106.5 101+.0
Grand total** 1,678.0 1,682.2 1,678.0 1,682.3
*The table shows the value of strategic materials delivered to CCC by contractors and reimbursements 
to CCC for procurements for U. S. Government agencies.
**Contracting totals do not equal delivery and reimbursements totals because the value of the latter, 
and of the counterpart agricultural exports, varies from contracting figures because of tolerance, premiums 
and discounts on materials delivered, and contract defaults, etc.
SOURCE: Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, U. S. Department of Agriculture.
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and continues to take on many different characteristics, 
depending upon the country practicing it and on the circum­
stances when it is employed. At one extreme is the Soviet 
Union, which is the "pure" case today. Not only is foreign 
exchange in governmental hands, but everything from produc­
tion to distribution, both horizontally and vertically, is 
government owned and controlled. In other nations, the 
state may limit itself to procurement (as in the United 
States) and delegate to the private sector the task of 
producing commodities for exchange. Between these extremes 
lie those countries (developed or under developed) that use 
some combination of state production and procurement to 
satisfy their objectives. Thus any explanation of state 
trading would have to consider political orientation, types 
of commodities traded, level of income, and the special 
features of the internal and external production and distri­
bution system of the country or countries concerned.
Similarly, the exact form or type of trading
establishment varies from country to country. In some, the
most common form is the public corporation. In others there
appears to be a mixture of many forms, including purchase
offices, marketing boards, stores departments, supply
missions, committees, purchasing authorities, food agencies,
2 5and import and/or export offices. J Moreover, these forms
^United Nations, State Trading in Countries of the
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vary in degrees of autonomy in their commercial operations.2̂  
As a result, advantages (or disadvantages) can accrue to 
public agencies that are not available (without additional 
costs or perhaps not at all) to private traders. For 
example, free use of government services may be made avail­
able to state trading organizations while private merchants
27have to go to the market for them. ' On the other hand, 
without relative autonomy the state trader may be severely 
limited in its flexibility and its ability to employ com­
mercial principles in its operation. Again, the degree of 
autonomy will vary from case to case, depending on the goals 
of the organization, the products it handles, the political 
philosophy of the country, and so on.
It therefore appears that state trading can take on 
a nearly infinite variety of forms and characteristics when 
circumstances create different environments for its 
existence. How, then, can it be defined? Obviously, the 
definition must be broad, although much meaning may be lost
Asia and The Far East Region. Report by the ECAFE 
Secretariat, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(New York: United Nations, 196*1-), pp. 2-3.
26Autonomy is the degree of restraint or freedom in 
such areas as legal administration, financing, rights and 
privileges, pricing policies, and objectives to be pursued.
2?Public Transportation services and additional 
credit facilities being cases in point.
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28in making it so general. That, however, appears to be a 
necessary evil.
For purposes of this study, therefore, "state 
trading" shall be defined simply as "governmental partici­
pation in international commerce as buyer or seller." 
Objectives may vary, commodities and conditions may vary, 
but if a government through any of its agencies purchases 
or sells in International trade for its own account, it may 
be said to be "state trading."
O O This refers to the debate between realistic and 
unrealistic assumptions in economic theory. Shall the 
assumptions be realistically accurate and detailed in their 
description or shall the assumptions be broad and "un­
realistic" and hence lead to more universal application. 
Perhaps Cartter's inbetween approach has merit in that:
"The more specific and descriptively realistic a 
theory is, the more specialized is its use, carried to the 
extreme, a theory based on thoroughly realistic and accurate 
assumptions is applicable to one unique situation in time 
and space. The wider the desired application of a theory 
the simpler and more generalized it must be."
See: Cartter, Allan M., Theory of Wages and
Employment (Richard Irwin, Inc., 1959), P. **■, and also 
Friedman, Milton, Essavs on Positive Economics.
CHAPTER III
GOALS AND CONSEQUENCES OP STATE TRADING
As noted earlier, state trading can result from a 
myriad of motivating forces. Depending on circumstances 
and conditions, nations use governmental trade to secure 
objectives that are varied and in many instances hidden 
from view. It is thus the purpose of this chapter to note 
the various possible goals of state trading and explore 
some economic consequences of its practice.
General Objectives
It is not easy to analyze the goals of state 
trading, for they are complex. Most nations do not have a 
single goal but ’mixtures" tied to the overall economic and 
political aims of their governments. Some of the major 
objectives which may be sought singularly or in combination 
include:
(a) Ensuring regular supplies of commodities 
at stable or favorable prices. Britain has used 
"bulk purchase" contracts with Argentina to ensure 
itself of a regular supply of beef and other staples, 
for example. (Stability in home consumption standards 
may be an important overall governmental objective.)
(b) Maintaining stable production levels at 
home by means of international commodity agreements 
which set price ranges and production quotas for 
each member. Members of the International Coffee
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Agreement, for example, have this as one of their 
several goals.
(c) Securing markets for the disposal of sur­
plus commodities, either through barter of through 
normal commercial channels. Public law Jj-80 sales 
and grants of U. S. farm commodities is an example.
(d) Securing special advantages through bulk 
transactions. Again, Britain's "bulk purchase" 
contracts are cases in point. One such contract 
entailed the purchase of New Zealand's entire ex­
port surplus of meat for seven years, with prices 
free to vary only 7k per cent annually.
(e) Ensuring the supply of strategic or essential 
materials. U. S. stockpiling purchases of strategic 
ores are an example.
(f) Maintaining control over foreign economic 
assistance programs. Aid-receiving countries may 
have a propensity to expend assistance in the form 
of hard foreign exchange in wasteful or non-economic 
ways; this tendency can be controlled by providing 
assistance in the form of goods exported by the 
donor government.
(g) Raising revenues. Financially hard-pressed 
governments may profit by purchasing commodities 
domestically at relatively low prices and selling 
them at the world price.
(h) Regulating health and sanitary conditions.
A government may take it upon itself to ensure an 
adequate supply of food or medicine by doing the 
overseas purchasing itself,
(i) Making more effective use of foreign exchange 
and/or conserving existing supplies. Straight barter 
deals make usage of foreign exchange unnecessary; 
similarly, trade can be directed away from scarce- 
currency areas toward surplus-currency areas if 
convertibility problems exist.
(j) Increasing the dependence of other countries 
upon the state trader for political or economic 
reasons. The Soviet Union has been quite successful 
in this respect since World War II, and Hitler's 
Germany made efforts in this direction during the 
1930's.
(k) Increasing the effectiveness of economic 
planning by enlarging government's role in the 
economy. Britain's Labor government in the immediate 
post-World War II period attempted just this strategy.
(1) Facilitating the economic development process. 
By means of state trading, for example, the state 
trader may stimulate production in its own industries 
or industries of other nations.
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(m) Improving the terms of trade. By controlling 
export supplies and buying imports in bloc, a state 
trading government may be able to increase its gains 
from trade.
(n) Facilitating trade with centrally planned 
economies. If a government feels that its private 
traders would be at a bargaining disadvantage in 
dealing with a Soviet-type country, it may set up a 
trading agency,of its own to "balance off" the mono­
lithic entity.
The above list, though long, is not necessarily 
all-inclusive. There may be other objectives not publicly 
divulged or there may be subclasses of each major goal. 
Moreover, a more broadly stated goal might include one.
The Economic Consequences of 
State Trading (Static)
This section considers the economic-consequences of 
various actions on the part of state traders, viewed in a 
static framework. In all cases, the term "state trader" 
will refer to the practicing government agency. A nation, 
regardless of whether its economy is basically market or 
non-market, employs its "agents" to perform its tasks. For 
sake of simplicity, such agents will be assumed to be the
•̂ See: United Nations, State Trading in Countries
of the Asia and the Far East Region, report by the ECAFE 
Secretariat, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(New York: United Nations, 1964), PP. 1-3. Also see:
Walter Krause, International Economics (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 19o5/» PP. 197-98, and pp. 206-09.
As the reader may note, these objectives are not 
necessarily uniform in direction. That is, the pursuit of 
one may conflict with the obtainment of another. For ex­
ample, facilitating the development of another nation may 
entail a sacrifice in the terms of trade of the assisting 
country.
3^
state trading country*s sole international trader— in other 
words, anything exported from the country is purchased by 
the agency from those enterprises who do the actual pro­
ducing and then sold to foreign consumers by the agency, 
Just as it purchases all imports from foreign suppliers and 
markets them to domestic consumers. Also, it is assumed 
that there are only two countries in the world— the state 
trader and its trading partner, which might be labeled "the 
rest of the world."
The actions considered may be taken in pursuit of
one or several of the objectives just outlined and do not
2relate specifically to any single one. Two basic cases
are examined: that of undertrading, wherein fewer goods
are exchanged because of actions by the state trader; and
3overtrading, where the reverse applies.
Acting as an Exporter (above previous export 
prices).— In some situations, the state trader may attempt 
to limit exports in order to secure one or more of the 
previously stated objectives. The effect of such an action 
is similar to that of a tax on exports under a regime of 
private trade. That is, assume the state agency is
20f course, as noted earlier, profit does not have 
to be pursued. Hence, the state trader does not have to 
seek profits or avoid losses.
■^These terras will become apparent as the cases are 
presented.
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initially selling exports at certain prices but then
attempts to sell the goods at higher prices by restricting
li­
the volume exported. Foreign purchasers (whether state
traders themselves or private merchants) will be confronted 
with higher prices than before for their imports. Faced 
with such higher prices, the foreign consumer will in most 
cases reduce the volume purchased. These higher prices 
in turn can be expected to stimulate foreign production in 
overseas import-competing industries, if any. In the state 
trading nation, however, domestic consumption in the home 
market may be stimulated with increased local supplies 
resulting from possible lost overseas markets, especially 
if home prices drop somewhat. But, lower prices may dis­
courage production of the commodity in question. Figure 1 
depicts such a trading situation. The diagrams presented 
are "back to back" supply and demand charts; one for the 
exporting state trader's home market and one for the over­
seas home market.^ The price axis is common to both 
nations and the quantity axis represents the same type of
itThese initial prices might be called "world" 
prices since, as will be seen, they are common to both the 
exporting and importing countries.
^Diagrams of these types are found throughout most 
international trade texts. For example, see: Delbert A.
Snider, An Introduction to International Bconomlcs (1967), 
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good. In Figure 1-A, S and D represent domestic supply and 
demand in the state trading nation; S and D in Figure 1-B 
similarly represent supply and demand in the overseas pur­
chasing nation's domestic market. Without any trade (and, 
therefore, no state trading agency) supply and demand 
conditions would establish a price of in the state 
trading nation, while a P2 price would prevail in the 
overseas market. As the state trader enters, total demand 
in the state trading nation for the commodity in question 
shifts to D,p creating a price of Py  At this P^ price 
domestic quantity demanded is equal to P^B while total 
domestic production is P^A. The distance A3 represents 
the demand by the state trading agency for the commodity 
in question which in turn will be sold overseas. Distance 
AB thus represents the exports of the state trader. In the 
foreign country, these available goods from the state 
trader give rise to a shift in the total supply schedule to 
ST , which now includes foreign domestic production (import 
competing goods) and the supply from the state trader. A 
P^ price results with P^C being domestically produced and 
CE imported. As may be noted, the distance CE = AB as ex­
ports of one nation must equal the imports of the other 
country. P^ is now the assumed world selling price and the 
price kn both markets.^
^The P^ price is the same price that would prevail
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At this point it is possible to illustrate the im­
pact of the state trader limiting exports. P^, as just 
described, is the initial price in both markets when the 
state trader sells volume AB overseas. Now if the state 
trader decreases its demand in its own market to DT ’, price 
drops to P^, At this P^ price domestic consumption is P^H, 
an increase over previous consumption of P^3. However, 
total production now drops to P^J, a reduction relative to 
P^A. Of course, JH now represents the volume of exports 
which is clearly smaller than before.
In the overseas market similar production and con­
sumption effects occur. With reduced imports available 
from the state trader, now is reduced (a leftward shift) 
to ST *. With the new reduced supply schedule and the 
given demand schedule a price of P^ results. At P^, over­
seas domestic production (in importing competing industries) 
is P^K— an increase over the previous P^C level. Simi­
larly, domestic consumption with the higher P^ price is 
now P^P— a reduction relative to P^E. Again, imports into 
the buying overseas market must equal exports from the 
state trader, or distance JH must equal KP. In sum:
under conditions of free trade without any restrictions, 
i.e., under conditions of pure competition. In effect, the 
state trader is initially allowing this condition (price) 
to exist even though it might be able to enlarge its ex­
port earnings at some other price. Economic goals, in other 
words, may not be its primary goals.
39
(1) domestic production in the state trading nation is 
reduced (P-̂ A to P^J); (2) domestic consumption in the state 
trading nation is increased (P^B to Pĵ H); (3) overseas con­
sumption is reduced (P^E to P^F); and (4) overseas produc­
tion in import-competing industries is stimulated (P^C to 
P^K). And as noted in the beginning, undertrading occurs 
as fewer goods are internationally exchanged (originally 
trade equalled AB * CE; now exports are reduced to JH =
KF).
It might be argued, from a welfare point of view, 
that with higher export prices and restricted quantities 
the world pattern of resource use is distorted. That is, 
the state trader underuses resources in its relatively low 
cost industries. The importing nation, however, tends to 
expand production in a higher cost production area, using 
too many world resources in the process. This result can 
only be avoided, of course, if the state trader limits its 
undertrading activities, i.e., does not attempt to raise 
export prices by reducing exports. But then it would be 
foregoing one of the advantages of engaging in state trad­
ing. Almost by definition, then, the state trader sub­
ordinates world economic welfare for its own national 
economic welfare— in a static sense, at least.
Acting as an Importer (below previous import 
prices).— Under certain conditions it may also appear
desirable for the state trader to attempt to import com­
modities below previous prices, which will reduce quantities 
purchased if the foreign supply curve has any elasticity at 
all. In this case of undertrading the economic results are 
similar to that of a tariff on imports. The action tends 
to reduce the price of the commodity in foreign markets by 
leaving an increased supply abroad. Foreign consumption 
then tends to increase while foreign production is cut 
back. Similarly, within the state trading nation domestic 
consumption may be restricted if prices rise with reduced 
supplies of the imported good. These price rises likewise 
may stimulate domestic production in import-competing 
industries. Figure 2 depicts such a possible case.' Start­
ing this time with the P^ price (the world price with the 
state trader already engaged in international commerce) it 
is possible to illustrate the impacts when the state trader 
limits or reduces its imports. Initially at the world 
price, the state trader is domestically producing P^B in 
its own import-competing industries (Figure 2-A). Total 
consumption, however, at the P^ price equals Pyu Distance 
AB, therefore, equals the volume of imports into the state 
trader before it attempts to reduce imports. In the over­
seas selling nation, total production at the P^ price equals
?The supply and demand curves are the same as in 
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P^E (Figure 2-B). However, domestic demand at the P^ price 
equals P^C. Distance CE thus equals the exports of this 
nation and as in the previous case, exports of one nation 
equal the imports of its trading partner, or distance CE ** 
AB. If the state trader now attempts to limit imports by 
reducing its overseas demand, the exporting nation's total 
demand shifts leftward to D^' (Figure 2-B). As a result, 
prices drop to P^. At P^, production is reduced to P^J 
while consumption (at this lower price) increases to P^K. 
Within the state trading country the effect appears as a 
reduction of total supply from ST to ST ' (Figure 2-A).
Prices rise to P«j. At the higher P^ price, consumption is 
reduced and now appears at P^G. Additionally, the higher 
P^ price stimulates production in the state trading nation's 
import competing sectors— or graphically to P^H compared to 
P^B previously.
In sum, the expected effects vrtien the state trader 
reduces its imports are: (1) reduced consumption in the
state trading nation (P^A to P^G); (2) increased production 
in the state trader's import competing sector (P^B to 
P5H); (3) reduced production in the overseas exporting 
nation (P^E to P^J); and (^) increased overseas consumption 
(P3C to PjjK).
Acting as an Exporter (below previous export 
prices).— In some situations a state trader may take the
43
position of an exporter selling commodities below previous 
export prices. To accomplish this objective of lower ex­
port prices, greater supplies are usually made available 
to the overseas importing nation. In such cases the eco­
nomic effects are similar to those of subsidies of the 
state trader's export industries. Overtrading may then 
result, in contrast to the previously analyzed cases of
g
undertrading.
More specifically, if the state trader sells ex­
ports below previous prices by way of greater exports, an 
increase in foreign consumption should result (assuming 
foreign demand is not perfectly inelastic). Lower prices 
abroad would tend to force foreign import-competing 
industries to restrict production, while domestic produc­
tion in the state trader's nation would be stimulated by 
the additional exports. However, domestic consumption in 
the state trading country would ordinarily be diminished as 
home prices rise in consequence of the state trader's 
policies. Figure 3 depicts such a possible trading situa­
tion. Again the assumption of an initial price remains. 
Given this price, the state trader will export volume AB 
while its citizens consume volume P^B (Figure 3-A). Of 
course, total production at the P^ price equals P^A in the
Q In the cases of overtrading, the state trader is 
buying at high prices and selling at low prices; obviously, 
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state trading nation. Overseas in the importing country, 
given a price of P^, total production equals P^C while 
total consumption equals P^E with the distance CE equaling 
the volume of imports needed to allow total consumption to 
be P^E (Figure 3-B). Again, exports equal imports or dis­
tance AB = CE.
At this point if the state trader begins its in­
creased export policies, it will demand an additional amount 
from its own domestic markets. This can be likened to a 
shift from DT to 1— or an increase in demand. As a 
result, in the state trading nation prices rise to P^. At 
this higher P^ price, consumption decreases and is now 
equal to P^H. Of course with higher prices, local indus­
tries increase production until total output equals P^J—  
an increase relative to P^A. Exports are also now larger 
and equal to distance HJ. Overseas, the state trader's 
policies are having consumption and production effects but 
in an opposite direction (Figure 3-B). The additional 
quantities made available by the state trader have increased 
the total supply from ST to ST '. As a result, price drops 
to P^ at which point increased total consumption occurs—  
or PjjF. However, lower prices in this overseas market will 
normally curtail the production of import-competing goods.
In this case P^K in domestic production occurs rather than 
the previously larger amount P^C. Distance KF now
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represents the increased imports into this country which 
are again equal to the larger exports of the state trader—  
or KF « JH. In sum, if the state trader exports larger 
volumes than in previous periods the effects will ordinar­
ily be: (1) increased production in the state trading
nation (P^A to F^J); (2) reduced consumption in the state 
trader's country (P^B to P^H); (3) overseas, increased 
consumption occurs (P^E to P^P); and (4) restricted produc­
tion in import-competing sectors appears (P0C to P,,K). In3 *•*
this case, therefore, overtrading is possible as greater 
volumes are exchanged internationally (JH = KP, which is 
greater than AB = CE).
AcfrAnft ag. JjnporJper (above,,prevjoug prices). — Over­
trading can also result if the state trader imports 
commodities above previous levels. The effect is again 
similar to that of a subsidy to private traders (the foreign 
producer in this case) with similar production and consump­
tion changes. Within the buying or importing state trading 
nation, the additional supplies from abroad (imports) will 
normally lower prices in its domestic market stimulating 
increased consumption. However, the state trader's 
domestic import-competing industries will usually reduce 
production in light of lower prevailing prices in the 
market. Overseas, the effect of increased demand for the 
good in question will normally raise prices in their
*J7
markets. Such increased prices will in turn reduce con­
sumption of the commodity if demand is anything but 
perfectly inelastic. Production, however, in light of the 
increased demands by the buying state trader will normally 
expand the subsidy effect to the foreign producer. Graph­
ically, this situation is illustrated by Figure b. Again 
the assumptions are the same as in Figures 1-3 and the 
initial starting price is P^. Of course at the P^ price, 
exports from the overseas seller equals distance CE. With­
in the importing state trader*s nation these appear as 
imports or distance AB . . . again imports of one nation 
equal the exports of its trading partner or distance AB * 
CE.
With the introduction of the state trader's new 
purchasing policy, total demand in the overseas market in­
creases to Dt' with resulting production and consumption 
changes (Figure 4-B). That is, with the increased demand 
by the state trader and resulting higher overseas prices, 
foreign production increases with the price to P^F—  
an increase relative to P^E. However, foreign consumption 
at the P^ price is reduced to P^K rather than the previous 
larger volume at the P^ price of Clearly, overseas
industries increase output while overseas consumers reduce 
their purchases. The difference betvreen the greater output 
and reduced overseas consumption now appears as distance 
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Turning to the state trading country itself (Fig­
ure *J~A), additional purchases from overseas markets appear 
as increased supplies (additional imports) within the state 
trader's nation. Diagrammatically, these increased imports 
cause the total supply schedule to increase from ST to ST '. 
As a result, price drops to P^. At the new P^ price level, 
total consumption increases to P^J— an increase relative to 
price level P^ and consumption of P^A. Domestic import- 
competing industries, however, in light of this lower price 
reduce their output or production from P^B to P^H. Hence, 
total domestic production has decreased while total con­
sumption has increased. Of course, this is only made 
possible by the increased volume of imports or distance 
JH— the difference between domestic output and consumption. 
In sum, the expected effects in this case are: (1) over­
seas production is stimulated (P^E to P^F); (2) overseas 
consumption decreased (P^C to P^K); (3) within the state 
trading nation consumption increases (P^A to P^J); and 
(*0 the state trader's import-competing industries reduce 
production (P^B to P^H). However, in total more goods are 
internationally exchanged (KF = JH which is greater than 
/flE = AB7) or overtrading exists.
Internal effects.— The preceding sections detail 
the impact of price changes on volumes traded and summarize 
the production and consumption effects upon the trading
50
countries. Perhaps a closer look at the latter will be 
helpful.
To illustrate, it is possible to further explore a 
case of undertrading, specifically the variant in which the 
state trading agency is attempting to force import prices 
down via reduced purchases. As noted earlier, the domestic 
impact upon the state trading country is similar to that of 
a tax or tariff on imports. The expected results would be:
(1) reduced domestic consumption as internal prices rise, 
and (2) increased domestic production of import-competing 
substitutes. Figure 5 depicts such an undertrading 
situation. DD' is the state trading country's total demand 
for the commodity. SS' is the state trading country's 
domestic supply curve of the good, reflecting its import- 
competing industry's supply capabilities. PSm is the supply 
of importables coming from abroad, funnelled through the 
state trading agency and sold initially at price P; this 
curve is assumed to be perfectly elastic for the sake of 
simplicity in the diagram, and the amount imported is 
Amount OQ^ is produced domestically and 0Q2 is consumed in 
total. When the state trading agency cuts imports to, say, 
because of its attempts to force world prices down, 
domestic prices are forced up to P'. Total consumption is 
lowered to OQ^ while domestic production increased to 0Q^.
A number of welfare effects follow from this import 
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surplus because the commodity price has risen— the reduc­
tion graphically is represented by the four-sided area 
PbdP'. Second, there is an increase in producer's surplus 
from SaP to ScP', a net gain of PacP'. This net gain by 
producers at the expense of consumers may be called the 
"redistribution effect" of the state trading action. The 
area aec represents the "protective effect," the loss of 
consumer's surplus due to the cost of employing resources 
in this relatively inefficient industry at the expense of 
other industries. Area fbd represents the "consumption 
effect," a welfare loss traceable to the necessity of 
shifting purchases to other less desired goods. The 
rectangle efdc represents a "revenue effect" or profit to 
the state trading agency stemming from its purchases at low 
prices and sales at higher ones. (Of course, if the world 
prices fall as it wishes, the area will be still greater.)
Meanwhile, what is transpiring in the exporting 
country? In Figure 6, DD' is the exporting country's home 
demand curve for its own exportable good and SS' is its 
supply curve. FDX is the state trading country's demand 
for exportables initially, again assumed perfectly elastic 
for diagrammatic simplicity. P is the initial price, ex­
ports are production is domestic con­
sumption is OQ^. When the state trading agency trims its 
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exporting country; production falls to OQ^ while domestic 
consumption increases to OQ^.
The welfare effects, of course, are the reverse of 
those in the importing country. Producer's surplus is 
trimmed from SbP to SdP', a loss of P'dbP. Of this, con­
sumers get P'caP as an addition to their consumers' sur­
plus, and this part of the lost producers' surplus is the 
"redistribution effect." Area cdfe is lost to the state 
trading agency in the importing country and might be thought 
of as a negative "revenue effect." Area cea might be 
called a type of "consumption effect," stemming from the 
diversion of domestic consumption from other, more preferred 
goods (under previous price conditions) to the exportable 
good. Likewise, area dbf might be called a type of "pro­
tective effect," reflecting efficiency losses from having 
to employ factors of production in some "second best" 
employment due to cuts in the production of exportables.
Similar analyses could be made of the other under­
trading case or of either overtrading case, with similar 
effects. The point of all this is, of course, that actions 
by a state trading agency to depart from "market" prices 
distort production and consumption within the trading 
countries as well as affecting trade volumes, values, terms 
of trade of both partners, and revenues.
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The Determinants of Governmental Pricing Behavior.- 
Clearly, the cases just described indicate that the state 
trader may find it advantageous, depending on its objec­
tives, to distort trade patterns and prices. However, it 
may also find it desirable to practice price discrimination 
if more than one market exists for either its purchases or 
sales. It may arise not only because of a desire for in­
creased monetary profits, but for other non-economic 
objectives as well.
In its role as seller or exporter, if profit maximl 
zation is desired and market demand elasticities vary, the 
state trader will ordinarily attempt to equate its marginal 
cost and marginal revenue. Since the marginal cost (of 
production if the state trader produces or of acquisition 
if it does not) is assumed to be the same in both markets 
the problem is one of determining the different marginal 
revenues. Two approaches may be used, one in which the 
seller practices no price discrimination but could; and one 
in which two prices are charged in different markets in 
order to maximize profit.
In the first case, the state trader may ignore the 
demand differences in the two markets and simply add 
together the two demand curves and hence the marginal 
revenue curves, as in Figure 7. At the point of inter­
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marginal cost curve, profit maximization will occur (given 
the state trading unwillingness to discriminate). But as 
Figure 7 shows, higher marginal revenue results in Market 
Two at the equilibrium level of output. The state trader 
could benefit by increasing sales in the more elastic 
market (Number Two).
In Figure 8, however, the state trader is attempt­
ing to truly maximize profits and is willing to engage in 
price discrimination to do so. The two markets have 
different demand and marginal revenue conditions. With a 
shift of quantity QQ' to Market Two from Market One, 
marginal revenues are equated to each other and to marginal 
cost. This means that profits are maximized by charging a 
higher price (OP^) in Market One and a lower price (0P2  ̂ *n 
Market Two. Taking advantage of the different demand
9elasticities, discriminatory pricing results.
Obviously, then, a state trader may choose to sell 
abroad at either a higher or lower price than that prevail­
ing at home, depending on demand conditions. And if 
overseas (or home) markets are sufficiently isolated from 
each other, further price discrimination could occur.
^In this case, profit maximization is assumed. 
However, non-economic objectives may motivate sales in the 
opposite direction of that described. See pages 31, 32, 
and 33 for a list of goals which do not always necessitate 
maximization of profit or minimization of losses.
FIGURE 8
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Similarly, a state trader may not only sell goods 
internationally but may also purchase goods from abroad.
If, in its role as importer or domestic buyer, the govern­
ment trader wants to minimize its overall costs, its 
policies will be affected by its monopsonistic position.
That is, if two sources of supply exist, the state trader 
will ordinarily attempt to purchase more from the market
whose supply is more elastic, as in Figure 9. If the state
trader simply wanted to pay one price (equate AC-̂  and AC2 ),
it would purchase OQ in each of the two markets. But then
marginal cost would be greater in Market One than in 
Market Two, implying foregone savings. If the trader 
transfers its buying from Market One to Market Two by amount 
QQ', marginal costs are equated, costs minimized, and dis­
crimination in pricing between the markets practiced.
This type of state trading behavior— buying abroad 
at either higher or lower prices than those at home— is not 
at all uncommon. Bulk purchasing abroad, for example, 
ordinarily involves overseas buying at lower prices than 
the "protected" prices prevailing in the domestic market. 
(Overseas supplies are usually more elastic than those in 
narrower home markets.) Cases where import prices are 
higher than home prices are obviously much rarer.
Up to this point the discussion has centered on the 
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various sizes. However, perhaps a more pertinent case 
(and a realistic one) is that of a government trader deal­
ing with another government trader, i.e., the case of 
bilateral monopoly. The case is of special interest when 
one considers recent thaws in the cold war between the 
United States and China, West Germany and East Germany, 
South and North Korea, and the growing importance of 
regional trading blocks.
Figure 10 depicts a bilateral monopoly situation. 
The curve D represents the demand curve (or average revenue 
curve) from the point of view of the monopoly seller, or 
the value of the marginal unit from the standpoint of the 
buyer. The MR curve is the standard marginal revenue 
curve as seen by the seller, derived from curve D. The 
MC-S curve is the marginal cost curve of the seller, seen 
by the monopsony buyer as a supply curve (or average cost 
curve). Curve MC* is the "marginal cost of buying" curve 
as seen by the moriopsonist, derived from curve MC-S. The 
monopoly seller would maximize profit by equating its MC-S 
with MR, producing 0Q2 selling at price 0P2 . The 
monopsony buyer would minimize outlay by equating the value 
of the marginal unit (as indicated by D) with its marginal 
cost (MC*) from its point of view; this would mean a 
willingness to purchase OQĵ  at price OP^.
Obviously, the solution is indeterminate, with 0P^ 
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outer quantity limits. In the words of C. E. Ferguson,
. . . price and quantity is indeterminate 
in cases of bilateral monopoly. This does not 
mean the market collapses or that the party fails 
to reach a definite agreement on price and quantity. 
Rather it means that the information the economist 
has is not sufficient to determine the precise 
market solution. The solution, in other words, is 
based not only upon conditions of demand and cost, 
with which the economist can deal but also upon 
bargaining skills and other personal character- 
istics anterior to the realm of economic analysis.
In other ifords, state traders dealing with other 
state traders need more than economic analysis in finding 
a comfortable middle ground for prices and quantities of 
goods traded.
Economic Consequences of State 
Trading (Dynamic)
The so-called "dynamic" consequences of state 
trading basically include those changes of a "process" 
nature and can conveniently be treated under the headings 
of factor changes, income distribution, and economic 
development.
Factor Changes.— As time passes, goods price 
changes induce movements and changes in the supply of 
factors in an economy. In the case of state trading, if 
domestic prices of imports are held above world levels,
10C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), p. 2^8.
domestic firms in import-competing industries are encourag­
ed to expand production. Additional resources (in use or 
unemployed) are shifted into these lines of production 
which may possibly increase factor prices. Other countries 
which have traditionally supplied such goods find their 
export industries losing factors to other segments of their 
economies (assuming third markets do not absorb the loss 
in sales to the state trader). The result is that the 
normal tendency for factor prices to equalize between the 
trading nations is reduced. In addition, the passage of 
time will ordinarily cause the supply of the factor(s) 
whose price increases most to,increase relative to other 
factors, changing the countries' factor endowments some-
11what and possibly altering their comparative advantages.
Similarly, the case of overtrading (charging less 
than domestic prices or buying at higher international 
prices) can produce opposite effects. The prices of fac­
tors in each respective industry within the state trading 
nation will be decreased when buying and increased when 
selling. Resources are shifted into other production
3-1In the other case of undertrading, exporting or 
"selling" above domestic prices, factor prices are de­
creased within the state trading nation and increased in 
the importing nation's import substitution industries as 
more resources are shifted into this area. Moreover, some 
factor prices will be affected more than others if export 
and import-competing industries utilize factors in dif­
ferent combinations.
industries in the first case and into export areas in the 
latter with the results noted above.
The above consequences, of course, assume basically 
free market economies. But when trade occurs between 
market and non-market nations (or non-market to non-market) 
price variations do not necessarily induce changes in 
factor use or prices in the non-market nations. Planned 
economies trade internationally in accordance with a pre­
conceived overall plan. For example, in the Soviet system, 
planning departments first consider prevailing committments 
and requirements for domestic output. Thereafter, in order 
of priority, the all-union Ministry of Foreign Trade plans 
trading activities in line with the overall national plan. 
Direction, volume, prices, and costs are devised in coordi­
nation with the State Planning Committee, Council of 
Ministers, and the State Bank. Corporations (monopolies) 
conduct the domestic activities needed to engage in foreign 
commerce while the Ministry of Foreign Trade operates
12abroad through trade delegations or commercial agencies.
Each corporation or enterprise is expected to pro­
duce planned profits in accordance with pre-conceived 
margins. Prices (sales) are in accordance with accepted
1 ?■^Nicolas Spulber, The Soviet Economy: Structure.
Principles, and Problems (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 
Inc., 1962), pp. 100-105. See also: Micolas Spulber, "The 
Soviet-Bloc Foreign Trade System," Law and Contemporary 
Problems. Summer, 1959, PP. ^20-53.
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norms with a markup ranging from 1 to 50 per cent of the 
domestic wholesale price. However, because of the variance 
in trading motivation (which is subject to many non­
monetary considerations),
. . . each Soviet agency tries to maximize 
profits on individual transactions, the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade considers the relation of total 
values of exports and imports traded with any 
given partner and attempts to maximize the dif­
ference between them in internal Soviet wholesale 
prices. In order to obtain an import that is 
particularly sought after, the ministry will 
readily enjoin the trading agency to sell below 
cost.13
Obviously, in cases like this state trading
monopolies need not accept or charge prices that are in
1kline with commercial considerations. In many cases use 
of factors (and their prices) can be subject to shifts in 
national plans rather than a result of movements and 
changes in trading patterns.
Income distribution.— If internal production 
structures are changed by state trading (as they ordinarily 
will be), it follows that income distribution will nearly
l^Spulber, The Soviet Economy, op. clt.r p. 105.
^Moreover, as revealed by Holzman and others, 
price discrimination is a relatively common practice between 
the Soviet Union and its satellites and Europe. See: 
Franklyn D. Holzman, "Soviet Foreign Trade Pricing and the 
Question of Discrimination," Review of Economic and 
Statisticsr XLIV (May, 1962); and H. Mendershausen, "Mutual 
Price Discrimination in Soviet Bloc Trade," Review of 
Economics and Statistics, XLIV. (November, 19o2).
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always be affected as well. In market countries, selling 
imports internally above world prices or selling exports 
abroad above domestic prices (undertrading) both tend to 
expand import-competing industries at the expense of export 
industries; similarly, overtrading tends to expand export 
industries at the expense of import-competing industries.
If import-competing industries are, say, labor intensive 
while export industries are capital intensive, undertrading 
would tend to benefit labor and overtrading to benefit 
capital. These changes in income distribution could then 
be expected to influence future demand patterns, savings 
and reinvestmant rates, and so forth.
Economic development.— State trading can also be 
used to encourage (and perhaps discourage) economic develop­
ment. That is, governmental trade can be of assistance or 
can create conditions conducive to expansion of national 
incomes. For example, in consequence of increased national­
ism and increased Sino-Soviet Bloc influence, many Far 
Eastern nations have introduced state trading for develop­
mental purposes.1-* Although not always successful, these 
nations have negotiated bilateral contacts with other
•^The list of such nations include: Australia,
Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China (Taiwan), India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Phillipines, Republic of Viet Nam, and Thailand. See:
United Nations, State Trading in Countries of the Asia and 
the Far East Regions, op. cit.
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countries which, because of their trading structure, 
require government to government exchange. As noted 
earlier, Burma’s experience was unsuccessful due to the 
nature of its fixed contracts under changing world market 
conditions. However, not all concerned nations have 
experienced difficulties. Australia, India, and others 
have received quite favorable influences from governmental 
exchange.^
Basically, these countries seek firm contracts 
which allow for the meeting of plans that require fixed 
supplies and/or revenues. If successfully obtained, 
development may proceed without some of the competitive 
risks involved in private commerce. Foreign exchange 
earnings are more secure and can be conserved with barter; 
investments are easier to carry out with steady streams of 
foreign exchange earnings; and just as in the case of free 
trade, favorable trading conditions can be created with 
trading partners. In addition, variations in the prices 
of contracted goods can alter income. For example, offer­
ing lower prices for exports has the same basic result as
an exchange depreciation with its resulting stimulation of
17exports. ' Hence, in total, state trading can allow for
United Nations, State Trading in Countries of the 
Asia and the Far East Region, op. cit.. pp. 10-20.
•^Richard I. Leighton, Economics of International 
Trade (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1970), pp. 269-276.
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more stable generation of income and development, assuming 
favorable conditions prevail in the affected nation.
CHAPTER IV
THE COMPARATIVE COST DOCTRINE AS 
A THEORY OP STATE TRADING
Prom the preceding, it is evident that state 
trading is a unique form of international commerce. But 
can the behavior of state traders be explained with tradi­
tional international economic theory? Can it explain what 
goods will be exchanged and at what prices (terms of 
trade), for example? This traditional theory (usually 
called the "comparative cost" doctrine) has been the main­
stay of most "western" economists for many decades.
However, as noted earlier, governmental trade can develop 
from a variety of motives and with many varied ends. How 
applicable then, is this theory to those areas where trade 
arises for reasons other than those of production and cost 
efficiencies?
The Comparative Cost Doctrine 
Pure form.— Actually, the doctrine of comparative 
costs (or comparative advantage) has varied somewhat in 
form as it evolved. Most economic historians give credit 
to Robert Torrens for his rudimentary statement of compara­
tive advantage, but David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill have
70
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! 1shared most of the recognition. Ricardo, with his classic
"wine and cloth" example, illustrated the mutual advantages
to be gained through exchange. Under free trade conditions,
each nation tended to specialize in those commodities whose
production costs were relatively cheaper and import those
items in which domestic producers had a comparative cost 
2disadvantage.
The model presented by Ricardo (and later refined 
by Mill and others) was based on the labor theory of value 
and explicitly assumed full mobility of factors of produc­
tion within a nation but complete lack of factor mobility 
between nations. Hence, only one input (labor) and two 
commodities and two nations were utilized. Moreover, the 
hypothesis implicitly assumed possible differences in 
production functions between the trading nations. Compara­
tive advantage, according to Ricardo, was thus based on
^William R. Allen, ed., International Trade Theory: 
Hume to Ohlin (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 4.
2lfiid.
3^Gottfried Haberler, A Survey of International Trade 
Theory. Special Papers in International Economics No. 1 
(Princeton University: International Finance Section, 1961),
p. 4.
Bela Balassa, "An Empirical Demonstration of 
Classical Comparative Cost Theory," Review of Economics and 
Statistics. XLV (August, 1963), 231-238.
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relative cost differentials arising from relative produc­
tivity differentials.^
Mill, in his reformulation of Ricardo*s concepts, 
used basically the same analytical technique.^ However, 
rather than restrict the explanation to a specific exchange 
ratio as Ricardo had done, Mill dealt with the possibility 
of a range wherein the terms of trade could lie. After 
opening up trade, if each country exchanged goods within 
the range established by their domestic cost ratios, both 
would mutually gain from exchange. The exact outcome or
exchange ratio was established by "reciprocal demand" with
7exports purchasing imports. Alfred Marshall later ex­
pressed this reciprocal demand in terms of "offer curves" 
of exports in exchange for imports. So-called "representa­
tive commodity bales," containing a fixed quantity of labor 
embodied in a vast number of different commodities, were 
offered by each trader. Each offer curve reflected both 
that country's willingness and ability to supply exports as
Q
well as its demand for the other country's exports. 
Marshall's analysis represented a movement from a partial
^Mill's analysis was of a more general form than 
Ricardo's and stressed different outputs produced by given 
labor inputs instead of given outputs with variable inputs.
?Allen, op. clt.f p. 13.
^Haberler, op. clt.. p. 9.
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equilibrium analysis. That is, each point along his offer
curve was a possible point of equilibrium with the concerned
nations adjusting their internal economies to the new 
opositions.
Between Ricardo's and Marshall's writings a number 
of others made significant contributions, but for the most 
part their analysis added to rather than changed the 
original comparative cost doctrine.
Today, however, modern trade theory utilizes 
"opportunity costs" rather than the "real costs" theories 
of the early classicists. Moreover, economists have tried 
to explain whv comparative advantages may or may not exist. 
Much of the credit for work done in this area belongs to 
Bertin Ohlin and his former teacher, Eli Heckscher.'1'0
Ohlin set up a system only partially similar in 
assumptions to those previously described in that:
(1) factors were free to move within a region 
but not across national boundaries;
(2) two nations existed in which trading could 
occur;
(3) production functions were identical between 




(40 many commodities and factors of production 
were present; and 
(5) a fixed rate of exchange was established.11 
Ohlin, like his predecessors, also assumed perfect compe­
tition, full employment, and no tariffs or transport costs. 
Within the framework each nation specialized in those goods 
it could produce the cheapest in money terms only, not in 
terms of labor or other factors. Price differentials arose 
primarily because of the different factor endowments of the 
trading nations. A country thus exported those items that 
used intensively those factors that were most abundant.
Conversely, it imported those commodities which used
12intensively the scarce factors. Comparative advantage 
existed in the first instance with a comparative dis­
advantage in the second case.
Briefly stated, then, Ohlin explained comparative 
advantages in terms of factor endowments, not in terms of 
different production functions as his predecessors had.
But in substance trade was still explained in terms of 
comparative costs. Since his contribution, there have been 
additions, modifications, and tests of his hypothesis but
12W. M. Corden, Recent Developments in the Theory 
Of International Trade. Special Papers in International 
Economics No. 7 (Princeton University: International
Finance Section, 1965), p. 28.
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basically it stands today (with qualifications) as the
13major "generalized" explanation of trade. J The question 
relevant here, however, is whether it is sufficient to 
explain the trading patterns emerging from state trading.
gpiparafrlv.s. C.Q.stg-.ag AppHsfl-to State Trading
As may be surmised from what has been said, the 
comparative cost doctrine has been an attempt to explain 
the behavior of market-oriented economies. That is, the 
motivation behind trade has been one of profit, with 
possible restraints. Nations exchange goods with the 
expectation of some possible gain, which is usually monetary 
in form. Indirectly, increased specialization is expected 
to enlarge total output so that all traders can and do gain 
from the exchange. Or at least traditional theory has 
emphasized this view.
But state trading may not be motivated primarily 
by economic considerations. Moreover, even if it is for 
strictly economic reasons, the direction and pattern of
For example, discussions have been carried on as 
to the (1) factor price equalization tendency of the 
Heckscher Ohlin model; (2) testing of the assumptions, 
especially the idea of identical production functions;
(3) testing of the main tenets themselves by Leontief 
(leading to his "paradox"); (4) general refinements and 
additions to the theory such as economies of scale, 
technical change, and the inclusion of more than two 
countries and two commodities. See: . W. M. Corden, op. 
cit., pp. 24-34.
■^Not necessarily equally, however.
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exchange may be completely different from what comparative 
costs would indicate. For example, in the non-market case 
so amply portrayed by the Soviet Union (and other communist 
bloc nations), trade has followed directions that in many 
instances have not been along lines of comparative advan­
tage.1^ The framework of the Soviet system is such that 
the doctrine has been incompatible with their operational 
setup.^
Non-market economies.— Specifically, the compara­
tive cost doctrine has implicitly assumed that prices were 
proportionally related to costs, i. e. that effective 
competition prevailed. However, pricing practices within 
bloc nations do not correspond closely to costs of factors 
or to demand conditions in product markets. Instead, 
prices have been fixed by planning commissions and are 
regarded more as planning tools than as signals of scarcity 
or utility. Nor do Communist economists readily accept the 
idea of marginality upon which comparative advantage rests. 
Western economists have assumed prices of factors to equal 
their marginal products along with product prices equalling
^Other similar examples could be cited. For 
example, for the Chinese case see: Yuan-Li Wu, The Economy
of Communist China (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger Pub-
1ishers, 1 ) ,  pp. 150-200.
^J. Wilczynski, "The Theory of Comparative Costs 
and Centrally Planned Economies," Economic Journal (March, 
1965), 61-65.
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marginal costs. Without the notion of marginality, gains
17or advantages from trade cannot be readily shown.
Similarly, plans rather than price differentials 
determine the export of commodities. Exports, in fact, 
have been viewed as a necessary sacrifice to acquire needed 
imports. In many cases development plans require certain 
goods and services that cannot always be obtained domesti­
cally. As a result the Communists view trade as a means of 
securing those items essential to fulfillment of their 
plans. Of course, Imports may be obtained by the "un­
willing" loss of export items, and have indeed been so 
obtained. In addition, exports may sometimes be reflections 
of planning mistakes— 1. e., overproduced items which 
officials would rather dispose of abroad than domestically. 
Hence, those goods exchanged do not necessarily (if at all) 
correspond to those commodities that would be traded if 
comparative advantage were followed.
The bloc nations have also viewed trade as a 
political tool. Since they want to minimize dependence 
upon Western or other non-Communist sources, exchange has 
been undertaken only when the results were consistent with 
the meeting of non-economic (as well as economic) consider­
ations and/or plans. For instance, the Soviet Union has 
supplied Italy with crude petroleum for years at very
17Ibid.
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favorable prices, gaining not only hard foreign exchange 
but a measure of economic and political dependence at the 
same time.
Finally, exchange rate practices do not allow for 
an exact correlation between prices and costs (even if they 
reflected comparative costs). Official rates usually have 
been at such levels as to arbitrarily overvalue bloc 
currency. The result has been further distortion of bloc 
prices and costs. In summary, one writer described the 
feelings of Soviet economists toward the doctrine of 
comparative cost as:
. . .  a pseudo-scientific, reactionary 
foreign trade theory disseminated by bour­
geois economists . . .  to serve as a theoretical 
basis for the Western discriminatory foreign 
trade policies toward Socialist countries.18
It is worth noting, however, that the Soviets have 
(in the "research" stage) been paying increased attention 
to indices of efficiency in exports (and to a smaller degree 
in imports). Such indices reveal a growing dissatisfaction 
with the inherent weaknesses of their present trade system. 
In their search for some kind of foreign trade profitability 
criterion, planners hope that the indices may provide a 
method of measuring the economic gains or losses from ex­
change. For example, one index— the "book keeping 
efficiency of exports"— provides information on the profit­
ability of exports to the foreign trade corporations within
18Ibld.. p. 66.
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19the Soviet system. Other indices provide similar data 
for those segments deemed in need of a guide to the gains 
from trade. However, such studies have been subject to 
limitations because of uncertainty about what should or 
should not be included as variables. More important, 
however, has been the problem of when to use the informa­
tion the indices have provided. As J. Wilczynski put it,
The economic leadership, for the time being, 
is very cautious in acting on the results of ef­
ficiency calculations except in extreme cases . . . .
The same writer concludes that:
The structure of foreign trade has changed 
little as a result of these studies. The final 
decision on the structure and direction of foreign 
trade takes into account non-commercial considera­
tions, which in many cases assume the main 20 
importance, overriding efficiency calculations.
The general conclusion concerning state trading in 
nonmarket economies, then, is that they do not necessarily 
adhere to the principles of comparative advantage when other 
factors outweigh the efficiency aspects of trade. Non- 
market economies have been structured to forms which cannot
*^More specifically the index compares export 
revenues with local sale prices or: bE = Rd where
P + me
bE « Bookkeeping efficiency of exports 
Rd = Official exchange rate value of foreign exchange 
P = Domestic wholesale prices trading corporations pay to 
local enterprises 
me = Local portion of marketing costs 
See: Wilczynski, J., op. cit., p. 70.
20Wilczynski, o p . cit.. p. 79.
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be fully rationalized by "Western" explanations of ex­
change .
Market economies.— Next, a more difficult case needs
inspection: do "market" economies conform to comparative
21advantage in their state trading activities? If the
government trader behaves in the same fashion as a private
trader, the answer would have to be a qualified yes. Of
course, this assumes that comparative cost is accepted as
an explanation of private exchange and that the state trader
is functioning essentially as a private trader. But other
22cases cannot be dismissed as easily.
Earlier it was pointed out that the comparative 
costs doctrine is generally recognized as the major explana­
tion of trade, but that trade can take place for other 
"economic" reasons that are not necessarily consistent with 
comparative advantage. For instance, it has long been 
recognized that countries may encourage exports (by subsi­
dies, etc.,) in order to achieve economies of scale.
Although there may be no initial comparative advantage in 
the industries concerned, it is possible that they may later 
emerge as output enlarges and unit costs decline.
21The assumption here is that trade takes place 
only between market economies, not non-market to market.
220f course, each particular nation would have to 
be analyzed separately. However, certain general conclu­
sions can be reached concerning exchange among "recognized" 
market economies.
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The above has been typical of many Latin American, 
African, and Par Eastern nations. Being relatively under­
developed, they have used trade channels to expand industry 
via both export expansion and import substitution~in other 
words, by means of intervention, which is ordinarily 
considered anti-comparative advantage in nature. This 
interference has sometimes been in the form of direct subsi­
dies to the industries desired, and sometimes in the form 
of (or coupled with) state trading. In any case, government 
trade does not necessarily have to conform to the prices and 
the directions of trade dictated by comparative advantage 
(although it may).
Another example of non-comparative advantage trade 
among market economies is that of underdeveloped countries 
suffering from severe shortages of foreign exchange. 
Governments often use state trading to enlarge the number 
and volume of exports in order to augment their foreign 
exchange receipts, as well as to limit so-called "unneces­
sary" imports.
However, perhaps of greater significance is the 
realization of what comparative costs emphasize. That is, 
it has been and remains primarily a supplv-orlented 
explanation of trade. Demand plays little if any role in 
the "pure" form of the doctrine. Later economists added 
demand conditions, but for the most part they have been
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additional theories in themselves.2-̂ Under such a supply 
interpretation, state trading can be readily shown to create 
changes in production that can possibly divert trade away 
from comparative advantage areas. For instance, in the 
earlier discussion of the economic consequences of govern­
ment trade, it was noted that a state trader may attempt 
to buy or sell goods below or above current market prices.
As a result certain domestic (or foreign) distortions 
appeared in the consumption and production of the traded 
item (or its substitute). These distortions in many cases 
manifest themselves through the supply of the commodity.
Again, many countries have agricultural policies 
(such as those of the United States) which artificially keep 
certain commodity prices above world market prices and 
ordinarily stimulate domestic production of such goods. 
Surpluses have resulted which in many cases have been pur­
chased by their respective governments and later sold 
internationally. If it is the policy at the time of the 
sale to sell at current world prices (lower than domestic), 
the government trader has indirectly encouraged domestic
^Demand (tastes and preferences) may help explain 
the desire to purchase certain items from sources that do 
not offer the lowest relative prices. For example: the
United States buying of strategic items only from "friendly" 
nations. Other cases could be cited.
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production which may or may not be in line with the com-
24parative advantage of the concerned nation.
Generally, then, the state trader can alter supplies 
and demands by creating conditions which induce or hinder 
the production or consumption of traded goods. And the 
resulting direction of flow, composition of trade, and 
prices of traded goods may have little or nothing in common 
with comparative advantage.
Modification to ComparativeC.g,g,t_P£g.t.r.toes
If comparative costs in its basic form is not 
completely applicable to the cases of government trade, can 
it be modified? Or can other theories be applied? To both 
questions the answer is a tentative "yes." A modification 
is considered in the remainder of this chapter, while other 
theories are taken up later.
Offer curves, though relatively old, are (ironi­
cally) uniquely suited to analysis of today's revival of 
exchange under barter conditions. Many countries, notably 
the non-market ones, negotiate bilateral contracts which in 
many instances require the exchange of one commodity against
Oh,^The writer is aware that the basic purpose of 
United States agricultural policy has not been the creation 
of goods for sale to the government to be stored or later 
resold. The point is that the possibility of later resale 
(gaining revenue for the government) may be of some signif­
icance in the argument for the maintenance of domestic 
price supports and of greater importance in explaining dis­
tortions in resource use.
8**
another.2^ As noted earlier, the graphic reflection of 
preferences of this nature was originally created by Alfred 
Marshall using his so-called "representative commodity 
bales."
Specifically, offer curves or reciprocal demand 
curves reflect the willingness of one nation to exchange a 
certain bundle of export goods against the exports (also a 
certain bundle) of another. Each point on a curve repre­
sents a definite amount of one good offered for a specific 
amount of the demanded good. When both countries' offer 
curves are considered, their intersection represents the 
same price in both countries for the two traded items.
Figure 11 may help illustrate offer curves and how 
they may apply to state trading. Two goods are exchanged, 
A-exports and B-exports, from countries A and B. Curves A 
and B represent the offer curves of state traders A and B. 
As the graph indicates, many prices (of one good in terms
-’Barter between free trading nations normally 
varies somewhat from the described situation. There usually 
exists a middleman— a barter specialist, commodity broker, 
or bank. Basically he arranges for each commodity to be 
exchanged for cash or foreign exchange. For example, the 
broker may notice a surplus in nation One. He then attempts 
to find a commodity in nation Two which nation One would 
like to have. Finding such a good, nation Two is contacted 
and a price agreed upon, which is usually a cash price. 
Nation One is then offered the good in exchange for the 
agreed upon cash value of his commodity. The profit or 
price differential depends on market conditions and the 
bargaining skill of the middleman.
See: Staff, "Barter is Respectable," The Economist.
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of another) are possible. These price ratio lines extend 
from the origin outward and reflect (for example) higher 
import prices (and lower export prices) for nation A as the 
slope of the price lines increase. (Conversely, nation B 
would receive more favorable prices.) Note that the offer 
curves are tangent to price lines I and II. Price line III 
represents the equilibrium price (or terms of trade) as 
determined by the given set of curves. Price lines I and 
II are especially important for they indicate the limits of 
the offer curves under normal conditions— they represent 
the domestic prices of goods A and B in the two countries. 
As one writer put it:
. . . the price line is a limit beyond which
the offer curve cannot go. This is obvious enough,
no country will export products for less in the
way of imports than it can produce in import-competing 
goods at home.2®
For the state trader, however, these “outer limit" 
price lines could be wider apart (or closer together) if 
non-economic considerations were allowed to influence a 
country's offer curves (i. e., if the relative cost of 
producing A and B was not the only determinant of the 
position and shape of the offer curves). For example, if 
the offer curves were drawn to include political a3 well as 
economic (cost) preferences, the limits (price lines) might 
reveal an enlarged bargaining zone— an area subject to
2^Kindleberger, o p . cit.. p. **0.
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negotiation, with the barter outcome influenced by the 
economic and political power of the concerned parties.
This could occur if the trade preferences of the trading 
governments rested on non-economic considerations such as 
strategic goods needed for defense or the desire to pro­
vide development assistance to poorer countries. Figure 
12 may be helpful in illustrating this. Recall that the 
offer curves show a country's willingness to give up a 
bundle of one good for a bundle of another. Suppose 
initially that offer curves A and B reflect economic con- 
ditions (or considerations) only, line IV is the equilib­
rium price line, line II reflects country A's internal 
costs of production, and line I reflects B's. Now suppose 
that country B introduces a political element into its 
trade preferences— let's say it wishes to assist economic 
development in A through extremely favorable prices for A's 
goods. This political element may be shown graphically as 
a lowering of B's "base price" line from I to III, the 
"wedge" or angle between these two lines reflecting the 
intensity of the economic sacrifice B is willing to make 
in order to get a political "gain." Offer curve B is the 
all-inclusive (economic and political) offer curve, and X 
is the new terms of trade line. Note, however, that line 
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Figure 12 might also reflect a strong political 
preference for good A by country B. Good A might be con­
sidered militarily important, perhaps, or good B might be 
deemed harmful politically, or at least of little political 
value. The Soviet Union, for example, reputedly mines gold 
and sells it abroad at a loss, presumably because (1) it is 
politically and perhaps economically useless within Russia, 
(2) it is widely demanded both economically and politically 
outside Russia, and (3) it is a sure-fire way of obtaining 
foreign goods of greater strategic, political, or economic 
value for Russia.
Offer curves may also be used to reveal the wide 
range of alternative prices available to a state trader.
In Figure 13 the government trader (B) restricts its im­
ports of good Y to OC. As a result prices may fall from 
P to P*, or rise to P". Or they may lie at any point 
between P* P". As previously pointed out, the solution 
becomes theoretically indeterminate.
In conclusion, then, it is evident that the state 
trader fLoes not necessarily conform to trading patterns 
traditionally explained by comparative costs doctrines.
This is expecially true within non-market nations and in 
market economies when non-economic considerations dominate 
exchange policies. Even when traditional theory is 
modified, it is not completely satisfactory for all the
FIGURE 13
0 GOOD
OFFER CURVES: BARGAINING ZONE
91
possible situations that can arise. Are there other, 
better methods of explaining the limits, resulting prices, 
and direction of trade? The next chapter considers use of 
game theory and suggests a bargaining model more applicable 
to state trading in many respects than those considered so 
far.
CHAPTER V
GAME THEORY AS APPLIED TO STATE TRADING
In the previous chapters it was noted that in some
instances of state trading, prices (the terms of trade) 
and the direction of traded commodities cannot be fully 
explained by traditional theory. The cases of bilateral 
monopoly have been debated and refined for many years. 
Proposals by Edgeworth and others have illuminated possible 
solutions but have also revealed many difficulties.
In the early 19^0's, Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
introduced their pioneering work in the field of game 
theory. Since their original study, many others have added 
to the existing body of knowledge. This chapter examines 
those variations of game theory which appear to best fit 
the various cases of state trading. Several approaches—  
beginning with a broad overview (macro) and ending with a
narrow (micro) examination— are utilized to reveal the
relevance of game theory.
Assumptions of Game Theory
In any attempt to present an explanatory model of 
government trade, it is of utmost importance to establish 
what game theory is— not only its strengths but its
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limitations. Basically, it is a branch of mathematics 
which utilizes formal models in the analysis of decision 
making within the realm of conflict.1 Problems involving 
opposition between two or more parties (with cooperation
ppossible, also) are subject to inquiry. The motivation
for participation may be economic, political, psychological,
or any other force behind human endeavors— including those
found within state trading.
The word "game” implies that two (or more) sides
are participating, with the outcome dependent to a degree
on the activities of all "players." The theory has as its
main objective the finding of rational decisions or choices
for the opposing sides. However, since real world
situations are subject to many forces and pressures, a
model capable of being handled and solved must be limited
and simplified. When this is achieved, the result or model
■ais referred to as a "game."v
Moreover, unlike real world games, a formalized 
model must be constructed and solved according to some 
preconceived and defined rules. Such conditions limit and
Martin Shubik, ed., Game Theory and Related 
Approaches to Social Behavior (iJew York: John Wiley and
£>ons, Inc., 19^)* P«
2Ibid.
^E. S. Venttsel, An Introduction to the Theory of 
Games (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1963), p. 1.
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channel the action of the players during the decision­
making periods within the game. When making moves according 
to a determined strategy, the result or outcome can usually 
be . quantitatively represented by a number of measures, 
including utility. When a game is assigned a numerical 
result, a payoff, each player can share (in different 
proportions) in the benefits.
A variety of approaches may be taken in applying 
game theory to state trading. For example, if the total 
payoff to two parties is fixed, so that one trader must give 
up what the other gains, the game is "zero-sum" or "constant 
sum" in nature. This is the simplest type of game, and is 
reasonably applicable to the state-trading situation.*1- 
Non-zero-sum games, where winners may gain more or less 
than losers give up, may be more typical or real-world 
games or conflict situations, but are more complex at the 
same time.
In addition, players may be assumed to make moves 
reflecting pure personal or rational choice, with no element 
of chance involved, or chance may be included. If chance is 
not a factor, payoffs are a certainty; if chance enters^ a . 
probability distribution of payoffs is necessary.
**X)f course, this assumes that the state trading 
case under consideration is the simplest in form and all 
values in the game can be calculated.
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The degree of ignorance is another determinant of. 
game payoffs. Perfect information may be assumed— implying 
that each side knows the available plays and all previous 
ones— or, more realistically, partial or total ignorance may 
be assumed.^
As can be thus surmised, limitations are necessary 
if a definite game is to be created— a game with a finite 
solution. Given the above workings of game theory, a 
rational solution can be presented for the case of state 
traders with complete or incomplete information, personal 
choice and chance moves, and a zero-sum or non-zero-sum 
payoff.
The Zero Sum Game (Two State Traders)
As noted earlier, a zero-sum game exists when a 
payoff to one player is exactly equal to the losses of the 
other player. In other words, the interests of the par­
ticipants are completely opposed. In order to determine 
which moves to make during the game, the player (state 
trader) can decide beforehand on the specific choices avail­
able. That is, he can conceive of all the possible situa­
tions and develop all possible appropriate moves. For any 
solvable game, the number of choices must be limited to a 
finite figure. In government trading cases, these choices
^A personal move or choice eliminates the necessity 
of a probability distribution for the chance selections.
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may regard the number of bargainers, location of talks, 
size of the trading "package,11 and so forth.
At this point it may be appropriate to point out a 
major difficulty in selecting the alternative strategies.
The state trader can be assumed to represent a single 
entity with its own preferences or desires; or it can be 
assumed to represent the collective wants of the citizens 
of the representative nation. In either case, however, some 
expression must be made about the utility of a particular 
strategy. It is necessary, then, to become involved with 
measuring utility and making interpersonal (or inter­
country) utility comparisons. And this is a truly major 
problem in the real world.
Originally, some early writers (i.e., Menger,
Jevons, and Walras) assumed utility to be measurable and
capable of comparison between individuals. Moreover, the
utility of one good was assumed to be independent of that
of other commodities that were consumed. Later writers such
as Marshall and Pareto avoided these assumptions with the
indifference approach (where only ordinal measurements were
required) and thereby reduced the importance of the early
7cardinal measures.' However, in state trading, approached
(LMark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), p. 3*7.
?C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), pp. 19-20.
97
through game theory, the basic problem of utility measurement 
remains. With the cardinal utility approach, comparisons can 
be made using standard utils of satisfaction. Ordinal 
measurements do not allow for such a finite comparison. Yet 
in the selection of strategies for the government trader, it 
is often assumed that cardinal measurements can be made— an 
assumption highly questionable at best.
Even with this important flaw, it is still possible 
to gain useful insights into the state trading process by 
means of game theory. After all, community indifference 
curves are theoretically impossible to construct without 
making interpersonal utility comparisons, but they are used 
nonetheless (see Chapter IV) with some very satisfactory
Qresults.
There are various ways to handle the difficulties 
involved in cardinal measurements of utility. Models can 
be devised that avoid interpersonal comparisons; hypotheses 
can be modified with restrictive assumptions concerning 
behavior and values— for instance, using money as a common 
measure; or cardinal utility measures can be assumed to 
exist. All three approaches may be utilized, depending 
upon certain conditions.
OFor a discussion of community indifference curves, 
see: Kindleberger, o p . cit.. pp.
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A Simple Game Theory Model
Suppose two state traders are confronting one 
another over a trade "package," with one basically a buyer 
and the other basically a seller. For purposes of illus­
tration, it can be assumed that they desire similar ends 
(profits or prestige) and that what one gains, the other 
must lose (in an opportunity sense). The gains (losses) 
are measured in "utils" and are derived from getting favor­
able (unfavorable) prices, quantities, commodity mixes, 
qualities, and degrees of political and economic dependence. 
Assuming only two strategies available to each for the sake 
of simplicity, the result is a "zero-sum, two person, two 
strategy game," in the language of game theorists. The 
"payoff matrix" is displayed in Figure and represents 
the seller’s point of view (although the buyer must lose 
what the seller gains in a zero-sum game). Note that the 
exporter (seller) has two strategies available to him. The 
outcome of the strategies cam, of course, be assigned 
utility values that are not necessarily consistent with 
market behavior. That is, if profit maximization is not 
the goal, high prices or large quantities may not be sought
Qbut some other outcome with higher utility.7 However, if
^Utility in this instance could include economic, 
political, military, or other such values. These possi­
bilities will be analyzed later. Note, too, that both state 
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profit is the main objective for both traders, a higher-than- 
market price (or larger quantities, perhaps) would give the 
state trader (exporter) the highest utility from the avail­
able choices. If the importer (the other player) is moti­
vated by similar objectives, his best strategy might include 
a purchase "below” market prices.
In Figure 1i+, the seller's two strategies are 
arrayed down the side and the buyer's across the top. If 
the seller employs his strategy A while the buyer does 
likewise, for example, the seller will receive 12 utils of 
satisfaction (and the buyer will lose 12). If the seller 
uses A and the buyer B, however, the payoff will be only 10.
As can be noted from the matrix, if each state 
trader attempts .to seek his most advantageous position, the 
buyer will choose strategy A, and the seller strategy B.
By selecting A, the seller ensures that he will receive at 
least 10 utils, no matter what the buyer does, and the buyer 
ensures that he will lose no more than 10, regardless of 
what the seller does. Perfect knowledge and intelligent 
choosing would thus gain the seller 10, and lose the buyer 
10 (his minimum loss). The seller will choose the strategy 
that maximizes the minimum he cam gaiin (maximin), while the 
buyer will try to minimize the maximum he can lose (minimax). 
These amounts are starred in Figure 1/+.
The game shown in Figure 1 /+ is both simple and 
trivial, however. The optimum strategy is so straightforward
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and the payoffs so certain that it has little resemblance 
to most real-world conflict situations. For example, it 
tells us nothing about the chances lying behind the payoff 
figures shown, and these "chances" may reflect not only 
"luck" or nature*s tricks with payoffs, but the respective 
power positions of the traders, as well. Let us suppose 
that the payoff of 12 utils to the selling state trader 
when he (or they) selects (select) strategy A and the buyer 
also selects A is a long-run average payoff derived from 
the following set of probabilities:
A zero probability of 3 utils payoff;
A 50% probability of 6 utils;
A zero probability of 9 utils;
A zero probability of 12 utils;
A zero probability of 15 utils, and
A 50% probability of 18 utils.
The seller's expected payoff of 12 is thus the result of 
50% x 6 utils plus 50% x 18 utils, the other payoffs having 
no possibilities; note that he never actually receives 12, 
only 6 or 18 in equal proportions over the long run. These 
payoffs may be the only open ones because nature has blocked
the others, or perhaps because actions by the buyer have
blocked them (chance and power position may both be 
reflected, therefore).
Chance, however, does not change the long-run pay­
off matrix, and if Figure lif reflects the long-run average
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payoffs with chance fully taken into account, the optimum 
choice of strategies is still the same: A for the seller
in each game, and B for the buyer.
Figure 1 Zf• s payoff matrix is still something of a 
special case, however— even if probabilities (or chance) are 
taken into account. Note that the seller's maximin and the 
buyer's minimax are both the same in terms of payoff utils—  
10, in this case. This game, therefore, has what game 
theorists call a "saddle point"— the seller's smallest 
minimum coincides with the buyer's largest minimum, the 
seller viewing the "saddle" from the side and the buyer from 
a fore-and-aft direction parallel to the "saddle." And 
games with saddle points are strictly determined. with a 
solution easily determined by inspection. But what happens 
if a game does not have a saddle point?
In Figure 15 the seller's row minimums are 10 and 
8, and his maximin is 10, corresponding to strategy A; the 
buyer's column maximums are 12 and 1 Zf, his minimax being 12. 
The game has no saddle point. What is more, if one player 
selects one strategy and sticks with it consistently, the 
other can consistently outplay the first. So, if the seller 
chooses strategy A to ensure a payoff of at least 10 utils, 
the buyer would naturally choose his strategy B to minimize 
his losses. But if the buyer sticks religiously to his B 
the seller can raise his payoff by shifting over to his 
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Likewise, if the buyer chooses his strategy A in order to 
minimize his losses to 12, the seller can calmly play 
strategy A, win 12 instead of his row minimum of 10, and 
keep on doing so. In sum, the seller is sure he can win at 
least 10, while the buyer is certain he need lose no more 
than 12. But each may do better than their maximins or 
minimaxes by changing strategies in some chance way— that 
is, by mixing their strategies.
Without going into the details of deriving odds, 
suppose the seller decides to mix his strategies in the 
proportion of 3 strategy A to each strategy B. His average 
payoff if the buyer chooses his•strategy A is ,75 x 12 +
.25 x 8 = 11; in other words, 3 times out of four (75% of 
the time) he will win 12 and 25% of the time he will win 8, 
averaging out to 11, which is of course superior to the 10 
he would be sure of by playing strategy A all the time. The 
value of the game to the seller is thus 11 if he mixes his 
strategy in some optimum, but random way (3 to l).1^
The seller's strategy of three A to one B would 
yield similar results against the buyer's strategy B. In 
this case, the value of the game would be .75 x 10 + .25 x
1*f = 1 1 .
1(̂ He must use some chance device, of course, like 
playing strategy B each time he draws a spade from a deck 
of cards— otherwise, a pattern may emerge which would per­
mit the buyer to predict when the seller would use B, 
enabling him to choose his strategy A and cut his losses to 
8.
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The buyer's best strategy in this game v/ould be to 
mix his strategies evenly— one A to one B— according to some 
chance device like the toss of a coin. The value of the 
game to the buyer if the seller uses strategy A is thus 
.50 x 12 + .50 x 10 = 11; if the seller uses B, then the 
arithmetic would be .50 x 8 + .50 x 1/+ = 11— an identical 
value to the seller's, of course, since the winnings of one 
are the losses of the other. And 11 is a smaller loss to 
the buyer than the minimum of 12 which would have been lost 
had the seller picked pure strategy A.
In games without saddle points, then, both sides
11gain by mixing their strategies in some optimum proportion.
So far it has been- shown that solutions may be 
found in zero-sum games, when chance is a factor in the 
payoff matrix, and when mixed strategies may be required.
But what has been learned is a way to present a state-trading 
situation, without a description of what actions are 
actually involved in each strategy, or what the elements 
of the payoff have been. Perhaps seller's strategy A is a 
long, involved sequence of steps, including threshold prices 
and quantities, quality levels, volume of ancillary services 
(like credit, freight, and insurance), mode of presentation 
of the package, terms of the transaction, timing, and so on.
11For a simple way to compute odds in a two-strategy 
game, see: J. D. Williams, The Compleat Strategist (New
Y ork: McGraw-Hill, 1965).
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Strategies for B may include the same or different items, 
in different proportions, sequences, etc. The payoff may 
be measured in terms of profits, strategic concessions, or 
political advantages. Yet although game theory cannot tell 
everything about a state trading situation, it nonetheless 
can clearly reveal the nature of the conflict situation 
somewhat better, and it is capable of providing determinate 
solutions to problems when all the elements are known.
Moreover, whether the game is (1) zero sum or non­
constant, (2) pure strategies or mixed, (3) with or without 
a saddle point, one of the essential elements lies in the 
power position of the respective participants. The proba­
bility distributions required are, hence, subject to the 
ability of traders to increase his "chances" of a desired 
outcome. The method of solution can, therefore, be subro­
gated to the probability of an event which in turn is a 
function (to a large degree) of the powers of the state 
trading "players." Information is thus essential concerning 
their respective size, bargaining ability, strength of their 
need to sell or purchase the commodity in question or in 
essence— their respective power positions.
Probability and Power
One of the most important questions in a state 
trading situation is that of the probability of state trader 
A exerting his influence over B. In other words, A's power
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can be measured by the probability of getting a certain
strategy selected by B. Power in this context thus varies
12from many alternative interpretations available.
In considering such a concept of power several 
dimensions can be identified:
(a) The base of power, i.e., the resources 
(economic assets, constitutional prerogatives, 
military forces, popular prestige, etc.) that A 
can use to influence B's behavior.
(b) The means of power, i.e., the specific 
action promises, threats, public appeals, etc.) 
by which A can make actual use of these resources 
to influence B's behavior.
(c) The scope of power, i.e., the set of 
specific actions that A, by using his means of 
power, can get B to perform.
(d) The amount of power, i.e., the net in­
crease in the probability of B’s actually perform­
ing some specific action X, due to A's using his 
means of power against B.
(e) The set of individuals over whom A has., 
power. The extension of power, in other words. ^
12In reality there are many concepts of power and 
many methods of measurement.. The method described, however, 
is felt to better illustrate the case of state trading. 
Perhaps it is very close to Max Weber's definition of power 
as "the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behavior 
of other persons." See: Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An
Intellectual Portrait (New York: Anchor Books, doubleday
and Co., Inc., 19&2), P. 290.
1 x«John Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, 
Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining 
Games," Behavioral Science. VII, No. 1 (January, 1962). The 
same material may also 6e found in: Martin Shubik, ed.,
Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 196*f), p. Note:
footnote references are to the Shubik text.
As may be noted reference will be made to state
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If these dimensions of power are known, the posi­
tions of government traders can be compared. For instance, 
an individual (state trader) has more "power” the greater 
are items (a) through (e). However, item (d), the amount 
of power, is the most significant for this paper's purposes. 
Moreover, item (d) is the only item that can be quantified 
as a "real" number; all the other listings are specific 
objects or actions. It is defined, after all, as a dif­
ference of two probabilities. And it may be regarded as a 
general measure of power, possibility including elements of 
other dimensions— for example, scope and extent of power.
Up to this point no mention has been made as to the 
possible costs involved. Hence, another dimension is 
needed:
(f) The opportunity costs to A of attempting 
to influence B's behavior, i.e., the opportunity 
costs of using his power over B (and of acquiring 
this pov/er over B in the first place if A does not 
yet possess the required power); which we shall call 
the costs of A's power over B; and
(g) The opportunity costs to B of refusing to 
do what A wants him to do, i.e., of refusing to 
yield to A's attempt to influence his behavior. As 
these opportunity costs measure the strength of B's 
incentives for yielding to A's influence, we shall 
call them the strength of A's power over B.'^
trading as if Harsanyi's article deals with government ex­
change. It does not. However, it offers a method of 
analyzing the bargaining procedure and is capable of 
application to the state trading case.
1^Shubik, ed., Game Theory and Related Approaches 
to Social Behavior. op.'"cit., p. 186.
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A's power over B therefore not only includes the 
ability of A to secure desired action from B with a certain 
probability, but also within a certain cost to A. These 
costs may be expressed in physical units, monetary units, 
or abstract utility measurements.
In addition, state traders A and B may have different 
views of costs. Nation A may be able to dominate B and
force a certain act to be performed but only at a consider­
able expense relative to what costs nation B might incur to
1 5force a similar act in its favor. ^ One way to measure
power might be to hold costs constant in both countries and
then compare the power or influence of the two nations which
results. However, nations (or their respective governments)
do not necessarily seek an objective from a "power-per-
dollar" point of view. Thus one country's subjective
evaluation of the goal may necessitate larger (or smaller)
cost outlays compared to another's. And in the extreme, a
nation may have limited resources to devote to a desired
objective even though their evaluation would suggest the
16desirability of a larger commitment.
Costs, then, are important. As the concept of 
opportunity costs implies, nation B must be aware of the 
costs involved in not complying (or agreeing) to nation A.
15Ibid., pp. 186-189.
1 6This point is especially significant when small 
and large nations mutually state trade.
That is, by not allowing A’s strategy to dominate, B may 
undergo a cost of "noncompliance," and this will naturally 
influence B ’s decisions to comply or not comply with A's 
wishes. Moreover, state trader A can influence such oppor­
tunity costs in several ways. It may offer B certain 
advantages or disadvantages without any conditions attached 
or nation A may offer possible rewards (or punishments) 
subject to conditions. And these results can be actual or 
real or they may be perceived (what B thinks they are).1^ 
For instance, from A's point of view, the cost of influenc­
ing B may be "objective" costs (known from rational 
analysis), while B might be less rational and have only a 
vague idea of the costs of compliance or noncompliance.
In summary, then, it has been stated that a state 
trader's power over another can be thought of in terms of 
increases in probabilities of securing certain actions, 
conditioned by any costs incurred by A to influence B and 
by B of refusing to be influenced. But more can be said by 
defining the strength of power as Harsanyi does in (g) 
above (in terms of the utility B gives up if it refuses A's 
attempt to influence its behavior), and then relating this 
potential gain in utility for B to B's disutility of per­
forming an action desired by A. As a result, the maximum 
increase in probabilities that A can influence B is
17'That is, nation B may think the costs to be at 
one level when they are really quite different.
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revealed. And this increase in probabilities is the maxi­
mum amount of power A can exert on B. In algebraic terms, 
if A  P is the increase in probabilities or amount of A's 
power, u is the utility gain for B from acceding to A's 
demands, and x the disutility to B of acceding or 
A P  g  u , That is, A's power maximum is simply the ratioX
of B's utility gain to its disutility from carrying out the 
action.
Realistically speaking, however, such a measure of 
power would require theoretical probabilities; yet in state 
trading, nation B's behavior may be observed over a series 
of similar events in which B complied with A in some pro­
portion of the times. Probability in this sense becomes 
empirical frequencies. B's behavior will yield disutility 
of various amounts in the observed events. B will tend, 
therefore, to comply with A in those cases when the dis­
utility is smallest. It is also possible that if B 
increases his agreements with A, his disutility for com­
pliance would increase as the more "distasteful" actions 
remained (as the less distasteful were selected first). As 
a result, the amount of A's power over B may increase some­
what less than proportionally over time if the number of
1 Qpossible actions are limited.
l8Ibid., p. 187-193
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The Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi Solution 
for Bilateral Power Positions
Thus far, probability and power have been discussed 
as though only one player or state trader had power over the 
other. In general, however, both parties have power over 
the other. In the Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi general model of 
bilateral power situations, both parties' power functions 
are analyzed, i.e., each state trader's power function must 
be viewed simultaneously.
It was assumed earlier that nation A had attempted
1Qto influence nation B into performing an act-say Y. y B, of
^The following symbols will be utilized in order of 
appearance:
Y = act wanted by trader A
y - disutility to trader B when performing act Y
p.j - probability of performing act Y
s - mixed strategy
s(pj) - mixed strategy with probability p^
s(o) - mixed strategy with probability o, yielding smaller
utility to B than s(p1)
Uj = B's utility for s(p.j) performance
uQ - B's utility if using other strategy s(o)
uQ* - A's utility if B does not perform act Y
y* -• increase in A's utility if B performs with a
probability of 1
Z ~ reward by A given to B for compliance to Act Y
increasing probability to p2
s(pP) mixed strategy with new pP probability (reward z 
included)
z - gain to B for reward Z
z* - cost to A for Z reward to B
u2* -= A's expected utility with cost of reward Z and
increased probability p2
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course, could realize a certain disutility (y) in complying 
yet would perform with a probability p1 /or a mixed strategy, 
s, would be chosen with the probability p̂  or 6 ^ / 7 .  That 
is, s(p^) to B can be assumed to yield a higher level of 
utility than a refusal by B to comply to the act. Another 
strategy s(o) would yield a smaller payoff uQ, rather than 
the higher payoff u1, for using the mixed strategy s with 
a probability p̂  or s(p^). B's total expected utility would 
thus be û  - p^y greater than uQ /or B's utility for using 
his strategy minus the disutility associated with it would 
be greater than the utility gained when using another 
strategy s(o27.









sanction or damages imposed by A against B in an 
attempt to increase the probability of agreement
loss to B for sanction from A
cost to A for imposing sanction on B
expected total utility forA with sanction against B
B's expected total utilitywith sanction
B's retaliatory action against A
A's retaliatory action against B
new total loss for B in conflict
new total cost for A in conflict
equilibrium probability for action Y for B
equilibrium probability for action Y for A
A's expected utility in asymetric case
B's expected utility in asymetric case
complementary act to action Y if Y is not performed 
by B
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If in the event that B did not conform to A's wishes, 
then A's utility would be lower, or uQ*. However, if B con­
formed with a probability of one, A's utility would be larger 
by y*. But in the event that the original probability p^ 
existed, then A's expected utility would be uQ* + p^y*, 
or the sum of these new possibilities of performance and 
nonperformance.
Of course, in all bargaining situations, it is 
possible for rewards to be offered for the performance of an 
act. If player A nov; introduces a reward Z to B, B's 
probability of compliance could increase to p2. For 
instance, state trader A may offer certain political con­
cessions to increase the probability of agreement. Again a 
new strategy is possible represented by s(p2). From a 
utility standpoint, the inducement Z added to B's utility 
while it represented a cost to A in satisfaction /or a gain 
z to B and a loss (cost) z* to A/. The reward now allows 
A's expected utility with the new probability (p2 ) to be the 
sum of A's utility if B does not perform minus the cost of 
the reward plus the increase in utility arising from the new 
probability. Nation B's expected value would differ by the 
addition of the reward. Symbolically, for A:
U2* - U2*(P2 ) : UQ* - Z* + P2y* 
and for B:
U2 = U2(p2) = Ul + z — p2y.
U 5
If the opposite approach is utilized, i.e., sanctions 
A can impose a penalty, or damaged D, against B in an attempt 
to increase the probability of agreement. Such penalties 
could include lost political or military ties, loss markets, 
reduced orders, or other denied favors (or penalties) that 
A may restrict (impose) to (on) B. Again in utility 
standards, the penalty D to nation B would create a loss d, 
while A would incur a cost d* by imposing the sanction. As 
with the rewards discussed previously, A's new expected 
satisfaction includes the utility if B does not perform 
minus the cost of the sanction plus the utility from the 
original p̂  probability. Player B's expected value would be 
the utility from the p̂  probability minus the sanction less 
the disutility when performing. Algebraically, A's.expected 
utility with an "in doubt" p2 would be U y  = uQ* - d* + p^y* 
while B's expected utility would become - û  - d - p^y.
The assumption in this situation is that B would still 
retain his p̂  probability for performance (or that they could 
not agree on the value of ^2) •
In more realistic cases of state trading, both 
parties usually have the ability to use retaliatory 
strategies and direct them against each other. In most 
trading situations, a passive participant is rare. Each 
trading party has its own unique "methods" depending on the 
interpreted value of the action. In addition, such action 
will be limited by the size and resources of each respective
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nation. For instance, Russia while trading with smaller 
countries has been quite capable of securing advantages 
simply because of the sheer magnitude of her possible 
retaliatory actions.
Assuming these conditions to be present, nation A 
can use measure and nation B may resort to measure Vg.
If this situation arose, d would now become the total loss 
for B in a conflict, a cost accruing from B's own rataliatory 
strategy and the cost (loss) created by A's actions. For 
similar reasons, d* would include both cost items for trader
A.
Up to this point, no mention has been made of the 
actual probability p2, i.e., the equilibrium probability for 
action Y of the state traders. However, with all possible 
actions now presented, it is possible to find such a value. 
Obviously, it lies between the two nations' concession 
limits. A's concession limit is reached when the expected 
utility from those actions with rewards equals that ex­
pected utility with sanctions or damages. Or algebraically 
when U2* = U^* and similarly when U2* = u-j* - z* + p2y* 
equals U^* = uQ* - d* + p^y*. Solving these equations for
A 7 * - d *the p0 value for A gives p~‘ = p1 + _----- If the equilib-
A y*rium probability p2 equals p2 , then A's expected total 
utility will be u2*(p2A) = U^* = uQ* - d* + p^y* as before 
but now d* includes retaliatory actions. Similarly, B's
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Aexpected total utility with the p2 value becomes
u2 ( p 2 a ) = U1 + z  “  ~ P«|y-y
As with nation A, B's concession limit is realized 
when the expected utility from those actions with rewards 
equals that expected utility with sanctions or damages.
T3That is, when U2 = giving the p2 value for B of p2 =j Bp̂  + 5 Again with p2 = p2 , B's expected total
y gutility becomes U2(P2 ) = = Uj - d - p^. Similarly, A's
B Bexpected utility with the p2 value becomes U2*(P2 ) =
u * _ z* + _Zl(z + d) + p,y*.o y  1*7
When translated into a geometric figure in the form 
of a utility plane (see Figure 16), the total of agreement
points lie on a straight line connecting the two traders'
concession limits— points Q and W. Algebraically, in the 
plane (U*, U) the agreement points are U(p) = (p2),
U2 (p227 with the concession limit points Q = U(p2 ) =
/U2*(P2B), U2(p2Bi7 and W = U(p/) = ^I2*( p2A), U2(p2A17.
The payoff in conflict cases occurs at N with N ~ (Uy, U^).
If a further assumption is made that the agreement
points (U) lie on the straight line QW, the solution, pro­
vided that the game is perfectly symmetrical between the 
players, falls halfway between Q and W— (or at H). Again 
algebraically, A's expected utility at point H equals
V  = ^ 2 #(P2A) + U2*(p2B̂ 7 = uo* “ Z* ’2 ■d'* + (Z + d) +y ap^*; while B's expected utility becomes = -£/CT2(p2 ) +








Setting U^* = U2*(p2) and = U2(p2) the equilibrium value 
of p2 consistent with the solution point H becomes
p~ = p, + z * d + z * - d * -2 Q  
2y 2y*
In addition, trader A will attempt to select a Z 
value (reward to B) which will maximize the following:
A z = £ - £*. By achieving such a maximum, A has the best
y y*Z as an incentive, minus the cost of providing this service 
to B. In a similar fashion, A will attempt to choose the 
penalty D to maximize the following: A  d = £ - i-LL. That
y y*
is, A by maximizing the difference between the penalty value
and its cost, adds to its power position.
In the more realistic case of both parties using
their retaliatory strategies, A would attempt the above when
B's retaliatory strategy is given. B, of course, would
attempt the same type of maximization procedure given A's
retaliatory strategy but would achieve it by minimizing A  d
when A's strategy is known. As a result of both parties'
actions, the equilibrium choice of Dg and will be of
21that value to allow A d to be a maximum.
As a consequence, B can select a strategy s(p2 ), the 
equilibrium probability strategy, which would allow the 
amount of A's power over B to be the difference in proba­




B agree from this to do act Y with the probability p2 then 
B will not perform act Y with a probability of 1 - P2 » 
Technically speaking, A and B have agreed on a jointly 
randomized mixed strategy with a probability p2 of compliance 
for B and a 1 - p2 probability of noncompliance. However, 
noncompliance by B toward A measures B's power over A to 
perform a complementary action (CA) to action Y with a 
probability of 1 - p2 «
Thus as noted, if B does not comply to A's wishes,
A will perform action CA. If so, A will have lost the 
utility associated with compliance by B, or y*. In other 
words, y* now is a measure of disutility to A when forced 
to perform the complementary action CA. If (as shown above) 
the amount of A's power over B is p = p2 - p̂  or p = p2 - p̂ » 
■Kz +d - d* - z*) then (z + d) measures the sum of the
y y*reward for 3 for compliance plus the penalty for non- 
compliance. In reality, it indicates B's willingness to 
agree with A. It thus represents the conflict opportunity 
costs to B and hence the "total" strength of A's influence 
over B. Moreover £ measures A's "relative" strengthy
over B.
In addition- (d* - z*) indicates the cost differential 
to A of a sanction against B and the cost of rewarding B. 
Similarly, (as with B) the difference measures A's willing­
ness to agree with B. From A's point of vievi, it is his 
opportunity costs of conflict with (d* - z*) measuring the
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"total” strength of B over A and being the rela-
v*22tive strength of B over A.
As pointed out by Harsanyi:
If both parties follow the rationality postu­
lates of the Zeuthen-Nash theory of the two person 
bargaining game, then in bilateral power situations 
the amount of A's power over B with respect to some 
action . . . tends to be equal to half the net 
strength of A's power over B with respect to the 
same action . . .  this net strength being defined 
as the difference between the gross relative strength 
of A's power over B with respect to action • . . and 
the gross relative strength of B's power over A with 
respect to the complementary action . . „ .25
More specifically, this applied model reveals the 
amount of power a state trader (A) may have over trader (B) 
under the given assumptions. It includes the possible 
rewards a nation may offer plus the possible penalties it 
may impose to force compliance to an act. At the same time 
it includes another force, that one of less submission in 
light of the concessions that B perceives A may have to 
make. The strength of these forces is the difference be­
tween the total relative strength of nation A over B 
relative to event Y, and the total relative strength of 
nation B over A with respect to a complementary event CA. 
Given the symmetry assumption (the same starting disagree­
ment point), the amount of power would be equal to one-half 




it would appear as i )7. That is, nation A'sL y y* ./
power over B equals one-half the rewards plus the penalties 
given to B by A divided by the disutility to B for performing 
(this is one strength or force); minus—the cost to A for 
imposing any damages or penalties on B minus the cost of any 
rewards given to B divided by the gain in utility to A if B 
performs with increased probability (1).2Zf The greater the 
difference between these two forces, the greater will be the 
power of one state trader (A) over another (B).
In sum, the above system yields the following 
results: In the first instance, it provides an equilibrium
probability for action under the described (limited) 
assumptions. Moreover, the presented solution is Pareto 
optimal for it lies on the boundary of the utility plane 
(see Figure 16) and is the best position for both players.
In addition, symmetry was assumed, allowing for the 
determination of the equilibrium probability and utility.
That is, the final solution had to lie within the confines
of the utility plane with zero as the common origin (i.e.,
25the same disagreement point) for both parties. J
^ O f  course, y* has become a measure of disutility 
to A in conflict.
^ A s  may be surmised, the Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi 
solution is not the "only" theory of the bargaining process. 
However, its emphasis on power relationships made it more 
significant than most for state trading purposes. Though 
approaches may vary, the outcomes may be relatively close.
As pointed out by J. Cross: "In view of these results, it
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Power over another, therefore, depends on the 
strength of the individual (or nation) to influence or 
command compliance. The greater such strength the greater 
will be the scope and extension of power. Incentives for 
action include utility or disutility for performing, with 
greater power going to those willing to assume the costs 
depending on their interpretation of the value of the 
achieved event. By analogy to production theory, output 
is a function of the various inputs. With power, the 
ability to influence others is a function of the utility 
and costs borne in forcing compliance.
The Values Within the 
Payoff Matrix
It may be recalled that as the simple state trading 
model was presented, the solution was limited in its 
"description" of strategies. The Harsanyi procedure (when 
applied to state trading) provides a solution (with weak­
nesses) but it lacks the capability of divulging "all" 
influences on the selection of various strategies. The 
original model had these possibilities but as presented was
is not hard to surmise why international negotiations, where 
learning and discount rates are probably lower . . . ex­
pectations may be more optimistic, and bargaining costs are 
practically zero, can last for years, although for the same 
reason we would expect that the outcomes will be fairly near 
the Nash solution." See: John G. Cross, "A Theory of the
Bargaining Process," The American Economic Review. LXVI 
(March, 1969)* PP« 68^"7.
12^
incomplete. The following is aimed at supplementing the 
previous material by looking more deeply into the component 
parts of a strategy, i.e., into the values within a simple 
payoff matrix. More specifically, how may economic goals 
be reconciled with political or military or general 
prestige goals, and how are the overall values (including 
both economic and noneconomic elements) of the payoffs 
determined?
Just as Harsanyi made use of cost-benefit ideas in 
the development of his bilateral power position model, the 
cost-benefit approach may be employed in analyzing the 
trade-off between economic and noneconomic goals. Harry G, 
Johnson used essentially this technique in his explanation 
of why small countries often attempt to industrialize even 
though inefficiency will obviously result. According to 
Johnson, certain policy actions will be taken "up to the 
point where the value of the marginal collective utility 
derived from collective consumption of national power is
prjust equal to its marginal excess private cost." Later,
B. J. Cohen modified the approach to explain the trade-off 
between consumption of economic goods and services on one
26Benjamin J. Cohen, ed., American Foreign Economic 
Policy (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 19b8),~p. lb.
See also: Harry G. Johnson, "An Economic Theory of Protec­
tionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs 
Unions," Journal of Political Economy, LXXIII (June. 1965). 
256-283.
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hand and the consumption of power (a political good) on the 
other. Cohen's formulation is especially helpful in the 
state trading case.
First, it is possible to define the real income of 
a country in terms of its total utility derived from its 
total consumption of economic goods and services together 
with its total consumption of national power. National 
power is defined so as to include military position, politi­
cal advantages, international prestige, and so forth; it is 
thus a noneconomic end in itself, rather like a consumer 
good, as well as a means to both more economic goods and 
services (potentially) and more power. In the latter 
respect, national power serves as a type of noneconomic 
capital good, which can be used to raise real income in the 
future while serving as a noneconomic consumer good at the 
same time. It is, therefore, a direct noneconomic equiva­
lent to economic goods and services, which are partly 
consumer goods and services and partly capital-type goods 
and services.
The potential total real income of a country is, in 
turn, determined by the volume and quality of resources 
(broadly defined) available. To some extent, national 
power and economic goods and services are mutually rein­
forcing parts of total real income— that it, the more goods 
and services available, the more potent the country may be 
in a political or military sense as well (and vice versa),
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but only to a point. At some point, greater international 
power may require the sacrifice of resources: more men and
material for arms production, perhaps, at the expense of 
domestic living standards, or more economic assistance for 
politically pivotal underdeveloped countries at the expense 
of domestic environmental improvement. When this point is 
reached, income maximization can occur only by means of a 
trade-off of economic goods and services for national pov/er 
or vice-versa. To maximize real income, therefore, a 
country should trade off economic consumption of goods and 
services for national power as long as the marginal collec­
tive utility of consuming national pov/er is greater than the 
marginal cost of foregone consumption of goods and services.
The United States and the Soviet Union are excel­
lent polar cases of this trade-off phenomenon. In the 
U. S., a relatively high valuation is put on economic goods 
and services, and usage of resources for military buildups 
or foreign aid (which serve to enhance national power) is 
permitted only grudgingly. In the Soviet Union (at least 
until quite recently), high priority has been put on 
military expenditures, economic penetration of the under­
developed countries, acquisition of high-technology goods 
from the West, and so forth, at considerable cost in terms 
of living standards. Obviously, these two countries 
formulate state-trading strategies quite differently— their 
payoff matrices are very different, and the makeup of each
127
matrix square is quite different, since their relative 
valuations of national pov/er and economic goods and services 
vary so.
Cost-benefit analysis (or marginal analysis, if that 
is a better term), then, can help explain the composition 
of the values in a matrix— how much utility is derived 
from national power and how much from consumption of eco­
nomic goods and services. Likewise, it can also be helpful 
in showing what the amounts are. Since a state-trading 
matrix is necessarily based on trade between two governments, 
it is only necessary to say that the amount of value 
(economic plus noneconomic) in each matrix square depends 
on the marginal contribution of imports to total real income 
or utility minus the cost to real income of foregoing those 
goods and services exported. Since different strategy 
combinations will yield different volumes and terms of 
trade (as well as different political concessions granted 
and received), the matrix values will also differ.
Perhaps a rough example may help clarify the fore­
going. Suppose the U. S. is considering the negotiation of 
a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. Suppose further 
that the United States* strategy A amounts to a relatively 
generous (by past standards) offering of wheat, computers, 
and heavy equipment at attractive prices if the Russians 
respond with a relatively liberal strategy permitting U. S. 
firms to enter into co-production arrangements in the
U. S. S. R., to develop markets for U. S. products like 
Coca Cola, and to import sizable amounts of Soviet crude 
oil. On the other hand, strategy A may require the U. S. 
to supply only a small amount of wheat and accept only 
homogenized yak furs if the Russians adopt a relatively 
restrictive strategy. A liberal response may well yield a 
much higher increment to U. S. real income, since enlarged 
sales and production of "comparitve advantage" goods 
coupled with increased power over the Soviets stemming from 
their increased dependence upon this country could be 
expected to substantially outweigh the economic and political 
costs of foregone wheat, computers, heavy equipment, and 
dependence upon Russian oil and markets. A restrictive 
response by the Russians would not cost so much, but 
neither might the net benefits be more than incidental, 
with a correspondingly low matrix value.
In conclusion, this chapter has dealt with game 
theory as applied to the state-trading situation. Initially, 
a simple two-person zero-sum game was hypothesized to 
indicate the nature of game theory as an analytical tool.
This was then expanded, using the Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi 
approach, to permit power positions to enter the state- 
trading calculus. Finally, cost-benefit analysis was 
employed in an attempt to show how both economic and non­
economic considerations may enter into the determination of 
state-trading payoffs. Although game theory may not be
able to offer a determinate solution to the real-world 
policymaker, it nonetheless offers a unique view of the 
state trading situation, emphasizing the importance of 
conflict, of benefits and costs, and of power and prob­
abilities. Game theory may not be especially useful as 
predictive device, therefore, but does appear to have 
useful explanatory powers inasmuch as it, more than any 
other approach, gets to the root of the basic nature of 
state trading— conflict.
CHAPTER VI
STATE TRADING IN WHEAT
It has been shown that state trading can take many 
forms, employ both economic and political measures, and 
have some far-reaching consequences. The preceding chapter 
suggested that game theory may have some useful applications 
to state trading situations, perhaps more in the way of 
helping to understand why state traders behave as they do 
than in any predictive sense. As a tool of analysis, game 
theory thus may be somewhat comparable to the kinked 
oligopoly demand curve: it tells us something about the
nature of an economic situation, but it cannot really tell 
us much about how that situation came to be in the first 
place. Game theory merely offers a method of analyzing the 
outcome of a bargain or transaction, which may nonetheless 
be of considerable value. This chapter explores just such 
a deal— the Soviet Union's purchase of wheat from the United 
States in 1972.
The Wheat and Pood Aid Treaty 
In order to understand and truly appreciate the 
Soviet-American wheat deal, it is first necessary to examine 
briefly several aspects of U. S. agricultural policy which
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appear to operate as "external restraints" on the American 
side.1 It is commonly known that the United States has a 
complex set of policies and regulations concerning the 
production and distribution of its grain products. Nor is 
the U. S. alone in such practices— many other nations also 
supervise their agricultural activities for both external 
and internal reasons.
In addition, the United States is a member of an 
international wheat agreement which has been renewed and
modified over the years until it reached its present form
2in 1971. Under this agreement, member countries report 
to a "Wheat Council" and "Secretariat" those of its 
activities which govern the production and sale of wheat 
in its domestic markets. The Council and Secretariat then 
use this information to monitor world wheat prices and 
market conditions and make whatever recommendations seem 
necessary to maintain stability in these markets.
Of course, stability in prices ideally requires 
some reference point from which to measure changes. Prior
*0f course, only those activities and regulations 
concerning state trading (of the nearly infinite number of 
agricultural regulations) are examined. Other regulations 
are dealt with only as they apply to the various aspects of 
the Soviet deal.
2United States Congress, International Wheat Agree­
ment. 1971. Hearings before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on 
International Wheat Agreement of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, on Executive F, 92nd Con­
gress, 1st Session, June 15, 17, and 29. 1971 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), P. 1**3. The
agreement will last until July, 197^.
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to the 1971 extension of the agreement, the U. S. had hoped 
that one standard type of wheat would be adopted— the top 
quality wheat in the world, Manitoba No. 1 at a price of 
$1.62| at Lakehead ports— and that all other wheats would 
be pegged against it. However, for several reasons agree­
ment could not be reached on this matter in the 1971 exten­
sion. For one thing, Canada was in the midst of installing 
a new grading system for wheat, and secondly, neither 
Canada nor thq U. S. was willing to have one of their grains 
adopted as the reference wheat. Therefore the final agree­
ment— without a reference wheat— also lacked a reference 
price.3 This meant that the 1971 wheat agreement, unlike 
its predecessors, had neither an agreed maximum nor minimum 
price (setting a range within which world prices would 
float).
The Soviet-American Wheat Peal 
Given these world wheat pricing conditions— flexible 
ones, to say the least— the stage was set for the
^This point will have significance when examination 
of the Soviet wheat deal is made.
At this point it may be beneficial to note that as 
part of the international wheat agreement, a food aid 
agreement was also signed. Under its terms, the U. S. (only 
one of 31 nations— including the U.S.S.R.) agreed to donate 
to "needy" nations a sum of wheat according to its capability 
to produce wheat. Of course, the U.S., being the largest 
producer in the world, was allocated the largest share. 
Contributions are made under Public Law ^80 and are given 
out of Commodity Credit Corporation stockpiles. The U. S. 
donation amounts to 1,890,000 metric tons each year over 
the life of the three-year agreement.
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Soviet-American wheat transaction. In December of 1971 
information was received by the u. S. government concerning 
Soviet difficulties with grain production. Bad weather and 
crop failures had plagued the Russians, forcing them to 
turn to international markets to meet their grain needs.
In April of the next year, Secretary of Agriculture Earl 
L. Butz led a trade mission to Moscow and conducted the 
beginning discussions. Two months later, on July 8, 1972, 
President Nixon announced that agreement had been reached 
on the sale of grains to Russia.^
Behind the scenes, however, the negotiations were 
conducted in two distinct segments. In June, a Soviet 
delegation arrived in the United States prepared to pur­
chase various grains specified in the Moscow meeting in 
April. However, the delegation consisted of two distinct 
groups. Private negotiations took place between part of 
the delegation and eight large American grain exporting 
firms while government negotiations on credit arrangements 
were handled by the rest of the Soviet representatives with 
the U. S. government. On July 8, final agreements had been 
reached on both parts of the grain sale. At this point, 
however, neither the type (or types) of commodity (or 
commodities), nor their volumes, were stipulated in the
All About That Soviet Wheat Deal," TJ. S. News and 
World Reports. DCXIII (October 9, 1972), 28-30.
13**
agreement or publicly disclosed— the specifics would be
5determined at some future date.
It was not until one month later that the Russians 
announced their intentions to purchase wheat only, excluding 
other grains that had been previously considered. As a 
result of the announcement, the wheat market responded 
vigorously, with domestic prices rising from $1.65 per 
bushel in June to $2.27 by late November. Of course, along 
with the domestic price increase, U. S. export subsidies 
aiso rose.^
At this point, it may be helpful to review U. S. 
export subsidy policies relating to the wheat deal. 
Basically, the U. S. Department of Agriculture's export 
subsidy is a discretionary "tool" resting with the Secretary 
of Agriculture. It is designed to ensure the "competitive­
ness" of U. S. wheat in world markets.^ In addition, the 
subsidy may be used to stabilize world wheat prices, to aid 
price-support programs by strengthening domestic market 
prices, and to reduce the quantities of wheat the Commodity
5united States Congress, House of Representatives, 
Sale of Wheat to Russia. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Livestock and Grains of the Committee on Agriculture,
92nd Congress, Second Session, September l*f, 18, and 19,
1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972),
PP. 1-5.
6Ibid.. pp. 5-15.
?In recent years U. S. wheat prices have been above 
world prices. Export subsidy payments are made to bridge 
the gap between higher domestic prices and world selling 
prices.
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Credit Corporation (CCC) must purchase to maintain domestic
Qprices at their support levels.
Prior to the wheat sale of 1972 the subsidy rate 
was very low. It was determined daily by USDA officials, 
and set at levels high enough to ensure the competitive­
ness of U. S. wheat in world markets. To receive a subsidy, 
an exporter had to apply for it and offer to export a 
certain quantity and quality of wheat from a specific port.^ 
If the application was accepted by the Agriculture Depart­
ment, the subsidy was fixed at that day's rate (regardless 
of when the wheat was actually shipped). Payment of the 
subsidy was then made by the CCC after proof of shipment 
was presented to them.
Naturally, after the Soviet grain deal was publi­
cized and domestic prices began to rise substantially above 
world prices, the export subsidy rate soared. Table 4 
shows the U. S. export subsidy rates and domestic prices 
for wheat for those months immediately after the announce­
ment of the deal. Of special interest is the period between
Q United States Congress, United States Senate, 
Extension of Farms and Related Programs. Hearings before 
the Committee of Agriculture and Forestry, 93rd Congress,
1st Session, February 27, 28; March 1, 2, 8, 9, 13, 1^, and 
20, 1973 (Washington: D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1973).
^The exporter does not necessarily have to have 
orders for wheat but may be contemplating a shipment . . . 
or he may be trying to take advantage of that day's favor­
able export subsidy rate!
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TABLE 4
U. S. EXPORT SUBSIDY RATES AND PRICES FOR HARD RED WINTER WHEAT 




At U.S. port subsidy price
Date (Domestic Price) rate ("World" Price)
1972
3 $1.68 1/k $0.05 $1.63 1/4
5 1.69 .06 1.636 1.71 1/2 .07 1.64 !/87 1.69 7/8 .07 1.62 7/810 1.71 7/8 .09 1.62 7/811 1.76 1/k .13 1.63 1/412 1.76 1/2 .13 1 .63 1/2
13 1.76 1/2 .13 1.63 1/214 1.73 1/k .10 1.63 1/4
17 1,7k 1/k .11 1.63 1/4
18 1.76 7/8 .13 1.63 7/8
19 1.79 1/k .15 1.64 1/420 1.77 5/8 ,1k 1.63 5/8
21 1.76 1/k .13 1.63 1/4
24 1.78 3/k .14 1.64 3/4
25 1.79 1/8 • 15 1.64 1/8
26 1.77 7/8 .Ik 1.63 7/8
27 1.76 5/8 .13 1.63 5/8
28 1.78 .14 1.64
31 1.79 3/k .16 1.63 3/41 1.80 1/2 .16 1.64 1/2
2 1.80 3/k .17 1.63 3/4
3 1.88 .21 1.644 1.95 .31 1.64
7 2.05 .31 1.748 2, Ok .31 1.73
9 1.96 l/k .31 1.65 1/410 2.02 .36 1.66
11 2.04 3/k .36 1.68 3/4l4 2.05 • 36 1.69
15 2.02 3/k • 35 1.67 3/4
16 2.0U .36 1.68
17 2.08 .38 1.70
18 2.10 1/k .38 1.72 1/4
21 2.10 1/2 .38 1.72 1/2
22 2.11 3/k .38 1.73 3/4
23 2.1k 1/k .38 1.76 1/4

















25 $2.09 3/1* .1*7 $0.38 1.62 3/!+ $1.71 3 /k
28 2.10 1/1* .1*7 .37 1.63 1/1+ 1.73 1 /k
29 2.13 1/1* .1*7 .35 1.66 1/U 1.78 1/1*
30 2.lU 1/1* .1*7 .32 1.67 1/1* 1.82 1/U
31 2.12 .1*7 .30 1.65 1.821 2.17 1/1* .30 1.87 l/U
5 2.18 1/2 .30 1.88 1/26 2.17 1 /k .30 1.87 l/U
7 2.17 1/8 .29 1.88 1/88 2.18 3/8 .30 1.88 3/8
11 2.21 .29 1.92
12 2.27 .28 1.99
13 2.25 1/2 .26 1.99 1/2lU 2.29 3A .25 2.0l* 3/U
15 2.38 1/8 .25 2..13 1/8
19 2.U6 1/2 .21 2.25 1/220 2.1*0 1/1* .19 2.21 1/U
21 2.39 3 /k .11* 2.25 3/U
22 2.1*3 5/8 .00 2.1*3 5/8
25 2.39 1/2 .00 2.39 1/2
Source: United States Congress, United States Senate, Extension of Farm
and Related Programs, Hearings before the Committee on Agri­
culture and Forestry, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, February 27, 
28; March 1, 2, 8, 9, 13, lU, and 20, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1973)> pp. 753-5U.
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August 25 and August 31. During that one week, the Agri­
culture Department, having decided to phase out subsidies 
altogether, adopted a so-called "two-tier" export payment 
system. In fairness to U. S. exporters who had previously 
made commitments to sell wheat around the $1.63-$1.65 
target ("world") price range through 1973 on the assumption 
that the subsidy program would continue those targets, the 
Department offered— for one week only, from August 25 to 
31— an export subsidy rate of either ^7 cents per bushel 
(using target prices in the range of $1.62 to $1.67) or a 
lower rate, which actually ranged from 30 to 38 cents 
(using target prices in the $1.71 to $1.82 range).10 This 
4-7 cent rate was offered on all prior or present sales or 
commitments made at prices based on the assumption that 
subsidies would continue. So, naturally, exporters all 
signed up for the higher subsidy rate, making it a one-tier 
system, in effect.11 No doubt some exporters with prior 
commitments were bailed out by this action, and no doubt 
others were able to profit nicely by selling their wares 
abroad at prices considerably above that week's artificially 
low target prices.
10The target price is the one set by Agriculture 
Department officials to ensure "competitiveness" in world 
markets and, of course, to control domestic quantities at 
the same time. It also determines, along with domestic 
prices, the amount of export subsidy to be paid.
^ Extension of Farm and Related Programs, p. 737.
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Why did the USDA decide to phase out the export 
subsidies? The steep increase (from 5 cents in July to 38 
cents in August) in the subsidies certainly was one reason. 
Also, the Department's export goals had generally been 
met, and world wheat prices were on the rise, anyway. A 
cynic might say that, having seen how the Russians were able 
to profit from the subsidies, the USDA decided it was in for 
heavy criticism and moved to cut off any other would-be 
buyers who might be interested in sharing in the largesse.
It was noted earlier that the U. S. government was
arranging credit terms with the Russians while the private
exporters were negotiating the sale itself. In effect,
then, the agreement signed on July 8, 1972 was not a sales
agreement between the United States and Russia. It was
really only an agreement on the amount of credit to be
extended by the Commodity Credit Corporation to the Soviet
12purchasing agency. Basically, a credit limit was 
established of $750 million to be used over a three-year 
period. No limit was set on the amount or types of grains 
to be purchased, nor were minimums set. The only require­
ment was that no more than $500 million of CCC credit be 
outstanding at one time.*3 under normal CCC arrangements,
^ I n  addition, deliveries could be made to other 
Eastern European nations!
^ Extension of Farm and Related Programs. Hearings,
P. 7^7.
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a three-year maturity period is allowed at an annual 
interest charge of 6.125 per cent.1** These terms were 
extended to and accepted (reluctantly, or so it seemed at 
the time) by the Russians.
The Cost and Benefits of the Deal
It thus appears that the type(s) of state trading 
practiced during the wheat sale consisted not of one form, 
but two. The Soviet state trading agency made its arrange­
ments on credit with the U. S. government (state trader to 
state trader) and arranged the sale itself with private 
U. S. exporters (state trader to private trader). More­
over, within both deals certain costs and benefits can be 
identified which can help illuminate motives and strategies 
which will be of interest later when game theory is taken 
up in more detail.
Foremost among the many possible benefits resulting 
from the deal was the income received from the sale of the 
wheat, which depended in part on the price. Most government 
representatives (such as the Secretary of Agriculture) 
guessed that the privately negotiated price was very close 
to the U. S. target price range of $1.63 to $1.65. However, 
as the actual arrangements over price were made with private
lZhj. S. Department of Agriculture, P. L. 480 Con-fressional Sales. Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No.5 Economic Research Service, September, 1970 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 10-15.
traders, no exact price information was disclosed publicly. 
In addition, under the export subsidy program, receiving a 
subsidy does not require a price to be revealed. Instead, 
the difference between the U. S. target price and the 
domestic price is used as the basis for the subsidy. How­
ever, since the negotiations were conducted in the June-July 
period during which the domestic price level approximated 
$1.69 with export subsidies of around seven cents, it is 
probable that the negotiated prices fell very close to U. S. 
target prices.
Even at these prices, various U. S. benefits are 
subject to identification, if not precise measurement. 
Obviously, American wheat dealers were the direct recipients 
of Soviet outlays. In addition, as increased demand drove 
up American domestic wheat prices, farmers' incomes 
increased substantially (in accord with the goals of U. S. 
farm policy). However, the agreed-upon selling price, it 
has been argued, was quite low relative to what it could 
have been. Farmers who had sold their wheat before notice 
was given of the deal were naturally quite upset at the lost 
revenue they "could" have had, given information about the 
size of the sale. Agricultural Department officials, how­
ever, have argued that they did not know the magnitude of 
the Russian wheat purchase themselves. According to 
Secretary of Agriculture Butz:
M
We do know that Soviet buying agents were 
in New York during the first week of July. But 
any contacts they made at that time were with 
trading firms— not with us. And of course, the 
purchases were made from private sources and not 
from the U. S. Government. This is long estab­
lished policy, fully in keeping with the American 
free enterprise system and with repeated congres­
sional directives and policy statements.
I emphasize that nobody knew then— neither 
the Department of Agriculture nor the trade— just 
how much the Russians would buy. The export 
traders were not telling each other how much the 
Soviets were booking with them. The exporters 
did not tell the Department of Agriculture. Nor 
were the Russians talking.
It is accurate to say that the eventual size 
of the Soviet purchases caught everyone by sur­
prise, including the Russians themselves. Soviet 
grain purchasers were in this country dealing 
with the private export trade in July and went 
home. Unexpectedly, they came back in a few 
days— apparently after getting a further assessment 
of the damage that had been done to their wheat 
crop by the hot, dry weather.15
It is apparent from the above, therefore, that the 
American farmer gained substantially from the deal. How­
ever, it can also be contended that they could have made 
greater gains with more information while the deal was 
being negotiated.
Similarly, benefits went to the dealers handling 
the grain because of the CCC's export subsidy setup. 
Depending on what future subsidy rates are expected to be, 
an exporter may register immediately or delay registering 
for a particular subsidy rate. According to E. B. Staats, 
Comptroller-General of the U. S.:
^ Sale of wheat to Russia. Hearings, p. 7.
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The speculative aspects of the subsidy 
registration system are illustrated by five 
examples, CCC will pay exporters subsidies 
totaling about $60^,493, whereas had the ex­
porter registered on the sales dates the 
subsidies would have totaled $268,188 or 
$318, 305 less.1°
If benefits are measured by extra income to such dealers, 
it can be argued that the CCC arrangements allowed some 
traders to benefit, albeit at a cost to the American tax­
payer. This, of course, may or may not mean a net gain to 
the U. S. as a whole. All we can say is that some income 
redistribution resulted.
For similar reasons, beneficiaries of the sale in­
cluded those industries and organizations related to the
movement of wheat— trucking, rail, and barge lines, as well
17as those engaged in ocean shipping. Perhaps of more 
importance, though, was the impact of the wheat sale upon 
the U. S. balance of payments. Approximately one billion 
dollars in earned revenue has emanated from the transaction. 
And the CCC itself has saved another estimated one-half 
billion dollars from reduced storage costs and farm sub­
sidy payments.*®
In sum, then, it is possible to identify several 
quite tangible benefits to the U. S. from the wheat sale.
^ Extension of Farm and Related Programs. Hearings,
p. 390.
*?It has also been argued that some high officials 
used their inside information for personal gain. However, 
these have been unsupported claims.
*Qsale of Wheat to Russia. Hearings, p. 8.
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Perhaps one of the more subtle economic benefits is the 
overall improvement in economic efficiency commonly 
associated with the expansion of industries which have 
notable comparative advantages (which the wheat-growers of 
the U. S. are ordinarily presumed to have) and the added 
pressure this puts on other industries via competition for 
factors and so forth. Additionally, since added exports 
usually translate into added imports at some point in time, 
there are important consumption gains, as well as competi­
tive pressures on import-competing industries to make 
better use of their inputs.
Furthermore, it is likely that various political 
or less tangible (in the sense that they are not easily 
measured) benefits accrued, as well. For example, it is 
likely that the transaction assisted in building the 
"detente” or accommodation with Russia that the U. S. 
government had been seeking. To the extent that such under­
takings reduce tensions and anxieties, head off wasteful 
arms races and the like, welfare in the total sense is 
clearly increased. It may also be that the wheat deal 
constituted part of the pressure the U. S. was putting on 
the Soviet Union to limit its assistance to North Vietnam 
and to counsel de-escalation in that conflict. Some politi­
cal observers also feel that closer ties between the U. S. 
and Russia help keep a wedge driven between Russia and Red
l*+5
China— the enemy disunited, in other words. Still others 
believe that U. S. trade with Russia is beneficial in 
serving notice to our European allies that they cannot 
take this country for granted, thereby making them more 
pliable in NATO negotiations, GATT and IMP negotiations, 
and so forth.
It might even be argued that the U. S. reaped an 
important international prestige gain by presenting the 
world with the image of a well-fed capitalist nation 
marketing its surplus food to a hungry country that just 
happens to be the "showcase" of world communism. It may 
have been good public relations, in other words.
Yet the sale did not develop without some quite 
large cost factors that must also be considered. As noted 
earlier, the price agreed upon for wheat was undeniably 
low, considering world supply and demand conditions at the 
time of the sale. Several months prior to the Soviet- 
Araerican agreement, Canada had sold a large volume of 
wheat to Russia. After the sale, Canada withdrew from 
international wheat markets fearing possible domestic 
shortages in light of recently increasing production 
problems. Similarly, many European and Asian countries 
were encountering potential supply problems. The most 
potent factor, however, was that the U. S. export subsidy 
program, as exporters saw it, was supposedly to continue. 
During negotiations with the Russians, therefore, prices
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were set with the assumption that governmental support 
for target prices would continue. Under these conditions, 
exporters felt that they could afford to sell at approxi­
mately $1.63-1.65, knowing that any difference in export 
market prices and domestic prices would be made up by 
subsidies. The stage was set. Skillful Soviet negotiators, 
having done their homework, arranged for a deal which, 
according to the real supply and demand conditions, could 
have been at much higher prices. Assuming an inelastic 
Russian demand for U. S. wheat, potential income was there­
by lost to American interests. This is a definite "cost" 
of the deal in the opportunity sense.
Additionally, it should be noted that the magnitude 
of the wheat sale severely disrupted the markets of American 
products using wheat. In the later months of 1972, wheat 
prices rose to levels more than 80 cents above pre-Soviet 
sales peaks. Quite obviously, wheat users suffered addi­
tional cost burdens (and lost consumer surpluses) which 
eventually pushed up prices for products such as bread.
Other grain products which were substitutes for wheat also 
rose in price. These generally higher food prices, of 
course, also tend to raise living costs, money wages, and 
contribute to general inflationary pressure from the cost 
side.
Another costly result of the sale was the tremendous 
bottleneck that developed in those transport industries
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charged with moving the wheat. Complicating the matter
was the fact that the U. S. economy was gaining momentum
and approaching full employment by late 1972.^  This
placed still more strain on rail lines, barge lines, and
international shipping firms. As in most such cases, the
20quality of services also deteriorated as costs rose.
There were undoubtedly political and prestige 
losses stemming from the wheat deal, too. There is some 
evidence that the thaw in U. S.-Chinese relations stalled 
somewhat as U. S.-Soviet relations warmed up. There was 
also angry reaction in Europe from allies who felt that 
U. S. "friendship" with Russia was coming partly at the 
expense of U. S. ties with Europe. Other wheat-exporting 
countries were understandably unhappy with the transaction, 
as were grain-exporting countries in general. Poor 
countries which had come to depend on cheap U. S. wheat 
financed by Public Law 480 moneys were hurt as prices rose. 
And many diplomats feared that U. S.-Soviet cooperation 
might expand to the point where the two superpowers might 
join forces to exploit less powerful countries both 
politically and economically.
Grain Strain: Shipping U. S. Wheat to Russians
Burdens Transportation Systems," Wall Street Journal. CXC 
(October 18, 1972), 1.
^^These costs and benefits have been discussed from 
the American point of view. Russia's costs and/or benefits 
will be dealt with in a later section.
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Finally, in weighing costs and benefits a distinc­
tion must be made between gains or costs to the U. S. 
economy as a whole and gains or costs to a particular 
sector. Overall gains depend on the weighted sum of the 
various benefits minus any costs to society. Individual 
gains obviously occur only to certain groups. It is pos­
sible to argue, for example, that the present administra­
tion was in favor of the deal because it wanted to 
redistribute incomes toward farmer and exporters at the 
expense of others, even though the nation as a whole might 
suffer from the exchange. Or from another perspective, the 
combination of satisfied farmer and exporters, reduced cold 
war tensions, and so forth may have in total outweighed any 
disutility to the unhappy consumers and taxpayers. In 
either and all interpretations, separation of individual 
and/or societal gains must be made.
It may be noted that the benefits and costs of the 
credit arrangements made with the Russians have not been 
explicitly discussed. Fairly obviously, these arrangements 
were made primarily to permit the grain sale to be made—  
that is, they were basically passive or accommodating in 
nature. It is not likely that a great hunger for interest 
income prompted the U. S. government to make the financing 
available, nor does it appear that the Russians enjoy in­
debtedness to the U. S. at capitalistic interest rates. The 
costs to the U. S. might include whatever added financial
1^9
market or inflationary pressure which may have resulted, 
as well as some foregone or postponed investment activity. 
The costs to the Soviet Union would include the interest 
charges themselves, and perhaps a prestige loss from having 
to borrow in order to finance necessities, as well as other 
possible internal financial problems connected with distri­
bution and repayment.
State Trading and Game 
Theory Applications
The preceding section was intended to offer some 
insights into the nature of the wheat deal and suggest 
some of its resulting costs and benefits. However, several 
unanswered questions remain concerning additional motives 
and strategies the sale, the applicability of the com­
parative costs doctrine, and the applicability of game 
theory.
First, the sale involved two of the four possible 
types of transactions. In one case private merchants sold 
to a Soviet state trading agency. In the other, govern­
ments dealt with each other over credit arrangements. 
Obviously, the motives for action in both instances varied.
In the first case, where private IT. S. merchants 
negotiated sales with Soviet governmental buyers, several 
objectives can be postulated. For the U. S. exporters, 
profits were no doubt of primary importance. It was noted 
earlier that most of the sales were within the $1.63-1.65
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range, which was consistent with then-current prices in 
world markets. However, negotiated prices could conceiv­
ably have been at higher levels with complete knowledge of 
Soviet demand and world supply conditions. The motive of 
the private traders was thus most likely profit, but sub­
ject to a '•knowledge" constraint. This was pointed out by 
Secretary of Agriculture Butz in response to a question 
during Congressional hearings:
Mr. Pindley: Would you give us some insight
as to what that means to a private trader in this 
country in attempting to negotiate a major deal 
with either China or the Soviet Union? If he is 
up against a state trader, what are the hazards 
that he has?
Secretary Butz: Well, if he is up against
a state trader, he has no firm idea what his total 
intentions are, what his total program likely will 
be. If he is up against a competitive situation, 
you have some basis for more public information 
than if you are up against a situation where the 
decision is made at the top of the hierarchy and 
filters down through.21
On the Soviet side, even given some degree of 
monopsonistic power, the sole motive of profit (purchases 
at lowest possible prices) cannot be so easily assumed.
The objectives of the Soviet Union, as with all government 
traders, are usually complex, varied, and secret. But it 
is quite obvious that the main goal of the Russians was 
the simple securing of badly needed wheat. Soviet crops 
had been adversely affected by an extremely severe winter;
21Sale of Wheat to Russia. Hearings, p. 3^.
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Eastern European countries were similarly affected; and 
prior Soviet purchases had been made from Canada, Austra­
lia, and France. Under these conditions, and coupled with 
a shift in Soviet import policy (placing higher priority 
on consumer demands), the Soviet bargaining position was 
anything but favorable. Yet, through skillful negotiation 
and bulk purchases, significant advantages were gained.
It can only be conjectured at this point, but other Soviet 
motives probably included better relations with the U. S. 
(perhaps due in part to fear of China), the opening of 
future markets and sources of vital, high-technology- 
machinery, a desire for access to more consumer goods, or 
any number of other possible undisclosed objectives.
Likewise, the negotiations over credit terms (state 
trader to state trader) are subject to the same type of 
interpretation. That is, each government had its own 
motives for action. For the Russians, financing was 
probably necessary, given its shortage of convertible 
foreign exchange and the necessity of having the wheat.
But why did the U. S. enter into both the sale and 
the financing arrangements? At first glance, expanded 
exports prompted by balance-of-payments difficulties appears 
to have been a strong motive. In addition, it has been a 
policy of the Nixon Administration to improve relations 
with many nations formally held in "ill repute." Moreover, 
the Soviet Union offered a large market for American goods
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and offered many more potential imports (oil, minerals, 
and so forth). Under these circumstances, expansion of 
trade was inevitable. The wheat deal was only one of many 
possible avenues.
The sale itself, however, appears to have been 
arranged with very specific intentions. The private market 
was used exclusively to supply the commodity. No Commodity 
Credit Corporation stocks were to be involved. Export sub­
sidies were paid, but were more than offset by reduced crop 
subsidy income payments to the farmers and savings in 
storage costs to the CCC. As a result, farmers' incomes 
rose, crop surpluses were reduced, and fewer controls were 
placed on crop production— and all are goals of U. S. 
agricultural policy. In addition, the credit arrangements, 
although favorable to the Russians, were made in part on 
the assumption that negotiations would continue on Russian
lend-lease debt, high seas shipping problems, and ending
22the Viet Nam conflict. In sum, the objectives were quite 
specific, economic and political in nature, and conditioned 
by possible future arrangements.
To the broader question of whether the sales accorded 
with comparative advantage, the answer is more illusive.
For years it has been argued that the greatest comparative 
advantages of the U. S. were in capital goods and
22Sale of Wheat to Russia. Hearings, p. 25-26.
manufactured products. The question arising today, however, 
is to what extent the U. S. in fact may have a comparative 
advantage in agricultural production. However, due to the 
many regulations and controls over farm production and 
prices, it is difficult if not impossible to correctly 
assess the situation. That is, due to U. S. participation 
in various commodity agreements (for example— the previously 
described International Wheat Agreement) and domestic 
regulatory policies, "true" output and price levels are 
difficult to determine. It can be stated, however, that 
the sale has forced some relaxation of control over land 
use and output levels (additional supplies are desired).
The deal thus may have "pushed" the IJ. S. more into an area 
of comparative advantage with a resulting more efficient 
use of world resources.
Several observations regarding the applicability of 
game theory to the wheat sale and the credit arrangement 
now appear in order. The game(s) can under certain con­
ditions be said to be "zero sum" (the losses of one equal 
the gains of the other). The players (Russia, the U. S. 
government, and private traders) each gained (gave up) or 
lost (gained) from the trading partner. The export of 
wheat from the U. S. equaled the imports received by 
Russia, the price paid by Russia equaled the price received 
by the U. S., the loss of possibly higher prices to U. S. 
farmers equaled the saved cost to the Soviet Union, and the
15^
concessions in credit by the U. S. equaled those gained by 
Russia. Prom an alternative position, however, it can also . 
be argued that the game(s) was (were) not zero sum.
Certainly the higher prices of wheat and wheat products in 
the U. S. as a result of the deal were not "direct" gains 
to the Soviet Union. Nor can production, employment and 
consumption effects be counted as equal losses or gains to 
each party. However, whether gains or losses are measured 
by the deal itself (zero sum) or whether all the end 
results of the exchange are included (non zero sum), game 
theory can help reveal many interesting elements of the 
transaction. In the discussion to be taken up shortly, a 
non zero sum assumption is made.
Similarly, the degree of ignorance on the part of 
each trader can be questioned. Neither side had much real 
knowledge of the other's motives or expectations in either 
"game." This was especially true of U. S. farm interests 
and partially true for Soviet dealers in the wheat sale 
transaction in that "it is accurate to say that the even­
tual size of the Soviet purchases caught everyone by 
surprise, including the Russians themselves. Technically 
speaking, therefore, the strategies were not known in total 
to all sides. Under these circumstances, the game(s) can 
be classified (depending on the above conditions of
^ Sale of Wheat to Russia. Hearings, p. 7.
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interpretation) as having complete or incomplete informa­
tion and being zero or non-zero sum in payoff.
In the case where the U. S. government faced the . 
Soviet government (state trader to state trader), it is 
equally possible to argue that in an "opportunity" sense 
the same was zero sum. Profit or prestige loss equaled 
that gained. Moreover, each government could have con­
ceivably (beforehand) calculated the various strategies 
available to itself and its trading partner (complete 
knowledge). In turn, depending on the preferences and 
desires of each country, the strategies would yield varying 
amounts of utility. As we saw earlier, such desires or 
objectives were varied (for example— future expanded trade, 
increased supplies of wheat, better international relations, 
fear of third parties, and so on). They were in fact, 
blends of political and economic preferences. Profit 
maximization may or may not have been exclusively consider­
ed. Hence the resulting utility to each trader can only be 
assumed to be at a certain level and of a cardinal scale, 
for simplicity's sake.
Be that as it may, the crux of the game(s) for all 
of the players lies in the ability of one party to exert 
his influence over the other. In other words, the power of 
one party can be measured by the probability of getting a 
certain strategy selected by the other player. As pre­
viously noted (see Chapter V), several power dimensions may
be identified ranging from the base of the power (resources, 
assets, etc.) to the opportunity costs of refusing to an 
action. This point is especially significant in the case 
of American farm interests. Quite obviously the base, 
means, scope and extension of their power was quite limited 
relative to the "collective" interests of the Soviet 
trading agency. The same cannot be said when comparing the 
U. S. with Russia over credit arrangements. Power "dimen­
sions" therefore were considerably greater for the Soviet 
Union when dealing with the "individual" wheat exporters.
The "amount" of power in both deals, however, 
depended on the difference of two probabilities. In the 
case of the American private exporters, it can be argued 
that the Soviet Union*s power can be thought of in terms 
of increased probabilities of securing certain actions 
(the sale), conditioned by the costs borne by the wheat 
dealers for refusing to be influenced. Moreover, the 
"strength" of such power can be phrased in terms of 
utility lost to the exporters if they had refused to make 
the sale (in this case lost revenue of over 1 billion 
dollars). This in turn can be related to the exporters' 
disutility in performing the sale. In this situation the 
disutility was "perceived" as market prices rose and 
dealers lamented "what could have been." However, at the
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2 iftime of the sale such disutility was nearly zero. In 
algebraic terms, following the Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi model 
of Chapter V, p can be the increase in probabilities or 
amount of Russia's power, u the utility gain to the ex­
porters for acceding to the Russians, and x the disutility
to the wheat dealers for accepting the sale or A p £ H.x
That is, the Soviet Union's power maximum was simply the 
ratio of the exporters' gained utility to their disutility 
from agreeing to the sale. Under the described conditions, 
it therefore appears that the exporters had little to lose, 
much to gain, and the Soviets had correspondingly greater 
power in its bargaining position.
In the case of the Soviet Union and the U. S. 
government, such an assumed power position is somewhat more 
complex. That is, both parties had power over each other.
In reality, a “true" bilateral power situation pre­
vailed in the agreement to trade and in the arrangements 
over credit. Under such conditions, there existed the 
possibility of mixed strategies, rewards, sanctions and 
retaliatory actions.
^Disutility could have arisen if the wheat could 
have been sold in other markets at more favorable prices. 
However, this was highly unlikely during the period of the 
sale.
2^In the case of the U.S. exporters being motivated 
by profit, it was assumed that the only power they had was 
to refuse to sell— a highly unlikely assumption. As price 
was set by previously described forces, much out of the 
hands of the exporters, this was not considered a relative 
power force either.
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More specifically, it was possible for both nations 
to use mixed strategies— or change their strategies in 
some chance fashion to insure a more favorable payoff. In 
addition, rewards could have been offered for the perform­
ance of an act. As noted, at the time of the deal, 
negotiations were taking place over shipping problems, lend 
lease debt and Viet Nam. Additional possible rewards could 
have included future markets, much needed sources of 
supplies of certain critical items (for example— in the 
case of the U. S.-oil), or political concessions. Along 
similar lines, sanctions and retaliatory actions could have 
included the loss or reduction of such benefits.
In terms of the previously presented game theory
model, and if the previous assumptions are accepted, the
amount of Russia*s power over the United States would be
equal to one-half the difference between: the rewards plus
the penalties given the U. S. by Russia, divided by the
disutility to the u. S. for agreeing to the sale; minus— -
the cost to the Soviet Union for imposing any damages,
minus the cost of any rewards given to the U. S., divided
by the gain in utility to Russia if the U. S. performs with
absolute certainty. The greater the difference between the
26two forces, the greater will be Soviet power.
2^It might be noted that the U. S. position can now 
be considered to be a collective one. That is, it includes 
not only direct gains (losses) to government but also gains 
(losses) to its citizens.
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Symbolically the deal would appear as:
i /"rewards (U.S.) + Penalties (U.S.)
L. disutility (U.S.)
Penalties Costs (U.S.S.R.) - Reward Costs (U.S.S.R. 27
Utility gains for certain performance (U.S.S.R.) __/*
Prom the preceding analysis of the various costs
and benefits (Section "The Costs and Benefits of the Deal"
of this chapter) that conceivably could apply to the deal,
the rewards, penalties and disutility to the U. S. "appear"
to have been larger than the penalty and reward costs and
utility gain (i.e., one probability utility gain) to the
28Soviet Union. If such was the case, the bargaining 
position of the Soviet Union would have been greater and 
actual deal closer to Russian desires.
Unfortunately, the game theory analysis, although 
beneficial, suffers from a lack of concise and reliable 
data. This is, in part, due to the nature of the model 
(utility is required) and in part caused by incomplete 
information concerning the deal itself. The entire system 
has value, however, in its unique "view" of the grain deal 
and its ability to reveal many facets incapable of strictly 
economic analysis.
27por instance, rough numbers for the model could 
appear as i/^+l _ (.7-.5)7 Of course, such numbers are
*L~ r ~ TT-J*
not available— especially any gains or costs to the Soviet 
Union. In addition, for a more mechanical breakdown of the 
workings of the model, see Chapter V.
28See footnote 25 in Chapter V.
CHAPTER VII
STATE TRADING IN OIL— THE OPEC CASE
The wheat deal between the United States and the 
Soviet Union is a good example of the increasing role that 
governments are having in international trade. Still 
another is the subject of this chapter— the crucial role 
that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) has come to play in determining world oil prices, 
availabilities, and to some extent, the level and distri­
bution of world income and output.
There can be little question that, of the many 
economic problems facing the United States, the energy 
crisis stands foremost. A full production, full employment 
economy with reasonable price stability is simply not 
possible without adequate supplies of oil and petroleum 
products. As demonstrated by the Arab oil embargo of 1973- 
7k> the U. S. is no longer in a position to ’'assume" that 
such supplies will be automatically forthcoming. But 
growing oil imports, notwithstanding Mr. Nixon's "Project 
Independence," continue to be a necessity. Presently, the 
United States produces approximately 76% of its petroleum 
needs domestically. (These data reflect pre-embargo
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conditions.) By 1980, according to an Oil Import Control 
authority, oil consumption will total 18 million barrels a 
day, of which 10 million will be from domestic sources. As 
a result, nearly half of American oil needs will have to be 
met by imports. And these imports must come primarily from 
areas of known oil reserves, i. e., the Middle East.1 A 
study of U. S. petroleum sources is 'therefore to a very 
considerable extent, a study of the OPEC— THE state trader 
of oil.2
The OPEC— Its Origin and Development
The history of the OPEC is, in a large part, the 
recent history of the Middle East. That is, many of the 
factors that affected the development of Middle Eastern 
countries also influenced (both favorably and unfavorably), 
the OPEC. A complete history of the area would be too 
immense for this paper’s purposes, due to the mass and 
complexity of political, economic, and religious factors 
involved. Hence, although all of these influences are 
important, only those of a "critical" nature to OPEC are 
considered below.
1 United States Congress, U. S. Interests in and 
Policy Toward the Persian Gulf. Hearings before the Sub- 
committee on the Near feast of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, Second 
Session, February 2, June 7, August 8 and 15. 1972 (Washing­
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972;, p. 14-0.
2The term "state trader" applies to OPEC as all oil 
is owned by each respective state.
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The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Nations had 
its "official" beginning in Baghdad in September, 1960.^ 
However, its seeds had been planted many years earlier in 
various arrangements and agreements created by major oil 
producing companies. And just as labor unions found 
strength through collective action, the OPEC nations sought 
similar power by banding together.^ Venezuela has been 
credited with the initial role because of its early contacts 
(19JLf8—lf9) with "Eastern" oil exporters. However, it was not 
until 1959» at the first Arabian Congress in Cairo, that oil 
became an acceptable topic on the agenda of the Congress. 
Basically, the exporting countries were seeking a common 
policy or attitude toward the united front of petroleum 
companies. Although no positive action was taken in the 
initial meetings, all members of the "to be" OPEC were 
brought together, notwithstanding their diverse backgrounds. 
Included were Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
Venezuela.^
At this point it might be beneficial to examine 
briefly the oil-purchasing companies and their role in the
• Ĵohn Maffre, "Administration Searching for Methods 
to Aid U. S. Oil Interests in Bargaining With OPEC,"
National Journal. IV (May 13, 1972), 810.
^Collective strength (or countervailing power) is, 
of course, only one of many possible reasons for the develop­
ment of labor unions.
^Charles A. Heller, "Ten Years of OPEC," World 
Petroleum. XVI (November, 1970), *t6.
creation of the OPEC. Basically, seven major oil producers 
(referred to as the "Seven Sisters") had been investing for 
many years in the Middle East.^ Due to many price wars, 
however, these companies had reached agreement (as early as 
1929) on an elaborate system of quotas and posted prices. 
This system remained in force through World War II but 
began to shov; signs of cracking under the rising tide of 
nationalism in the early 1950's. By the late fifties, a 
market generally characterized by excess demand for oil 
products had created a new rivalry between these producers 
and some new independent manufacturers. The producing 
countries, hov/ever, many with their income primarily depen­
dent on oil royalties, began to sense the possibility of 
losing revenues. This suspicion was confirmed in 1960 when 
the "Seven Sisters" announced— v/ithout consulting the oil 
producing countries— a price reduction of 2 to 5.5 per cent. 
As a result, the Middle Eastern countries lost, in i960 
alone, $93 million in royalties.^
Thus the stage was set— the final provocative act 
had been committed. The resulting coalition of the five 
charter members of OPEC took place within 50 days after the 
price reduction. Although other events such as the Suez
cThe companies were: Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey, Royal Dutch, Shell Group, Mobil Oil Corporation,
Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California, and British Petroleum.
^Maffre, loc. cit., pp. 810-812.
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Canal crisis in 1957-58, growing nationalistic feelings, 
and so forth also conditioned the OPEC’s formation, the 
"one-sidedness" of power in the hands of the producing 
companies appears to have been the galvanizing force stimu­
lating a countervailing power. Today, however, that power 
is anything but one-sided.
Recent OPEC Activities
From its inception, the organization was plagued by 
many difficulties. As previously noted, the members have
O
power struggles among themselves. Arab unity, in partic­
ular, has been extremely fragile, since the Arab political 
spectrum runs from radical or revolutionary regimes such as 
Libya to such traditional, conservative, and stable
Qgovernments as those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In truth, 
OPEC’s unity comes only from a common dependence on oil 
revenues— a single but cohesive force.
However, over the years the organization’s power 
(and membership) has been steadily growing, accompanied by 
a firming-up of its objectives. Basically, these objectives 
are three-fold: (1) the achievement of price stability for
petroleum in world markets; (2) increased revenue and
OMarwan Iskandar, MOPEC in Less Than Unanmity,"
World Petroleum. XLII (December, 1970 , 30-31.
Q̂Iran, a non-Arab country, is politically similar 
to Saudi Arabia.
returns to member countries; and (3) the establishment of a 
common oil policy toward the oil companies.1̂  For several 
years these goals were generally unfulfilled except for 
rather minor successes in preventing further posted price 
reductions and in securing slightly better tax rates on the 
oil producers. But in 1967 the "paper tiger" began to 
reveal its potential strength. As the Arab-Israeli dispute 
deepened, the Arab members of the organization threatened 
to cut off oil supplies to Western countries if any assis­
tance was given Israel. With the coming of the "six day 
war," the threat was kept. However, due to available 
supplies from other sources and some previous customer 
stockpiling, the effect was small, and the embargo ended 
some two months later. The OPEC had flexed its muscles 
although they were not quite fully developed.
Out of failure, though, can come a new, "harder
line" approach. Unsuccessful in cutting off supplies by
embargoes, the OPEC began to focus attention on a much
11broader method of control— that of participation. In a 
declaratory statement of petroleum policy at its sixteenth 
conference in June 1968, the OPEC announced as their
10Heller, op. cit.. p. 50.
^Michael Field, "Oil: OPEC and Participation,"
The World Today, January, 1972, p. 5-7.
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12ultimate goal "complete” control over the oil industry. 
Furthermore, the declaration stated their view that each 
country had permanent sovereignty over its own natural 
resources. To achieve the control objective, the following 
principles were to apply: (1) the government would super­
vise foreign capital investments, (2) the government would 
regulate the operation of foreign contractors, (3) explora­
tion and development of petroleum would be in government 
hands, (if) renewal provisions would be included in operating 
contracts at pre-determined dates, (5) renewal provisions 
would guarantee future government participation, (6) the 
government's assessment of the operator's income, taxes, and 
payments to the state would be based on negotiated agree­
ments with consideration given to the prices of manufactured 
goods traded internationally, (7) excess profit earnings 
would be open to renegotiation, (8) there would be 
established in each member country a "petroleum policy" 
providing for training domestic workers, for participation 
in the setting of royalty rates, tax rates, and so forth 
and (9) disputes would be handled by national courts.1-̂
In sum, a "New Petroleum Deal" was created in 1968 
which acted as a reference base for future actions by the
12In the shorter run, however, the OPEC countries 
demanded and were granted concessions that led to the treat­
ment of royalties as part of operating expenses along with 
a reduction of marketing discounts.
^ Ibid.. p. 5Zf.
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OPEC members. Quite obviously, not all of the objectives 
have been fulfilled, but they have served (in part, at 
least) as the bases for present and "new" radical demands.
For instance, in 1971 in Tehran and Tripoli, 23 oil com­
panies, including the Seven Sisters, bargained "collectively" 
with the (then) seven OPEC members. (Ironically, the 
governments of Britain, France, and the United States had 
granted antitrust privileges to the oil. companies, allowing 
them to negotiate as a group. The U. S. delegation, 
according to a Justice Department decision, would not be 
breaking any antitrust laws. Like trucking companies 
bargaining with the Teamsters, the oil companies could thus 
offer a united front— and legally so.)1**
During the actual negotiations, the threat of an 
embargo was potentially much more dangerous in 1971 than 
it had been earlier because of changing market conditions.
The OPEC countries, taking advantage of their position, 
demanded $15 billion in additional taxes from the companies 
(over 5 years) for the privilege of having "business as 
usual." Their demands were met, along with an additional 
$700 million six months later following the devaluation of 
the dollar.1^
1if"Is a Cartel Next for Oilmen?" Business Week 
January 23, 1971, p. **6-47.
^John Maffre, op. cit.. p. SH  . The $700 million 
was demanded to compensate for the drop in the value of the 
dollar . . .  the basic unit of payment by the oil companies.
163
OPEC Participation. Added revenues are important 
gains, of course, but the central, dominant goal of the OPEC 
today remains participation. Just as labor unions first 
sought membership before greater economic benefits, the OPEC 
nations in their first ten years sought economic benefits 
and now sire pursuing control. Participation is the question 
of today and tomorrow. As pointed out by Nadim Pachachi, 
Secretary General of OPEC:
Over the last twenty years circumstances have 
changed, and nowhere do governments accept the role 
of sleeping partner. They want to have a direct 
role in the management and exploration of national 
oil resources, so as to get knowhow, and to develop 
national expertise in the production and marketing 
of oil.16
The degree and type of participation, however, 
varies from country to country. Ultimately, the OPEC mem­
bers would like to control outlets in comsumer countries—  
the so-called "downstream ventures." Of course, the 
companies' role as middleman would then be eliminated. The 
benefits would presumably be substantial, but the capital 
costs would be extremely high— perhaps too high relative to 
current income. A more moderate short term goal has been 
the control of production "within" the host nation— the 
"upstream" end of the industry.
^Michael Field. "Oil: OPEC and Participation,"
The World Today. XVIII (January, 1972), 6-7.
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Given the desire for participation— which most oil 
companies feel is inevitable— two types of participation 
are possible. First, the OPEC members might opt for equity 
shareholding, or secondly, the more active "joint venture" 
approach. The latter currently appears to be the most 
desired option. However, there appears to be little agree­
ment among either the oil companies or the OPEC members 
regarding compensation for the investments. As pointed out 
in a report on an OPEC session, for example:
Three different positions emerged: Abu Dhabi,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia favored 
a 20 per cent shareholding in operating companies, 
Libya, supported by Algeria and following in its 
pattern called for either a 51 per cent participa­
tion or nationalization. Indonesia, Nigeria and 
Venezuela did not actively seek to support either 
position because of their own particular circum­
stances . . . .17
Similarly, the oil companies themselves have been 
unable to reach agreement on a common "acceptance policy" 
for participation. Some companies would like to hold out 
as long as possible, but not so long as to precipitate 
nationalization. Other firms, taking a somewhat more 
dynamic view, would prefer to anticipate the changing 
nature of oil agreements and perhaps secure better compen­
sation thereby. In general, U. S. companies seem to have
17'Marwan Iskandor, op. cit.. p. 30.
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adopted the first position, while European firms have been
18more willing to modify existing arrangements.
Further complicating the matter is disagreement 
among all parties as to the value of compensation once the 
question of the form of participation has been settled. 
Basically, the OPEC members would prefer to use the book 
value of the operator’s assets— including such items as 
plants, pipelines, etc.— at cost price minus depreciation.
On the other hand, the companies want a procedure that 
would allow for the covering of lost anticipated profits.
And the discrepancies between the two positions would 
appear to be enormous.
The OPEC Lesson
In the relatively short period of its existence, it 
is quite apparent that the OPEC has become a very formidable 
state trader. Moreover, its existence and development 
offer some useful insights into the complex nature of state 
trading itself, and cast light on both past trends and 
future possibilities.
It is quite apparent that, so far, only the "tip of 
the iceberg" has been revealed by OPEC activities. The 
U. S., like most other industrialized coutries, will
18United States Congress, The United States and the 
Persian Gulf. Report of the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, 
House of Representatives, September 29, 1972 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 4.
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doubtless find itself confronted with growing demands by 
the OPEC members. Because of the essential and strategic 
nature of petroleum, the U. S.— whether willing or 
unwilling— will be forced to expand its relations with OPEC. 
As Table 5 shows, the United States controls only a small 
fraction of total known oil reserves. The largest source- 
greater than all others combined— is the Arab Middle East 
and North Africa. And in the short run, oil demand appears 
to be quite inelastic, given the paucity of available sub­
stitutes. Under these conditions, it is anything but a 
buyer's market. Most of the "iceberg," therefore, is the 
chronic need of the industrial countries for OPEC oil.
Another part of the OPEC problem is monetary. As 
Table 6 points out, the revenues which are expected to 
accrue to the Middle Eastern members of the OPEC alone are 
enormous. From an estimated $6 billion in funds in 1973, 
the Middle East's receipts should rise to approximately 
$36 billion annually by 1980. And these estimates are 
based on mid-1973 values for oil, not on the more recently 
inflated figures. As far as the U. S. balance of payments 
is concerned, it was estimated before the oil embargo that 
$17 to $20 billion annually would be paid for oil imports
(from all sources) by 1980 and $30 billion by 1985, and
1Qthis, too, was based on mid-1973 oil prices. y








United States 1+5.1+ 6.8
Canada 10.2 1.5
Caribbean 17.1 2.8
Other Western Hemisphere lU.5 2.3
Total Western Hemisphere 87.2 13.1+
Western Europe lU.8 2.3
Africa 58.9 8.9Middle East 366.8 57.6
U.S.S.R., East Europe and China 98.5 15.1+Other Eastern Hemisphere 15.6 2.1+
Total Eastern Hemisphere 55^.6 86.6
World 6U1.8 100.0
Source: Robert E. Hunter, The Energy Crisis and U. S. Foreign Policy, 
Headline Series, No. 216 (New York: Foreign Policy Associa-
tion, Inc., 1973)> p. 27.
TABLE 6
ESTIMATES OF MIDDLE EAST OIL PRODUCTION AND REVENUES 
(Production stated in thousands of barrels per day, 









Iran 3,848 1.1 7,300 4.3 8,900 7 .9Saudi Arabia 3,798 1.2 8,500 5.2 14,000 12.2
Kuwait 2,989 .9 3,500 2.0 4,000 3.5Iraq 1,558 .5 1,900 1.2 3,000 2.8
Abu Dhabi 691 .2 2,300 1.4 3,500 3.1Other Persian Gulf States 857 .3 1,800 1.0 2,000 1.8
Subtotal 13,741 4.2 25,300 15.1 35,400 31.3
North Africa:
Libya 3,321 1.3 2,200 2.0 2,000 2.6
Algeria 900 .4 1,200 1.1 1,500 1.9
Subtotal 4,311 1.7 3,400 3.1 3,500 4.5
Total 18,952 5.9 28,700 18.2 38,900 35.8
SOURCE: United States Congress, The United States and the Persian Gulf, Report of the Subcommittee on the
Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, September 29, 1972 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 5«
-0U)
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The impact of this enormous revenue exchange will
be critical for all concerned parties. For the United
States, which presently has a favorable trade balance with
the Middle East, the increase should be easier to swallow
than for Western Europe and Japan, whose dependence on OPEC
oil approaches 100% in some causes. Also, the U. S.’s trade
balance with the OPEC countries may be helped as the
development process raises their incomes and, hopefully,
their future purchases from the United States. However,
these improvements may seem somewhat insignificant com paired
to the $10 billion (in 1980) or $15 billion (in 1985) that
20oil imports from the Middle East are expected to cost. 
Moreover the returns on U. S. investments (presently 
approximately $1.5 billion annually) will probably decline 
as Middle East "interests" replace Western "interests" in 
the ownership of oil producing facilities.
.To the Persian Gulf States, these funds must seem 
like manna from heaven. Though relatively underdeveloped 
at present, these countries can employ enormous amounts to 
development, raise consumption, and provide for increased 
social welfare benefits. But on the negative side (from 
the U. S. point of view), these balances will give the OPEC 
states unique and sudden abundance of hard foreign exchange.
20The $10 and $15 billion figures are derived from 
estimates that one-half of U. S. oil will come from the 
Persian Gulf by 1980-85.
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Much of this will be held in the form of American dollars, 
and thus pose a potential threat to stable exchange rates 
and money markets around the world. In fact, these 
countries could become primary sources of international 
investment funds, and may even become the homes of major 
international financial centers. (Beirut, though not in a 
major petroleum producing country, has already become a 
financial force to be reckoned with in the Middle East.)
As this occurs, the U. S. may expect new impacts upon its 
balance of payments, its monetary policy, its aid policy, 
and its general bargaining position in the world.
In light of the above features, it is now possible
to cast the bargaining positions (game theory) of the OPEC
and the purchasing companies. First, it is necessary to
know something about the players. Actually, their makeup
and characteristics have been changing and appear to still
be seeking permanent forms. Originally, for example, the
OPEC numbered five but has grown to eleven over the years
through a method which allows degrees of membership. The
degrees range from full charter membership to "new" full
21membership to "associate" membership. Under this arrange­
ment, the OPEC may expand and allow other countries to join 
the organization (by degree) and thereby increase the
21Ruad Rouhaui, A History of OPEC, (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 7.
effective collective strength of the group. In fact,
potential members need not be substantial exporters of oil,
but only share the same common interests and beliefs of the
OPEC nations. Similarly, the oil companies themselves have
been taking on various changing forms. In the original
negotiations with OPEC, the companies bargained somewhat
independently, but as noted earlier, they have been allowed
by their respective national governments to combine their
forces into one united front. It can therefore, be argued
that the producers are in effect one buyer. Given the one
seller— the OPEC— and one buying oil company group, a
reasonable approximation of bilateral monopoly can be said
to exist. In this situation, a state trader (the OPEC)
2?confronts a private trading bloc (the oil companies).
It is interesting to note, however, that these conditions 
are not necessarily permanent, since additional assistance 
may be given either side if conditions warrant such inter­
ference. For example, U. S. government intervention may 
take place on behalf of American oil interests in the case 
of possible nationalization. Or the OPEC countries could
22It must be pointed out that the term "private 
trading bloc" is more applicable to U. S. interests than 
that of all companies. U. S. firms are private organiza­
tions but not all importing organizations are. In addition, 
the United States is one of the few that recognizes private 
ownership of petroleum (or mineral rights). Most govern­
ments claim ownership of oil beneath the ground.
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conceivably ask for Russian assistance if armed intervention 
on the part of Western powers appeared likely.
As to the actual bargaining itself, Herbert Hansen, 
Vice President for government agreements of Gulf Oil 
Corporation, perhaps best summarizes the problem:
Negotiating with OPEC can be a mysterious 
process which has been likened to the mating of 
elephants. Everything takes place at a very 
high level, in clouds of dust, and it is several 
years before you can see the results.^3
In other words, OPEC negotiations, like many other 
state trading arrangements, are subject to a high degree of 
vagueness and secrecy. As in the case of the Soviet wheat 
deal, much is still unknown (or unavailable) concerning the 
arrangements. However, a game theory approach can be 
helpful in isolating some variables relevant to the nego­
tiations.
First, it may be recalled that each player may 
select various strategies, depending on his interpretation 
of the events. For each party, each strategy has its ov/n
unique value or worth (utility). The actual payoff, of
course, depends on the opposing strategy employed by the 
other player. For example, the OPEC nations may employ a 
particular strategy while the oil companies do likewise.
The payoff from these two strategies (whether zero-sum or
23-OJ. S. Interests in and Policy Toward the Persian
Gulf. Hearings, op. cit.. p. 37.
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non-zero sum) depends partly on chance or luck, and partly 
on the respective power position of the traders. This much 
has been previously stated. But what are some of the 
possible "elements1' within each party's strategies?
On the side of the OPEC, the group's overall 
strategies are very much affected by the very disparity in 
the sub-goals of the different members which were referred 
to earlier. The formal objectives of the OPEC are gener­
ally accepted by all members, of course, but the degree of 
importance attached to each goal doubtless varies for each 
country. Hence, the overall OPEC stance will depend in 
part on which political (or economic) faction dominates the 
organization.
In the earlier years of the OPEC, a fairly mild 
attitude prevailed with the elements of its strategies con­
sisting mainly of increased royalties and maintenance of 
posted prices. As the organization developed both in 
numbers and potential power, its desires became more 
extreme. Assuming that the more radical "factions" (like 
Libya and Algeria) dominate, the elements within their 
strategies would probably consist of much higher royalty 
rates, increased nationalization efforts, greater down­
stream participation, higher crude prices, and greater 
political use of oil "power." Elements within other 
strategies would be similar but perhaps lesser in degree—
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for example, a 20% participation rate rather than national­
ization.2^
Recent events tend to indicate that the more 
extreme position is in fact coming to dominate the policies 
of the OPEC. During the recent renewal of fighting between 
Israel and several Arab countries, for example, the threat 
of an oil embargo against the U. S. for supporting Israel 
was made and carried out. In addition, Libya nationalized 
the holdings of two U. S. oil companies on the grounds of 
"Israeli agression." More directly, the OPEC itself, had 
actually taken unilateral action in doubling posted prices 
twice. These actions were taken even though the 1971 
Tehran agreement was supposed to last 5 years!
With the above influencing factors present, and 
with use of the previously described game theory model, the 
OPEC nations' power derives from its ability to secure 
desired action from the oil companies. The rewards to the 
oil companies basically take the form of continued supplies 
of crude oil at negotiated prices. Additional rewards 
could stem from better relationships with Middle Eastern 
countries (precluding or diminishing the need for greater 
dependence on Russia or for finding added oil elsewhere)
2i+The elements within the oil buyers' strategies 
would also vary in degree, depending on the "weighted" 
influences and desires of the concerned companies. As 
previously noted, the U. S. has taken a firmer stance than 
European interests on such issues as nationalization, 
participation, prices, etc.
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and from participation rather than nationalization of 
company oil interests. The cost of these "rewards" to the 
OPEC can be measured by the difference between whatever 
revenues are secured from a mutual agreement and those 
financial gains which could be had from a stronger degree 
of participation and/or nationalization.
The penalties to the companies similarly, could 
include and OPEC refusal to supply oil, worsened relation­
ships, and/or complete nationalization. In degree, all of 
these have already been imposed against the oil companies. 
In the last major negotiation arranged in Tehran and 
Tripoli in 1971, the five year agreement was reached after 
the threat of an embargo. This penalty move cost the 
companies some $15 billion in revenue over the life of the 
contract. Nationalization also has been used as a penalty, 
but for somewhat different reasons. In addition to the 
aforementioned October, 1973 takeover, Col. Muammar Raddafi 
of Libya had earlier on June 11, 1973, nationalized the
Hunt Oil Company in what was termed a prelude to a wide-
25spread showdown.  ̂ The takeover in this case was not a 
direct OPEC act, but the state and OPEC for most practical 
purposes are inseparable. Libya, along with other Arab 
countries, was pressing for further participation at the
^"Slap in the Face by Libya— Why," U. S. News and 
World Report. June 25, 1973, p. 72.
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time. In addition, the penalty was imposed directly 
against American oil interests in retaliation for American 
support of Israel.
On the buying side, the oil companies have also 
taken on changing forms. Their obtaining of official 
governmental approval for cartel behavior certainly served 
to increase their power position. Also, the companies can 
count to some extent on "backlash" against the OPEC by 
non-OPEC countries. The 1973-7^ embargo, for example, 
seems to have hurt fuel-using underdeveloped countries more 
than it has the developed countries. The world-wide price 
rise for petroleum has also boosted oil company profits, 
stimulated more oil production by non-members and added 
exploration outside OPEC territories, and set energy users 
to exploring other sources of power, particularly coal. 
These, over the long run, clearly strengthen the companies' 
bargaining position.
However, due to the (shortrun) crucial nature of 
petroleum products, it is not too likely that the oil 
companies (and the consuming countries they serve) will be 
able to impose any real sanctions against the OPEC nations. 
These sanctions might include the refusal to buy oil, 
attempting to lower posted prices or reduced royalties and 
taxes, or the reduction of trade and aid; but none seem 
feasible in the face of growing world oil needs and the
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OPEC's swiftly improving financial position. The afore­
mentioned sanctions against the oil companies (embargoes, 
higher prices, and so forth) therefore appear to be more 
likely to prevail in practice.
penalties, then, the amount of OPEC's power over the oil
•
companies would be equal to one-half the difference between: 
the rewards plus the penalties given the oil companies by 
OPEC, divided by the disutility to the oil companies for 
agreeing to the OPEC's terms; minus . . . the cost to the 
OPEC for imposing any damages, minus the cost of any rewards 
given to the oil companies, divided by the gain in utility 
to the OPEC if the companies perform with absolute cer­
tainty. The greater the difference between the two forces, 
the greater will be the OPEC's power. Symbolically, the 
deal would appear as:
penalties, and disutility to the oil companies (and the 
concerned nations) appear to be larger than the penalty and 
reward costs and utility gain to the OPEC. If this is
Giving consideration to the various rewards and
£ /Awards (companies) + Penalties (companies) 
L . Disutility (companies)
Penalties Costs (OPEC) - Reward Costs (OPEC)
Utility gains for certain performances (OPEC) 
Under the described conditions, the rewards,
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correct, the bargaining strength and position of OPEC would
26be greater than that of the oil companies.
Given this disadvantageous power position for the 
oil companies and the consuming interests they represent, 
some have given consideration to the development of a new 
countervailing power— OPIC. An Organization of Petroleum 
Importing Countries has been proposed as a possible 
equalizing factor to offset OPEC's position. In fact, this 
step was partially taken when the Justice Department 
allowed "cartel11 bargaining by American firms. It may be 
noted, however, that the domestic interests of American 
companies are basically similar, so this step was a 
relatively easy one. But the needs and desires of European 
oil companies are far from being "basically similar" to 
those of their American counterparts. In light of Europe's 
dependence on Middle Eastern oil, it seems highly unlikely 
that in the near future such am international OPIC alliance 
would be possible. This, coupled with official European 
"neutrality" in the Israeli-Arab conflict, appears to leave 
the OPEC relatively unchallenged.
The OPEC case thus helps to point out the crucial 
nature and significance of state trading. Quite obviously,
26In this situation, the power for the seller 
appears to be greater. In the Soviet wheat deal, greater 
power appeared to have been in the hands of the purchaser. 
Also see footnote 25, Chapter V.
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the commodity in question (petroleum) is very essential; 
other goods exchanged by state traders are not always as 
important. However, that in itself suggests that the 
potentials of government commerce are virtually boundless. 
Practically any good (or service) can be state traded. 
Failure to recognize this may put the United States (or 
any country) in an undesirable position with respect to 
foreign and domestic policy. The OPEC lesson is clear; 
state trading can offer both advantages and disadvantages 
to the v/orld. Either way, it gives every appearance of 
fostering a true revolution in world trade and investment.
CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
As noted at the beginning, the purpose of this 
study has been to explore and analytically examine the 
economic and non-economic nature of governmental trade.
The need for such a study has become apparent. Although 
information has been available concerning certain aspects 
of state trading, little has been done in analyzing the 
economic purpose, significance, and "indeterminancy" of 
such exchange. In addition, "game theory" has not been 
previously applied to the unique situations found within 
government commerce.
As a result of this inquiry, some new insights 
into the state trading process have hopefully been devel­
oped. Briefly, government trading was defined as inter­
national commerce between national governments or their 
agents. Although state trading dates back at least as far 
as the Middle Ages, it was sporadic and poorly developed 
in that period. However, as market economies appeared, new 
avenues of expansion were made available. Especially in 
the Mercantile period, governments grew in statute and 
power, with state trading flourishing with the successes
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of the trading monopolies created by many European govern­
ments .
Ironically, although economic liberalism ushered*
in the Industrial Revolution and eventually socialA®® and 
"total" state trading in some parts of the world, its 
atmosphere of "free thinking" first led in the direction of 
lalssez faire. Especially in the Classical period, there 
was increased pressure for change in the direction of a 
"hands off" policy of limited regulation and control. The 
concept of ".self interest and the public good" reduced the 
need for government intervention, creating a climate in 
which state trading stagnated and all but disappeared.
It thus appears that one of the first character­
istics of state trading was its fluctuating pattern. This 
trait, once established, has never ceased. As further 
evidence, after the Classical era, governmental commerce 
was again rekindled under the aegis of Socialism. Social­
istic writings generally advocated that economies be 
"planned" rather than market-oriented. Of course, the role 
of the state in all affairs was more extensive under 
socialism than under previous economic systems.
By the turn of the twentieth century, countries 
such as the United States, Prance, and Russia had estab­
lished world-wide government trading missions. These 
beginnings, although sporadic and piecemeal, grew and be­
came more permanent with the need for strategic supplies
during World War I. However, after the War, the U. S. 
returned its emphasis to more private channels of exchange, 
while Russia, Prance, and some Par East nations continued 
to develop and expand their methods of government commerce. 
By the decade of the thirties, the Soviet Union offered 
such a strong example that many nations, facing growing 
trade barriers abroad and unemployment at home, eagerly 
adopted state trading practices to ease their difficulties. 
And with the 1939 outbreak of hostilities in Europe, new 
trade alignments were made (including trade agreements be­
tween Russia and the United States). These practices were 
broadened and continued into the late forties.
In more recent years the Spread of state trading 
has continued. During, the 1950's, Prance and Britain, 
along with "many Par Eastern countries, negotiated govern­
ment contracts for the securing of essential agricultural 
commodities. Similarly, the Soviet Union continued to 
expand its form of government trade while extending its 
influence into the bordering nations of Eastern Europe with 
the "adoption" of satellite countries.
Ironically, during this same period the United 
States again reversed its generally market-oriented policy 
and laid the foundation for the resurgent development of 
its own special brand of state trading. With the enactment 
of Public Law 4-80, today's Pood-for-Peace program, the
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disposal of government-owned agricultural surpluses 
accelerated. In addition, the program has become a tool 
for: (1) the encouragement of economic development abroad,
(2) the expansion of American markets, and (3) more general 
U. S. foreign policy goals. However, in the early 
seventies the volume exchanged under the program declined 
slightly, although recent grain and oil contracts (1972-73) 
with the Soviet Union and China indicate renewed interest 
for expansion in these areas. Prom peak to trough, the 
cyclical pattern appears to be firmly established.
The goals and consequences of state trading, like 
the history of government exchange, have also been subject 
to variation in light of the conditions of the times.
There has been a myriad of motivating forces for government 
trading. In some instances single goals have been subro­
gated to multiple combinations or blends. They include the 
following, either singularly or in combination: (1) secur­
ing regular flows of goods at favorable or stable prices, 
(2) maintenance of stable production, (3) disposition of 
surplus commodities, (4) ensurance of adequate supplies via 
bulk purchase contracts, (5) assistance to government aid 
and development programs, (6) raising revenues, (7) regula­
tion of health and sanitary conditions, (8) securing of 
barter deals, (9) rationing of foreign exchange, (10) the
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practicing of price discrimination, and (11) the facili­
tation of trade with centrally planned economies.
Though the motivations may be quite specific, the 
broad economic consequences of state trading are most use­
fully grouped according to whether the goods are traded 
below, at, or above market prices. In the case of commodi­
ties sold above domestic .prices the effect is basically the 
same as a tax on exports under a regime of private trade. 
Foreign consumption tends to be restricted, while import- 
competing industries are stimulated. Similarly, domestic 
consumption in the selling nation may be stimulated by in­
creased local supplies resulting from lost overseas 
markets. Overall, domestic production may be reduced, 
since efficient production is displaced by less efficient.
Under certain conditions it may also appear 
desirable to the state trader to import commodities below 
foreign prices. In this case the effects are similar to 
that of a tariff on imports equal to the difference between 
foreign and domestic prices. If the reduced imports 
increase supplies abroad (as seems likely), foreign con­
sumption would likely be increased and foreign production 
restricted. Similarly, domestic consumption would be 
reduced, assuming prices rise with reduced supplies of the 
imported good. This in turn may stimulate domestic 
production in import-competing industries. In addition,
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as in the previous case, the "terms of trade" effect 
depends on the bargaining strengths of the respective 
nations. That is, the attempted buying of imports below 
domestic prices may induce the exporting nation to sell at 
lower prices to maintain sales and revenue. If the state 
trader is large and is a dominant buyer of the commodity 
in question, the exporting country's terms of trade can 
worsen. Conversely, the government trader's terms may 
improve.
In some situations the state trader may take the 
position of an exporter selling commodities below domestic 
price levels. The economic effects are similar to those 
of subsidies in private trade with the degree of impact 
being determined by the divergence between world and domes­
tic prices. Overtrading could result, rather than the 
previous case of undertrading. That is, increased domestic 
production and increased foreign consumption can take place 
while decreased foreign production and restricted domestic 
consumption can occur.
As a last alternative the state trader occasionally 
may import goods above world market prices. The effect is 
again similar to that of a subsidy to private trade (but to 
a foreign producer) with similar production and consumption 
distortions. In sum, the effects are: (1) decreased
foreign consumption; (2) decreased domestic production in
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import-competing industries; (3) increased domestic con­
sumption; and (*0 increased foreign production.
In total, the alternatives clearly demonstrate the 
ability of the state trader to influence not only the 
conditions of its own exchange but also international 
prices, market conditions, and resource usages. Of course, 
the selection of one alternative over another depends on 
the motives and objectives of the traders. Additionally, 
price discrimination becomes a distinct possibility. It 
may arise because of increased monetary profits stemming 
from different demand conditions or because other non­
economic objectives may be sought which result in price 
discrimination (for economic gain or even possible loss).
Over the longer run, such pricing policies may 
either induce or hinder movement of factors of production. 
The normally assumed tendency of factor prices to equalize 
between trading nations can be severely dampened, or may be 
hastened. Moreover, when trade occurs between market and 
non-market nations (or non-market to non-market), price 
variations do not necessarily induce changes in factor use 
or factor prices in the non-market countries. In such 
countries, the use of factors (and their prices) is usually 
determined by the priorities of national plans rather than 
by market conditions.
The analysis of these trading practices and the 
consequences thereof made it evident that traditional
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theories based on comparative costs were insufficient for 
explaining which goods would be exchanged and at what price 
(or terms of trade) under state trading. As pointed out 
earlier, government trade developed from a variety of 
motives, and the comparative cost doctrine is simply not 
broad enough to explain all possible cases.
Basically, comparative cost theories have been 
attempts to explain the behavior of market-oriented 
economies. Under free trade conditions, each country tends 
to specialize in the production of those commodities whose 
production costs are relatively lower and import those 
items in which domestic producers have a comparative cost 
disadvantage. The motive behind trade is one of profit 
(with some possible restraints). However, as noted many 
times, state trading may be motivated by considerations 
other than economic. Moreover, even if trade is conducted 
for strictly economic purposes, the direction and pattern 
of exchange may be completely opposite to what comparative 
costs would dictate. For example, in the non-market case 
so amply portrayed by the Soviet Union (and other communist 
bloc nations) trade has followed directions that in many 
instances have not been according to comparative advantage. 
In these countries much of their trade has been viewed as 
a political and "plan fulfilling" phenomenon.
Similarly, market economies that practice state 
trading do not necessarily follow commercial principles of
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exchange. This situation is typical of many South Ameri­
can, African, and Par Eastern nations. Being relatively 
underdeveloped, they have turned to trade in order to 
achieve more sophistication in their economies and to foster 
industries that would not ordinarily appear without inter­
vention. This interference has been in the form of subsi­
dies to the industries to be prompted, or in the form of 
(or coupled with) state-trading practices.
However, perhaps of greater significance was the 
realization that many advanced countries also state trade 
along lines not necessarily consistent with comparative 
advantage. The U. S., for instance, promotes the produc­
tion of agricultural commodities through its various 
assistance programs to farmers. Surpluses have often 
resulted which have been purchased by the government and 
later sold internationally. The essential fact, of course, 
is that the government trader has indirectly encouraged 
domestic production which may or may not be in line with 
the long-term comparative advantage of the United States.
More generally, the state trader may alter supplies 
by creating conditions which induce or hinder the creation 
of traded goods. Without reviewing all the presented cases, 
it was noted that domestic production was stimulated when 
overtrading was practiced and hindered with undertrading. 
Conversely, the reverse was true for the trading partners.
19^
It is, therefore, possible that production may be directed 
to areas which may not reflect relative efficiency or 
productive competence.
On the demand side, traditional theories were also 
found less than fully capable of explaining the prices, 
direction, and volume of state trade. Demand, reflected by 
offer curves, may be expressed in terms of the willingness 
of one nation to exchange a certain bundle of goods against 
the export bundle of another country. If the curves are 
constructed so as to incorporate political as well as 
economic preferences, the outer limits to trade (price 
lines) could reveal an enlarged bargaining zone subject to 
influence by the economic and political power of the con­
cerned parties. It is, therefore, evident that the state 
trader does not necessarily conform to trading patterns 
traditionally explained by comparative cost doctrines.
This is especially true within non-market countries and in 
market economies where non-economic considerations dominate 
exchange policies. Even when traditional theory is modi­
fied, it is not completely satisfactory for all the pos­
sible situations that can arise. Under either barter 
conditions or the more normal money-based transactions, 
various limits are established wherein exchange can occur. 
However, the power positions of the respective nations can 
dominate the outcome, overwhelming economic considerations.
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State trading, therefore, does not always lead to 
nice, neat determinate solutions. Prices (the terms of 
trade) and the direction of traded commodities may not be 
able to be rationalized by traditional theory. Past work 
by Edgeworth and others has provided possible solutions to 
the bilateral monopoly problem. However, these approaches 
are fraught with many difficulties. The game theory 
approach of Von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced in the 
early 19^0*s proved more beneficial.
Game theory utilizes formal models in the analysis 
of decision making within the realm of conflict. It 
generally deals with problems involving opposition between 
one or more parties, with cooperation also possible. The 
motivation for participation may be economic, political, 
psychological, or any other force behind human endeavors—  
including those found within state trading.
In those cases analyzed within this study, however, 
certain restrictions or assumptions were made. Of course, 
this is true of all models where pre-set rules are 
required. In the presented case of a zero sum game, each 
side was assigned a value for each possible move or 
strategy. The exporter and importer then had to choose a 
strategy which ensured that over the length of the game, 
each player's losses would be confined to a minimum. Two 
possibilities were discussed, games with saddle points and
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those without saddle points. In both situations probability 
played a decisive role. Probabilities, however, are 
partially determined by relative power positions.
In considering the impact of power in state trading, 
several dimensions were identified. These included:
(1) the base of power, (2) the means of power, (3) the 
scope of power, (^) the opportunity cost of power to both 
players, (5) and the most critical— the amount of power.
In total, player A had greater power over 3 when A's costs 
to force compliance were smaller and when B's disutility 
for refusing were larger. It was noted that these costs 
could be expressed in physical units, monetary units, or 
abstract utility measurements. A's power over B thus 
included not only the ability of A to secure desired 
action from B with a certain probability, but also within 
a certain cost to A.
In total, the maximum amount of power that player 
A had over B was equal to the strength that A had over B 
divided by B's disutility of performing an action. 
Realistically speaking, however, such a measure required 
theoretical probabilities: in state trading, it was noted
that nation B's behavior might be observed over a series 
of similar events in which B complied with A in some pro­
portion of the times. Probability in this sense became 
empirical frequencies. B's behavior yielded disutility of
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various amounts in the observed events. B, therefore, com­
plied with A in those cases when the disutility was 
smallest.
As an illustration of the described situation, 
including those elements of costs, probability, and power, 
the Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi model was utilized and modified.
In this model of bilateral power, both traders' functions 
were analyzed. That is, both state traders' power func­
tions were viewed simultaneously.
Symbolically, when consideration was given to all 
possibilities— including retaliatory strategies— 3 selected 
a strategy s(p2 ), the equilibrium probability, which allowed 
the amount of A's power over B to beAp = P2 - P^ (the 
difference in two probabilities). When A and B agree from 
this to do act Y with the probability p2 then B's non­
performance for act Y assumed the probability of 1 - p2» 
Technically speaking, A and 3 agreed on a jointly randomized 
mixed strategy with a probability p2 for B and 1 - p2 
probability of non-compliance for A. As noted by Harsanyi:
. . .A's power over 3 with respect to 
action . . . tends to be equal to half the net 
strength of A's power over B with respect to the 
same action . . . this net strength being defined 
as the difference between the gross relative 
strength of A's power over B . . . and the gross 
relative strength of B's power over A with respect 
to the complementary action
■*NSee page 121, Chapter V.
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With respect to state trading the described system 
yielded multiple results. First, it provided an equilibrium 
probability for action in the example considered. In addi­
tion, the solution was Pareto Optimum, for neither state 
trader could increase its utility without harming the other 
trader. Thirdly, retaliatory strategies could be and were 
included for the more normal case of conflict between 
parties.
In addition, when the system was carried into
matrix squares and modified with an additional marginal
♦
cost-marginal benefit analysis a more descriptive and 
complete matrix was found. At this point, the complemen­
tary nature of each method became apparent. That is,
(1) the minimax-maximin solution (or the more complex 
mixed strategy approach), (2) the equilibrium solution of 
Zeuthen, Nash, and Harsanyi, and (3) method Ill's cost- 
benefit analysis— all revealed useful and complementary 
and new insights into the state trading process. Finally, 
the game theory model proved capable of application to the 
American wheat deal with the Soviet Union and in the OPEC 
oil case.
In general, then, the study has served to point up 
a number of previously neglected aspects of state trading. 
First, the investigation has suggested that governmental 
exchange is subject to somewhat of a fluctuating pattern.
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Secondly, the notion of comparative costs was found to be 
insufficient when applied to most state trading cases.
This was especially true when non-economic considerations 
motivated trade. Thirdly, it was shown to be analytically 
possible (as in the case of wheat and oil) to apply various 
game theory methods to the state trading phenomenon, and 
glean important insights in the process.
As a result of these findings, it is possible to 
form several conclusions about the nature, relevance, and 
impact of government exchange. Specifically, government 
trade varying as economic and political conditions change 
will give policy makers, "planning for" government com­
merce and its consequences, many difficulties. That is, 
given its cyclical pattern, it will be possible to under 
(or over) estimate its magnitude in some future time 
period. Moreover, errors are even possible in estimating 
its present volume given current recording practices.
To illustrate this problem, as may be recalled 
there is room for possible disagreement as to exactly what 
state trading is and what it is not. Perhaps an example 
would be helpful. In the wheat deal, two forms of state 
trading were employed. One involved the credit arrangements 
provided to the Soviet Union by the Commodity Credit 
Corporation. Credit in many instances, however, is not 
viewed as a commodity per se. If the arrangements are
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viewed this way, the deal would not be classified as state 
trading. Taking an alternative view that money (credit) 
can be treated as a commodity, state trading was practiced. 
Of course, the significance lies in the possible under- (or 
over) statement of the magnitude of government commerce and 
hence the need for consistent recording practices.
Hand in hand with the recording practice difficul­
ties, there also exists a data problem for the game theory 
model itself. As was revealed certain information about 
the players was required. Of course, much of it was sub­
ject to interpretation in this study, because the necessary 
data were often unknown, unpublished, or unavailable. 
Perhaps the accounting or recording methods of governments 
should be modified to further illuminate their trans­
actions so that a more "quantitative” analysis can be made. 
As things are, the analysis had to be, as with much of 
economics, descriptive. It is capable of interpretation 
by economists, and policy suggestions can derive from it, 
but its usefulness is still limited by the data available 
for the model. Its value lies primarily in the insights 
it offers into the nature of power, the penalties, rewards, 
strategies, and so forth which heretofore had not been 
applied to state trading.
It follows from the above, that if difficulties 
exist in the data, there may exist difficulties in
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assessing the importance of state trading. However, it has 
been seen that the planned economies of the i*orld (with 
more than half the world's population) for the most part 
are complete government traders. The United States, along 
with many European, African, South American and Far 
Eastern nations practice some degree of their own special 
brands of governmental exchange. Moreover, the influence 
and impact of even relatively small state traders can be 
extremely significant. The OPEC case and the present oil 
embargo is ample evidence in itself. It might even be said 
that government commerce (or lack of it) is capable of 
influencing national boundaries: the final international
boundaries between Israel and its neighbors will surely be 
influenced by the oil policies and oil "pressures" applied 
by OPEC. The growing volume of "0PEC0 dollars" will also 
have an important impact on the monetary, fiscal, and in­
vestment policies of many countries. The International 
Monetary Fund is presently having to reconsider its plans 
for future world monetary arrangements in light of much 
higher oil prices and their impact on payment balances for 
the nations of the world. The examples are virtually 
endless.
As for the future importance of government commerce 
(and of special significance to the United States), recent 
events have made it quite obvious that renewed interest is
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again developing in the state trading process. As the 
world becomes more competitive, especially between trading 
blocs, it is apparent that government exchange will play a 
larger and larger role. In many areas and with many com­
modities there is a growing division of interests (both 
political and economic) between those nations having the 
goods for exchange and those seeking such items. As in the 
cases of wheat and crude oil, the nations of the world are 
finding themselves more dependent upon foreign sources.
If such conditions continue to prevail, the United States 
may paradoxically find itself increasing its state trading 
practices while professing freer trade to the world. Even 
now, in the early 1970's, the U. S. is pressing for reduced 
discrimination in order to increase the competitiveness of 
its goods in foreign markets. These efforts will surely 
continue when consideration is given to this nation's 
enormous and continuing payments deficit and the growing 
production capabilities of other nations.
Thus, one of the many unanswered questions concern­
ing the future of state trading will be the role of the 
United States. As was noted, government trade can be used 
as a policy vehicle for assistance purposes or it may be 
used against countries. The latter aspect, as evidenced by 
the activities of the OPEC, can be of crucial significance 
to the practicing nations and its trading partners.
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Benefits (or costs) may be political, military, and/or 
economic. Usually, they (benefits and costs) are some 
combination of the three possibilities for it is rare, if 
not impossible, for a nation to limit its actions to those 
of a strictly economic nature.
As for the United States, it may find itself com­
pelled to use those means at its disposal to maintain and/ 
or increase its influence in the world. However, as noted 
at the beginning of this study:
When governments are also conductors of 
economic enterprise in the international field, 
what results is a pattern or intergovernmental 
relationship in which economic, political, and 
military bilateral monopoly plus duopoly are all 
wrapped up in one package of internationaldynamite.2
The conclusion is obvious. If the U. S. or any 
other nation(s) continues to use and/or expand their state 
trading practices, much more attention should be given to 
further inquiry and analysis of government exchange. It 
is puzzling— indeed, almost paradoxical— that so very little 
in the profession literature is devoted to this area. Only 
through continued research can more of the causes, conse­
quences, and theoretical explanations be found— which 
hopefully, will enlighten governments to the enormous
2Viner, loc. cit.
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impact of their dealings and perhaps in time temper their 
actions toward "commercial" standards of exchange.
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